

MARCH 1956

COMMENTARY

The Return of Two-Party Politics

SAMUEL LUBELL

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Is an Arab-Israeli War Inevitable?

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Britain's Traditional Hold Fails

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
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
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


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COMMENTARY

MARCH 1956

VOLUME 21, NUMBER 3

The Return of Two-Party Politics	<i>Samuel Lubell</i>	201
The Crisis in the Middle East		
Is an Arab-Israeli War Inevitable?	<i>Hal Lehrman</i>	210
Britain's Traditional Hold Fails	<i>George Lichtheim</i>	222
The Community and I: Two Years Later	<i>Evelyn N. Rossman</i>	230
Toynbee and the Culture Cycle	<i>Franz Borkenau</i>	239
A Case Study in Due Process	<i>Maurice J. Goldbloom</i>	250
From the American Scene		
The Politicians	<i>S. L. Blumenson</i>	257
Cedars of Lebanon		
Why a Jew Studies		267
The Destructive Will <i>A Poem</i>	<i>Harvey Shapiro</i>	268
On the Horizon		
Gibbsville and New Leeds	<i>Norman Podhoretz</i>	269
The Study of Man		
Automation and the Future Society	<i>Arnold M. Rose</i>	274
Letters from Readers		281
Books in Review		
The Rungless Ladder, by Charles H. Foster;		
The American Adam, by R. W. B. Lewis	<i>Richard Chase</i>	283
Epstein: An Autobiography, by Sir Jacob Epstein	<i>Alfred Werner</i>	285
America at Mid-Century, by André Siegfried	<i>Oscar Handlin</i>	290
On Jewish Law and Lore, by Louis Ginzberg	<i>Nahum N. Glatzer</i>	291
The Jewish Festival Cookbook, by Fannie Engle		
and Gertrude Blair; The Jewish Holiday Cook		
Book, by Leah W. Leonard	<i>Ruth Glazer</i>	294
The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, by		
Leonard Schapiro; The Russian Marxists		
and the Origins of Bolshevism, by Leopold		
H. Haimson	<i>Bertram D. Wolfe</i>	295

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COMMENTARY, incorporating *Contemporary Jewish Record*: Published monthly by the American Jewish Committee, 50¢ a copy; \$6.00 a year; 2 years, \$10.00; 3 years, \$14.00. No additional charge for Canadian or foreign postage. Offices, 34 West 33rd Street, New York 1. Re-entered as second class matter October 30, 1945 at the post office in New York, N. Y. under the act of March 3, 1879. Copyright 1956 by the American Jewish Committee. All rights, including translation into other languages, reserved by the publisher in the United States, Great Britain, Mexico, and all countries participating in the International Copyright Convention and the Pan-American Copyright Convention. Indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Magazine Subject Index, and Public Affairs Information Service.

IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES OF

COMMENTARY

The Anglo-Jewish Tercentenary

Cecil Roth

This year English Jewry celebrates the three-hundredth anniversary of its "Resettlement"—that is, of the readmission of Jews to England in 1656. An eminent historian advances a new interpretation of that event, which illuminates the nature of British and also American Jewry.

Judaism and the Hellenistic Experience

Moses Hadas

A distinguished classical scholar upsets several major clichés about the extent to which Judaism was influenced by the Hellenistic world, and comes up with a suggestive view of the relation of Judaism to Western culture throughout the ages.

Images of the Child

Stanley Edgar Hyman

A survey of some recent literature on child-rearing produced by the comparative anthropologists on the one hand, and several Gesellian experts on the other. By a critic who has had his own extensive experience of parenthood.

Anatomy of Congress

Samuel Lubell

In a second article by the well-known analyst of domestic politics, the question of new national party alignments in the future is discussed. Are there any prospects that a new dominant political majority will emerge to overcome what is, in effect, the present stalemate?

"Papa"

David Boroff

The pathos of a life in which the values of the Old World stubbornly refuse to give way to the techniques of American living, as seen in a son's portrait. In the department "From the American Scene."

Anti-Semitism in the USSR

Peter Meyer

The quashing of the "Moscow doctors' plot" has by no means put a halt to anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia, this report indicates. A study based on interviews with refugees.

COMMENTARY

THE RETURN OF TWO-PARTY POLITICS

Battling for the Middle Ground

SAMUEL LUBELL

FOR a full generation the Republicans have suffered from an inferiority complex, reflecting a painful awareness that they lacked political sex appeal on economic issues. After each of the five Roosevelt-Truman victories, Republican leaders found that the voting returns of any city pretty much matched its income map. In silk-stocking neighborhoods the Republicans would do well, but the lower down the eco-

THIS is the first of two articles by SAMUEL LUBELL on current trends in American politics, both of them drawn from a book, *Revolt of the Moderates*, that Harper will publish in April. Mr. Lubell earned a national reputation as a political analyst in 1952 with another book, *The Future of American Politics*, whose conclusions were sensationally confirmed several months later by Eisenhower's election. An article by Mr. Lubell based on material in that volume was published in our April 1952 number. Mr. Lubell, who was born in Poland in 1911 and came here at the age of two, was educated at CCNY (night) and the Columbia School of Journalism. At present a free-lancer, he has worked for many newspapers and contributed to many magazines, among them the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Reader's Digest*. In 1952 he received the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award from the American Political Science Association. During both the 1952 and 1954 election campaigns Mr. Lubell devoted himself to door-to-door interviews, and his predictions turned out to be remarkably accurate.

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nomic ladder one went, the thinner the Republican vote got.

Since the depression Republican political strategy has been dominated by *one* driving motive—a hunt for issues or candidates which would divert popular attention from this weakness on bread and work issues. This lack of economic confidence largely explains the eagerness with which so many Republicans have capitalized on the disillusionments of foreign policy. Until the GOP regains its economic nerve, it is doubtful that it can serve as a truly stable and constructive party.

Even Eisenhower's landslide sweep of thirty-nine states did not erase the line of economic cleavage which Roosevelt drew. Eisenhower, it is true, cracked some of the strongest Roosevelt citadels. He won San Francisco, Bridgeport, and New Haven, which had not voted for a Republican President since Calvin Coolidge; also Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Seattle, Buffalo, and Rochester, which had been Democratic since 1932. In our twelve most populous cities, Eisenhower lifted the Republican share of the vote from 38 per cent in 1948 to 44 per cent.

But when one examines the Eisenhower vote in the major cities ward by ward, it still stratifies consistently along income lines. Gaining at all income levels, his vote over-

rode rather than wiped out the economic cleavage.

What happened was summed up by a Detroit worker. A lifelong Democrat, he was explaining why he favored Eisenhower. Mainly he was "sick of having politicians running the country" and wanted "this inflation stopped." His ten-year-old son interrupted to ask, "Daddy, what is the difference between a Democrat and a Republican?"

"That's a good question, son," the father replied. "The Republicans are for people with money and the Democrats are for us poor people."

The fact that this man was marking his ballot for Eisenhower had not wiped out his consciousness of a class conflict between the "common man" and "economic royalist" which Roosevelt had etched so sharply in the minds of millions of Americans. His sense of economic interest had simply been subordinated temporarily to other grievances.

In brief, that was the pattern of the whole of Eisenhower's victory. Warren Harding and Herbert Hoover had both won a higher percentage of the popular vote, but Eisenhower was the first Republican President since the Civil War to draw substantial electoral support from every section of the nation, from grandchildren of both Union and Confederate veterans, from both farms and cities, suburbs and slums.

He won 31 of the 57 counties which had been Democratic since Al Smith's candidacy and 278 of the 366 counties which had been Democratic since 1932. He carried counties like Brown and Union in Illinois, Brown and Dubois in Indiana, and Queen Annes in Maryland which had never voted for a Republican President before.

But if the historic significance of Eisenhower's vote lay in just this fact that it was a truly national vote which surmounted the many bitter partisan cleavages of the past, it also posed one question for future elections to decide:

Could these old antagonisms be subdued for good? Or would the past rise to reassert itself?

THE first voting test—in 1954—was generally interpreted as a victory for the past. Actually, it marked the emergence of a "new look" in American voting which is likely to dominate our elections for some years to come.

Many Democrats, of course, returned to their old ballot markings. Some had voted for Eisenhower in conscious defiance of what they considered their economic interest because of the Korean war. Others had used the Eisenhower "crusade" as a means of purging their own party. As a lawyer in suburban Riverside, near Chicago, put it, "I'm not sorry I went for Eisenhower. The Democrats were in too long. But we've had the change and I still feel the Democrats are more the party of the little fellow."

But the 1954 voting also tore loose old allegiances. A cheesemaker in Des Moines, a railway express worker in Boston, a television shop owner in Minneapolis, a clerk in Detroit, a used-car dealer in Columbus, a Negro factory worker in Newark—in nearly every city I sampled during the campaign some persons told me, "There was so much depression talk in 1952 I was afraid to vote for Eisenhower, but I'd go Republican in 1956."

Others, like Joseph Schultz, a young Cincinnati salesman, had feared "a military man might get us into war." In 1954 Schultz swung Republican, explaining, "I'm better off than ever. I like being out of war for a change."

The closeness of the 1954 voting led to much talk of how confusing the election seemed. By and large, though, the results were a remarkably accurate reflection of economic conditions as they varied in different parts of the country. Where the downturn from 1952 was sharp, as in Michigan and Minnesota, the Democrats swept in. Where the level of prosperity was high, the Republicans held their own or even picked up voters.

In the shuffle of ballots, one item of striking significance was widely overlooked—in a vote dominated by pocketbook considerations the Republicans had come close to running the Democrats a dead heat.

The booming prosperity since 1954 has strengthened further the Republican economic appeal. Among farmers the Republicans have been weakened appreciably by the decline in farm prices. But in urban and industrial areas the old "hard times" imprint that has been the chief Republican liability has been fading—just how fast is the question that probably will decide the 1956 election.

Younger voters, in particular, who did not live through the depression, are inclined to credit the GOP with their economic advancement of recent years. In one middle-class neighborhood in Detroit, a young man was loading his wife and two children into a car when I asked whom he voted for in 1952.

"Stevenson," he replied. "That was my first vote, but I'm going Republican now.

"We've just bought a new home," he went on. "Besides, I've been promoted to the administrative side of my company. It's shown me that there's another side to the story of how a company is run besides what the workers see. I never appreciated that before."

There has been enough shifting of this sort so that, in a talk before the National Editorial Writers Conference in the fall of 1955, I expressed the judgment that the odds favored a Republican victory in 1956. That did not mean the Republicans could win with any candidate, I explained, but if the boom continued they would be able to go to the country with the economic edge in their favor for the first time since "those Hoover times."

Still, it is also my judgment that neither party is likely to win a truly decisive majority before 1960 and possibly not until 1964.

PART of the Republican problem, of course, is the wide gap between Eisenhower's personal popularity and how people feel about the Republican party. On one Cleveland street in 1954, three voters declared, "I'd vote for Eisenhower but I have no use for the Republican party." One of these per-

sons went so far as to say, "I'm for Eisenhower because he's a pretty good Democrat."

But my main reason for feeling that a decisive victory lies beyond either party's reach has little to do with Eisenhower personally. My judgment is based on what seem the main forces behind the truly "big news" of the 1954 election—the dramatic reappearance of a real, nationwide two-party politics.

Only rarely has the United States had two evenly competing parties. The usual pattern has been for one clearly dominant party to hold office until its following divided, as with the Republicans until split by the Bull Moose Roosevelt. The advent of the New Deal did not alter this pattern but switched the role of the parties, with the Democrats becoming the majority sun in our political solar system and the Republicans the minority moon.

But the 1954 voting demonstrated that there no longer was a "normal," decisive majority on which either party could count. In New Jersey and Connecticut only 3,000-odd ballots provided the margin of victory; in Oregon less than 2,500; in New York Averell Harriman won by 11,125. In all, fourteen Senatorial and gubernatorial contests were settled by less than two per cent of the vote. Outside the South a mere 34,000 votes was the difference between the Democratic and Republican totals for Congress.

To find a period in our history when the major parties were so jealously close, one would have to turn back beyond the voting span of all but a few venerable octogenarians. Between 1877 and 1896 the national political balance was so precariously poised that no party could win the Presidency twice in succession or hold control of both houses of Congress for two terms running.

"This country needs two parties" has long been a favorite slogan of reformers. Yet hardly any of us have had any living experience with such a political situation. So novel a development merits further scrutiny. Why should a genuine two-party politics reappear in the United States at this time? Does it promise to aid or obstruct us in meeting the tests of world leadership?

MOST observers assumed that the 1954 stand-off vote was brought about primarily by a resurgence of Democratic strength. But if the returns are examined county by county and ward by ward, one finds that through most of the country the Republicans actually held a good part of Eisenhower's gains over 1948. At the same time, though, they failed to hold their strength in areas considered as religiously Republican.

Of the five states where the GOP Congressional vote fell 10 per cent or more from 1952—Kentucky, Wisconsin, Vermont, Maine, and North Dakota—three have regularly ranked among the top Republican states in the nation. Of thirty-two contested districts where the GOP candidates for Congress dropped at least ten percentage points from 1952, five never voted Democratic through the entire New Deal period, while another ten have been Republican since 1940.

Puzzled at what stirred behind this shift, I went into three staunchly Republican counties—Geauga in Ohio, Isabella in Michigan, and Bedford in Pennsylvania—where the Democratic percentage jumped considerably above 1948. This meant that in each of these counties not only had the Democrats who voted for Eisenhower swung back, but they had been joined by normally Republican voters as well.

In all three counties, Eisenhower voters who had gone Democratic offered the same explanation. "The Republicans around here have been in too long. We wanted a change."

"This county is ready for two-party politics," declared John Gore, who edits the weekly *Geauga Record*. "We're tired of being taken for granted any more. This county got on the Republican bandwagon during the Civil War and has never been off it since. The local machine thinks we have to vote for anyone they put up. It's time we were given a real choice."

This desire for an alternative party through which voters can make their interests felt has gained surprising force since

the war's end. In some cases it reflects the feeling that "the only way to prevent corruption is to change parties regularly." Even in overwhelmingly Republican suburbs, as in Bergen County, New Jersey, Democratic mayors have been elected in revolts against the corruption of local Republican machines. Similarly, in Boston, one city employee confessed to me, "I used to think I had to vote the Democratic ticket even if the biggest horse thief was running. But by splitting my ticket I figure we get more honest men."

With many more voters, though, the turn toward a two-party politics reflects the effects of the vast economic changes which have been transforming the country. Particularly since the end of World War II there has been a dramatic upgrading in the economic status of most Americans. The decentralization of industry is shooting shafts of industrial feeling into the hitherto rustic countryside. With the power of government growing ever more important, every economic group has become more sensitive to the need of making its own interests felt in Washington.

Thus far, at least, the net political effect of these and other changes appears to be a trend toward evening out the strength of both parties.

THE spectacular population shift to the suburbs, for example, has thrown up Republican bulwarks which come close to counterbalancing the Democratic strongholds in the cities. In 1952, in fact, for the first time the commuter country around New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee rolled up heavier majorities for the Republicans than these cities gave the Democrats.

Close to half of Eisenhower's total plurality in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New York State was furnished by the suburbs around Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York City. In 1920, as can be seen below, these same suburbs furnished less than 10 per cent of the total Republican plurality in the three states.

*Per Cent of Republican State Plurality Cast
by Suburbs*

	1920	1952
Philadelphia suburbs	8	52
N. Y. suburbs	8	44
Chicago suburbs	7	40

In the decisive industrial states, in other words, the rural-urban cleavage of the 1920's is being replaced by a new struggle of the suburbs against the cities.

This change, in turn, reflects a growing tendency for all voting throughout the country to divide along economic class lines. The New Deal unloosed powerful trends which have been working to nationalize the basis of American politics. These trends have been quickened and extended by the Eisenhower Presidency.

But if considerations of economic class are becoming more, not less, important in American politics, it should be noted that this "class conflict" is more a "war of movement" within a mobile social structure than one of trench attrition between rigid, unchanging social halves.

The table which follows profiles the distinctive nature of class conflict in the United States. It shows that changes in the relative solidarity of the upper- and lower-income groups move together. In 1936 the workers in the cities were militant in their unison, while the better-income elements in the suburbs were divided almost evenly. By 1952 a complete about-face had taken place. The center of gravity of class solidarity had shifted to the suburbs and the cities were divided within themselves.

A Profile of Class Solidarity

	<i>Per Cent Republican</i>		
	1936	1948	1952
<i>New York</i>			
Vote in city	24	35	44
Nearby suburbs	54	66	69
<i>Philadelphia</i>			
Vote in city	37	48	41
Nearby suburbs	52	64	63
<i>Cleveland</i>			
Vote in city	30	35	40
Nearby suburbs	54	62	63
<i>Chicago</i>			
Vote in city	33	41	45
Nearby suburbs	50	64	66

Los Angeles

Vote in city	28	42	52
Nearby suburbs	36	51	59

Compared with 1948, Eisenhower gained more heavily in the cities than in the suburbs, indicating that many of the newer suburbanites the GOP won in 1952 would have voted Republican even if they had stayed in the cities. In fact, this table shows that the same forces which have solidified the well-to-do have simultaneously divided the workers. My talks with numerous voters in recent years leave little doubt that, economically, this change reflects mainly a growing sensitivity to inflation and, with it, a stiffened resistance against "government going too far."

In 1936, of course, there was nothing to distract the mass of workers from a single-minded devotion to the New Deal. Fresh in their memories tingled all the depression grievances. More than \$500 million were still frozen in locked banks. Of the total national tax burden, only 5 per cent was borne by incomes under \$5,000, which was where Roosevelt drew his greatest political strength.

By 1952 roughly a third of the tax burden was being borne by incomes under \$5,000. This new tax consciousness was stimulated further by the sizable migration out of apartment houses, where taxes are hidden in the rent, to home-owning with its sundry local taxes. By 1952, as well, the volume of savings held by individuals and subject to depreciation by inflation had more than tripled, soaring from \$60 to \$216 billion.

In short, the main force generating the current trend toward conservatism will be found in the economic gains since the depression. These gains hold the secret to the puzzle of why neither the Democrats nor Republicans are able to achieve a decisive majority.

For to some millions of voters both parties symbolize a threat to these gains in different ways.

MANY commentators and scholars, of course, contend that "there isn't any

real difference" between our two parties. Certainly there have been times in the past when, as Matt Quay, the old Pennsylvania boss, observed, a Democrat seemed like "only a left-handed Republican." But at least since the New Deal the voting public has not shared this belief that our parties provide little more choice than between Tweedledem and Tweedledep.

Over the last decade I have asked thousands of voters in every part of the country, "Just what difference do you see between our two parties?" The striking thing that emerges is how uniform is the consensus on what the parties stand for.

On foreign policy the Democrats are considered the party of foreign intervention, even, as some persons feel, the party that is "always getting us into wars," while the Republicans are regarded as the party of "isolationism" or less involvement abroad.

Economically, the Democrats are looked upon as "the party of the working man," inflation, and government spending, while the Republicans symbolize "big business" and "people with money," deflation, and less government spending.

Another difference commonly cited is that the Democrats are the favored political home for Catholics and other minority groups, while the Republican party, at least in the North, is still seen as largely a Protestant bulwark.

Each party's following cuts across these battle lines, of course. Still, the strength these stereotypes exert can be seen in the readiness with which people align themselves according to these images almost without second thought. Asked why he had switched to being a Republican, one Minnesotan grinned and replied, "I'll tell you the truth. I married a wife with some money."

Again, one Milwaukee housewife remarked that she was shifting to Eisenhower because she was tired of arguing with her husband. "He's a Republican and I'm a Democrat. Every four years I've had to listen to him tell me what's wrong with the Democrats. I finally told him all right, have it

your way. Let's see what your Republicans will do."

"Why do you and your husband differ so strongly in politics?" I asked.

"Oh, his father is in business so he thinks he has to be a Republican," she retorted. "I come from a family where everyone had to work hard for a living. We're all Democrats."

The depth of emotion behind these attitudes largely explains why so many voters find it difficult to choose decisively between the parties. For if the Republicans remain the "party of bad times" to many voters, others feel "the Democrats can't stay out of war." Similarly, farmers or workers will remark, "The Democrats have always done more for people like us," only to add, "But they don't know when to stop spending." Or the same man or woman will complain, "There's too much money in Eisenhower's cabinet," and then observe, "But the Democrats lean too much to labor."

Caught among these conflicting fears, a sizable part of the electorate has developed what might be described as a strong case of political insomnia, tossing from one party bed to another. Many voters have told me they shift their votes from one election to the next to "keep either party from getting too strong." Other voters have swung between the parties as their fears of inflation and depression have risen and fallen.

At least since 1948 this inflation-depression equilibrium has constituted the balance of political power in the country. When the threat of another depression has seemed the chief threat to the gains of recent years, as in 1948, the dominant voting trend has favored the Democrats. By 1950, and even more so by 1952, the inflationary impact of the Korean war had swung the balance against "too much spending" and "too much government." In 1954 the scales tipped back again, coming to rest in almost dead-weight evenness.

MANY observers attributed the change between the 1952 landslide and the 1954 stand-off to Eisenhower's not being on the

ticket in 1954. But the real difference between the two elections was not one of personalities.

In 1952 the public's thinking was dominated by the bloody stalemate in Korea. On that issue the popular mood was to demand a decision—to get the war over with one way or another. In 1954, however, the dominant issue was economic. On that issue millions of voters did not fully trust either party.

What the decisive margin of voters wanted was clear enough. They wanted to stay squarely in the "middle," avoiding depression and war, deflation and inflation, too much or too little government, too heavy a preponderance of influence for either business or labor.

This, of course, adds up to the same goal of "moderate government" which Eisenhower professed during the 1954 campaign. But where Eisenhower sought to convince the public that moderation could best be attained through the Republican party, the people preferred to seek it by using each party as a check upon the other.

Near McLeansboro, in southern Illinois, to give one example, Carroll Phillips, who combines preaching in a Baptist church with farming, felt Eisenhower was doing a "fine job" and deserved re-election. But when I asked about Eisenhower's campaign arguments that a President should have a Congress of the same party, Phillips replied, "It's better to have it split up so neither party has too much say."

This widespread distrust of both parties, I suspect, explains why so many people have talked of Eisenhower as being "above both parties," despite his strenuous activity on behalf of the GOP. It is not that the people are being fooled but that they want a President before whom they can deposit their mistrusts of both parties.

That this feeling does not reflect Eisenhower's personal charm is indicated by the popularity of many other politicians who are "liberal" on some issues and "conservative" on others, like Senators Paul Douglas, Stuart Symington, and Irving Ives. Through such "hybrid" candidates the voters can

pick the traits they like about both parties.

Since 1954 this desire for two evenly balanced parties has grown stronger in the farm belt. In the urban areas the conservative yearning to "hold on to what we have" can be expected to help the party in power as long as economic conditions are good. Still, booming prosperity does not seem to have overcome the desire to hedge one's fears of the uncertain future by balancing one party against the other.

This mistrust of both parties helps explain why the realignment now under way differs so markedly from that which followed Roosevelt's rise to power.

The reshuffling of party loyalties precipitated by the New Deal was a mass affair, with whole groups of voters swinging virtually en masse. Basically this was made possible by the fact that when Roosevelt came into office he quickly transformed what the Democratic party meant to people.

Negroes, for example, had remained loyal to the party of Abraham Lincoln in 1932, despite all their depression hardships. By 1936, however, they had swung with equal solidarity to the party which had introduced WPA and given every Negro a minimum standard below which his wages could not be cut, since he could then go on relief.

Similarly, the bulk of workers, who had never felt there was too much choice between the parties during the 1920's, marched virtually as a bloc into what many termed the new "labor party."

In contrast the Republican gains of recent years have come through a shifting of individuals, not groups. At every income level and among all social classes, one finds some families who have turned Republican, but there has not yet been any dramatic conversion of whole blocs of voters.

This slow tempo of realignment can be attributed to the curious paradox that both the voters and the country have changed so much more than have the symbols attached to the parties.

To sum up, the usual agitation for a "real two-party politics" has come from those who wanted to draw a sharp line of cleavage

which would force all "conservatives" into one party and all "liberals" into the other. But the reappearance of a two-party politics at this perilous point in our history has virtually nothing in common with any such motive. Instead of seeking to sharpen the party cleavage, it is aimed at moderating both parties and using them to preserve the gains of the last two decades.

What has happened, in short, is that the moderate elements, by refusing to cast their lot with either party, have forced both the Democrats and Republicans to turn their backs on the extremists in their ranks and to fight for the middle ground where the balance of victory lies.

Nothing quite like this revolt of the moderates has ever taken place before, and it may be several years before its full and novel implications are fully understood. Usually in the past when large numbers of Americans became dissatisfied with both parties, they gave vent to their grievance through third parties. From 1876 until McKinley's election the numerous third parties, from Greenbackers to Populists, prevented any President from gaining a full majority of the popular vote. In both 1876 and 1888 the winner actually got fewer votes than the loser.

These third-party insurgencies were sparked by a belief that the only real difference between the Democratic and Republican parties was that each was a custodian of different feelings toward the Civil War. Apart from that, many persons felt the parties were so alike that the truly crucial economic issues of the day could not be brought to conflict.

Today's revolt against both parties is clearly a quite different affair. It comes after a bitter period of party strife during which the Democrats and Republicans differed sharply on both economic issues and foreign policy. If the 1876-96 period could be said to have been marked by a search for ideological issues which would draw the parties apart, the dominant trend today can be visualized as a struggle to shed old ideologies.

But this reappearance of two-party politics also brings a double danger.

WITH both the Democrats and Republicans committed to preserving the gains of the last generation, our parties have become, as one voter pictured them, "like two fat men in a narrow hall." They cannot squeeze past each other. Either they move in the same direction or remain stuck in unbudging deadlock.

One danger, in other words, is of stalemate rather than balance. The second risk is that both parties may indeed move in the same direction—but against the interests of our foreign policy and security in the world.

The closeness of the voting balance tends to enhance the bargaining power of every major voting interest. Each is in a position to threaten to upset the party in power by withholding or swinging its support. While these rival pressures offset each other to some extent, they tend to elevate the needs of domestic conciliation over the needs of waging the cold war abroad. For fear of upsetting the delicate political balance at home, *both* parties may shy from the military or economic actions which might be needed to meet new developments in the cold war.

Take the raging argument over how much of a defense expenditure we can afford. The contention that our economy "cannot stand" more is certainly not valid in any physical sense. Industrial production has been pushed a full tenth higher than during the peak of World War II, while our labor force has been expanded by several millions. Obviously, the resources and facilities are available for an even heavier defense effort than was undertaken in World War II. No proposed program of defense and foreign aid combined calls for more than a part of what was done during the war years.

The ceiling on how much of a cold war effort we can stand is political, not economic. It is set primarily by the American people's sense of the urgency of the crisis before them and the amount of political will power that can be marshaled to see through the costs of what is undertaken.

It is at this sticking point of political will power that the delicate party balance exacts its price. With inflation made a constant

threat by the domestic boom, it does not take much to upset the balance among various segments of the economy. Yet, as the 1954 elections revealed, voters have become so sensitive to their economic interests that even moderate changes in economic conditions can shift the party balance.

The internal resistances limiting the power we can exercise in foreign affairs have been strengthened by a curious illusion that has developed in recent years—that no one needs to pay for the cold war.

That, at least, is the implication of the attitude which has been adopted by all of the major economic interests. All have taken as the measure of their well-being the income left them *after* taxes are paid. Labor, for example, contends that a steady rise in its take-home pay is needed to keep mass purchasing power high; business has insisted that higher earnings and dividends are necessary to continue a high rate of investment in new plants.

BUT if everyone is to be better off, net, after taxes are paid, who is to foot the bill for the cold war, which has been taking about a seventh of our national income?

One result, of course, is a struggle among the various segments of the economy to shift the cost of the cold war elsewhere.

Up to now these internal conflicts and distrusts have been tempered by the obvious-

ness of the Soviet peril. If, however, the Soviets cut this service of alarm, it is likely to become more difficult to divert our economic resources to the needs of peace. This prospect becomes all the more ominous if the cold war shifts to areas where economic weapons may be as important as military strength.

Stiffened resistance to unbalancing the budget must be expected if the danger of war seems to recede. The pressures for reducing taxes are also likely to mount.

Nor, in view of the prevailing temper of "moderation," can we even count on our politicians giving us the opportunity to take the harder choice of a more strenuous cold war effort. The same competition of the parties to become accepted as the vehicle of "middle-road conservatism" also puts a premium on domestic conciliation even at the expense of our security in the world, particularly if the threats to national security seem less immediate than the next election.

We cannot assume that what is good for each of us—the preservation of our individual gains—is necessarily good for the country as a whole. Situations may arise in which we shall be torn by a considerable conflict between preserving our gains at home and winning the cold war abroad. In the years ahead, it will be by our very gains of the last twenty-five years that our national character will be tested.

IS AN ARAB-ISRAELI WAR INEVITABLE?

A Challenge to American Leadership

HAL LEHRMAN

JERUSALEM

IT IS only too plain that further Western reluctance to deal sternly with the Arabs will have dismal consequences for all concerned in the Middle Eastern crisis—including the Arabs. The only party guaranteed to profit from present Anglo-American timidity is the Soviet Union.

It cannot be proved beyond a doubt that a strong policy in the past would have averted today's dangerous position. But it can be demonstrated with near-mathematical precision that a weak policy in the future will produce extremely unpleasant results.

Dangerously soon, it may impel Israel to fight a war for survival.

It will facilitate deeper and deeper Soviet penetration of the Middle East.

And if the West goes on trying to purchase Arab loyalty instead of energetically confronting Arab arrogance, the final result can be catastrophe: the complete infiltration and capture of the Arab world by the Kremlin's agents, foreign and domestic.

THIS correspondent is approaching the close of a seven months' tour that has in-

cluded two months in the Arab countries and six weeks in Israel. Certain fundamental facts emerged:

1. The Arabs hate Israel with an intensity that surpasses measurement and description. The quantity of time, energy, and passion devoted in the Arab countries to railing against, brooding over, and just hating Israel has to be seen on the spot to be believed.

2. The Arabs have no intention of making peace with Israel, not voluntarily. The only settlement or "peace" they can freely contemplate is on terms so disadvantageous to Israel as would lead to her paralysis, surrender, and extinction. They believe that, sooner or later, they will be able to obtain such terms.

3. The Arabs calculate that Israel's elimination can be hastened by exploitation of the Soviet presence and threat in the Middle East. They count on obtaining successive advantages over Israel—and a swelling bonanza of other favors from the West—by working on Anglo-American dread of a further Arab turn toward Moscow.

The Western powers can choose between two lines of action in coping with this diplomatic blackmail. They can surrender to it and appease the Arab demands. In that case, as surely as night follows day, their position in the Middle East will steadily diminish, and in the end be lost altogether. For Arab confidence and appetite will grow stronger with every bite. With every bite, the Soviet Union will loom larger as the alternate good provider if the other providers should fail. Indeed, the Soviets' one small investment in Czechoslovak arms to Egypt is already paying fat dividends: their stock has never stood higher with the Arabs, and Moscow gets the credit now for every friendly gesture the West makes. Isn't it obvious, reason the

HERE is a second article in which HAL LEHRMAN reports the findings of his latest tour of the Middle East, and it will be followed by others. The first, "Three Weeks in Cairo," appeared in our February number. (Elsewhere in this issue, in "Britain's Traditional Hold Fails," George Lichtheim reports on the diplomatic aspects of the Arab-Israeli crisis.) Mr. Lehrman hardly needs introduction to our readers. Born in New York, he studied at Cornell and the Sorbonne. After working for the Associated Press, Havas, *Newsweek*, and other publications, he served as wartime director of the OWI in Turkey. Since then he has free-lanced and written two books: *Russia's Europe* (1947) and *Israel: The Beginning and Tomorrow* (1952). He is also well known as a lecturer.

Arabs, that the gesture was made because of fear of the Russians?

Soviet hegemony in the Middle East, if things are allowed to deteriorate that far, would be a major disaster for the free world. For Israel it would mean annihilation. Right now, and for a given period of time to come, Israel can defeat any combination of Arab states even without arms to match the jet planes and tanks already delivered by the Soviet bloc. But Israel could not defeat an Arab military combination organized and directed by Russian Communists. Nor could she endure—in any form worth enduring—if the countries on her borders were Sovietized or satellized. Therefore Israel cannot simply stand by and wait for Western policy to wake up. Israel, tiny though she is, must fashion a policy of her own. At a certain moment, if all else failed, that policy would have to contemplate recourse to war.

The West's other possible line of action is to call the Arabs to order, at long last showing the toughness which the best Western "thinking" until now has deprecated as sure to drive the Arabs into the arms of the Russians. The glaringly evident fact is that a yielding attitude has sent the Arabs toward Moscow anyway.

If it is a policy of toughness the West elects to follow, then there is a formidable means of pressure at hand. The fact is that the Arabs are, quite literally, terrified of the Israeli military establishment, its officers, and its men. At the same time, not surprisingly, they take a dim view of their own military prowess. Judicious exploitation of this fear and self-distrust could soften and dissolve the whole Arab-Israeli deadlock—and even the threat of continued Soviet advance.

How can the Arabs be so frightened of Israel and at the same time act so beligerently? Because they do not have to answer to their opponent for their belligerency. Between them and him rises a forest of protective international obstructions, moral and legal. Best of all, they occupy a superb bargaining position vis-à-vis the Western makers of these obstructions.

Egyptian Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser's success in getting arms from Czechoslovakia, after being rebuffed by the West, gave Arabs everywhere a vast sense of euphoria and uplift. This was only magnified when the West failed to make any effective counter-move. For the Arabs, the implications were limitless: we, the long exploited and newly free, have made the foreigner tremble; the mighty Russians and the mighty Anglo-Americans fear each other and need us; therefore we too are mighty now and we shall do as the mighty do—we shall always take, and never give.

So, if the Arabs avoided settling with Israel before, why should they do so now? If the West fears that its least nod toward Israel may provoke another Arab-Soviet embrace, then it pays for Cairo and Damascus to be more obdurate than ever. The Arabs' strategic view of Israel rests on two assumptions: first, that Arab boycott and blockade are already bringing her close to economic collapse; and second, that the Jewish state is an expansionist power that can at any instant mount a full-scale invasion in all directions. It does not matter that these assumptions negate one another. The Arabs are applying both. If they can bully the United States into cutting down on aid to Israel (and perhaps even eliminating tax exemptions for philanthropy to her), they will speed her economic collapse. If they can scare the United States out of restoring the arms balance by sale of weapons to Israel, they can frustrate "Zionist imperialism."

This is a delightfully convenient arrangement for the Arabs—to grow militarily stronger, retaining the initiative all the time, while Israel's military potential is frozen and her economic structure crumbles. And this line can be pursued with virtually no risk, since the West has boxed itself in by all sorts of pledges to protect the Arabs if Israel should try to break out of her trap. Nasser's dearest hope is that Israel will simply do nothing. The main Egyptian propaganda line therefore is that Cairo's huge arms preparations are exclusively for defense, and

that Israel has nothing to fear. Arab commentators are constantly recalling that, prior to the Czech deal, foreign observers were unanimously agreed that Israel was strong enough to trounce all the Arab armies singly or collectively; nor had any Israeli spokesman ever denied this. How is it, they now inquire, that Israel has suddenly become so dreadfully weak? What about the 1950 Anglo-Franco-American guarantee of Middle Eastern frontiers? This protects Israel as much as it protects us, they say. What more does Israel want?

For the most part, however, the Arab argument is more truculent. Editorials and speeches harp on Arab invincibility. Israelis are always presented as hook-nosed, claw-fingered types in *Stuermer* style. I remember a cartoon of Premier David Ben Gurion in "his military uniform"—a wandering Jew garbed as a beggar with staff in one hand, the other outstretched to John Bull and Uncle Sam. Describing political life in Israel, one Arab paper solemnly asserted that Israeli parties had their origins in syndicates of gangsters. Elsewhere, a pro-Israel conference in the United States was described as a meeting of "Zionist drunkards," a courtesy message to it from the White House denounced as "a hostile diplomatic action against the Arabs." If the United States insists on incurring Arab enmity, cries the Cairo *Al Akhbar*, "the Middle East will become a sea of blood." Should "American bullets" be supplied to the Zionists, warns *Al Ahram*, "Egyptian-American relations will cease and Egypt will knock the stuffings out of Israel. Let America bear this in mind. . . ."

IN DAMASCUS I saw the funeral of three Syrian officers who had fallen at Lake Tiberias. The cortège was a quarter of a mile long. Most of the mourners were high school students. Normally these lads are among the most troublesome and dangerous elements in the country. A riot by them can threaten a government's existence. (The more immature and unstable an Arab country is politically, it seems, the younger are those who dominate its streets.) The funeral

might have been the spark for an insurrection; instead, it was serene and complacent—almost a victory parade. The Syrian army had just announced a thrilling "counter-attack" in which a hundred Israelis had been "killed." So the high school patriots felt no impulse to storm parliament and demand vengeance—which would have deeply embarrassed the modest Syrian high command. In private conversation, Syrian officials and newspapermen freely admitted to me that the counter-attack was pure invention.

Nasser had awarded himself a similar "victory" at Nitzana about a month earlier. The *Egyptian Gazette*, hailing a glorious counter-attack which had reportedly destroyed some two hundred Israelis, wrote: "The fight showed the Israeli regular army that aggression does not pay; by now its leaders must be convinced that frontier attacks will be repulsed with the same vigor by soldiers who know what they are fighting for." The comic truth was that the Israelis had finished cleaning up an Egyptian-invaded enclave on Israeli territory by 1 A.M.; around 5 A.M. the Israelis abandoned a hill on the Egyptian side which they had temporarily seized; some three hours later, without laying down any fire, because they knew the position was unoccupied, the Egyptians lumbered back with tanks in full battle array and "recaptured" the vacant hill—to the amusement of Israeli troops watching from a hill just beyond the frontier.

As for the Syrian army, I have met only two groups who were impressed by it. The first is the Syrian parliamentary regime, which must always reckon with the possibility of another military coup on the Shishekli model. The second is the government of little Lebanon next door, which has been adroitly evading the signing of an alliance with Syria for the excellent reason that Syrian troops hurrying to liberate Lebanese territory would endanger Lebanese independence far more than Israeli security. A military agreement that links Syria with Egypt and Saudi Arabia under an Egyptian commander-in-chief remains a paper pact much like the alliances George Lichtheim

wrote of in last December's COMMENTARY "between non-existent armies to fight imaginary enemies."

In every Arab country I visited (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan), informal conversations with junior as well as field officers invariably disclosed a firm respect for Israeli muscle, machines, fighting spirit, and fighting men. When asked about the quality of his own outfit, the Arab officer across the table would shrug his shoulders or make a face. If there is any army for which the average Arab professional soldier has greater contempt than his own, it is another Arab army. Exchanges of compliments between Egypt and Iraq in this connection make illuminating reading. During the Nitzana unpleasantness, Iraqi Premier Nuri Sa'id told his local press he had offered to rush an armored brigade to help the Egyptians—but he neglected to communicate the offer to Cairo, a fact of which the Egyptian press is still reminding him. In exchange, the Iraqis have been loudly inquiring why the Egyptians failed to succor their Syrian ally after the Tiberias misfortune. The whole Arab world expected Egyptian jets or paratroopers to turn up in Syria, the Iraqi press noted, or at least an Egyptian attack on the southern Israeli front. But Egypt simply sent a cash donation equal to less than the price of two planes. "This is no time for contributions but for battles," roared one commentator far away in Baghdad.

Arabs have the best of reasons to respect the Israeli soldier. They have been soundly drubbed in every encounter with him. Without exception, every foreign military observer I met in the area shared this view. One of them, a member of the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, briefed me in Damascus the night after the Tiberias raid. Politically, there is no doubt that this raid in retaliation for Syrian attacks on Jewish fishers was a blunder. It came just when Israel should have been on her best behavior, with her foreign minister at that very moment pleading in Washington for defensive arms against Egypt. But as a military operation pure and simple it evoked the admiration of

the MAC officer, who fairly glowed with professional enthusiasm over the intricacy, synchronization, daring, and masterful execution of the Israeli battle plan. "Could the Syrians put on a comparable performance?" I asked. He gave me a pitying look.

In Baghdad, one military attaché thought the Iraqi soldiers were "bloody useless," but that some Iraqi officers showed promise. Another attaché thought some Iraqi soldiers had possibilities but the officers were "bloody awful." I reached Jordan in time for the pre-Christmas insurrection, to discover that the much advertised Arab Legion had almost defeated itself just trying to push back street rioters. If its British commanders ever departed, non-British Western sources in Amman predicted, the Legion would soon "go Oriental" all the way. In Cairo, the army looked a shade snappier than when I had last seen it ten years earlier, but, though the country is now ruled by a lean military junta instead of a fat king, the Egyptian officer remains a beribboned salon warrior. A social gulf separates him from the man in the ranks, who continues to remain without the smallest clue as to why he wears the Egyptian uniform.

EXCEPT, perhaps, to kill Israelis. Observers who know both sides feel that a large part of Israel's superiority in combat is due to morale, and a large part of that is due to point of view. The Egyptian soldier is taught only to hate "Zionists"; the Israeli soldier is taught to know and love his country. In battle a man is far less likely to risk his life to kill something he hates than to defend something he loves. Between Egyptian officer and man there exists a wall of mutual ignorance and mistrust; the Israeli officer and man are neighbors in a nearly classless society. Under the Israeli army's system of recruit education, even the "Oriental" immigrant emerges after thirty months a spirited and dedicated Israeli.

Arab commanders fight by the textbook, their men by mechanical obedience to orders. But because Israel's size and location condemn her to being outnumbered and sur-

rounded, the Israeli commander is trained to square these disadvantages by doing the bold and unexpected, and the soldier by thinking for and relying on himself when separated from command. The Israelis have made a specialty, for instance, of night fighting, where self-reliance is at a maximum. The Arabs, quite literally, are afraid of the dark.

They are also, for the above reasons and others, afraid of the Israelis. All the armies in the Middle East have progressed since 1948. But by universal consensus of expert neutral opinion, the army of Israel—in organization, training, technique, and sheer fight—has progressed beyond compare.

Since the more professional Arab soldiers are gloomily aware of this discrepancy, it would take an inordinate amount of provocation or encouragement to prod them into heroic decisions. Having observed Arab malaise at close range, I do not share the common Israeli opinion that, from the moment they learn the know-how of their new Czech-delivered weapons, Egyptian policymakers will be spiritually ready for a military adventure. The Israeli makes the mistake of putting himself in the Egyptian's skin when he asks what he would do if, after living a long time in mortal dread of someone, he suddenly acquired bombers which the other team's fighters could not pursue, tanks which enemy guns could not dent, and perhaps even submarines against which the enemy had no defenses at all. An Arab regime—especially a military dictatorship like Nasser's—must reckon with the cost of losing, not just a war, but even a single battle.

With Stalin tanks and MiG-15's safely landed at Alexandria, an Egyptian major confessed to me that he now felt more confident of keeping the Israeli army—from Cairo! "We don't have to worry much any more about being conquered," he said. "What scares us is the possibility of being disgraced." He meant that any Egyptian setback in early clashes with the Israelis might topple the junta before Egypt's massive superiority in arms could be brought into play.

NEVERTHELESS, the Israeli contention that such material superiority remains an intolerable threat has substance. A grim guessing game is now going on in Israel: by what date will Egyptian personnel achieve proficiency with their new equipment, and how soon afterward will the pressures of that readiness induce Nasser to strike?

Not many allow themselves to think of the possibility that Soviet satellite pilots—or even Soviet Moslems—may be assigned to the Egyptian air force. According to available intelligence, the technicians accompanying the Czech deliveries are only instructors and foremen, not fighting men or mechanics—so far. Suppose, then, that Nasser has to rely exclusively on Egyptians. Suppose, too, that Egyptians take longer than Israelis to learn the use, servicing, and maintenance of complicated supersonic and electronic mechanisms; that a ground crew of seventeen to thirty men must be trained for each super-jet pilot in the air; and that only the rare Egyptian flier will be able to match the average skill attainable by Israeli personnel. Even so, the Israelis must reckon that it normally takes only twenty to thirty flying hours for the pilot of a Meteor (Egypt's standard jet-fighter) to be converted into a MiG-type pilot. (Ostentatiously, Cairo has let press reports get out that Egyptians are already flying the new ships—but no correspondent, apparently, has yet stood by at an airfield and seen Egyptians coming off these planes.) Even 50 per cent efficiency can lift an Ilyushin-28 light bomber off the ground and bring it more or less over the target. The computations of Israeli experts hover somewhere around late spring or early summer as the period when the Czech war matériel will have been sufficiently digested in Egypt to permit its large-scale employment.

What then? The Egyptians reportedly have at least forty IL-28 bombers, which could reach Tel Aviv eight minutes after take-off from their border airfields. Each carries a short-haul bomb load of four tons, which could be dropped from 40,000 feet. This is higher than Israeli anti-aircraft guns

can shoot. No existing Israeli jet-fighters could compete against a swarm of MiG's. Egypt has an estimated thirty big Stalin and fifty T-34 tanks (plus thirty-two British Centurions). Massed by night inside the Gaza strip, they could blitz across narrow Israel and cut the country in two within an hour. There is nothing of comparable defensive strength on the Israeli side to stop them.

How many military parades of this imposing armor, the Israelis ask, how many air shows by 24-plane wings of MiG-15's (and possibly a wing of MiG-17's, against which the fastest Israeli jet is just a sitting duck) would be required before the Cairo populace would feel war fever? How long before the rasher officers in Nasser's entourage began to dream of easy glory? How long before even Nasser, more cautious than his colleagues but dependent on their support, began to feel the pressure? Besides, what simpler, more spectacular way to make good his claim to primacy in the Arab world than by knocking Israel out with one gigantic blow?

At a certain fateful point in time, Israel believes, the Egyptians' certainty of victory will erase their fear of counter-attack and defeat. At that moment the temptations of their crushing superiority—so crushing as to *guarantee* success without even minimum risk—will sweep the last lingering hesitations aside. After all, it is the Arabs who insist there is no peace. Israel has never said she intended to destroy the Arab world; it is the Arabs who have many times proclaimed their intention to destroy her. Many Israelis feel it would be an act of criminal negligence to wait supinely until the point of no return was reached.

TO STAVE off arriving at that fatal point, the Israelis contend, only one effective way exists: the Egyptians must be kept from becoming *sure* they can win a war. How? Not by any of the proposals currently in vogue. It is almost frivolous, they say, to expect to restrain a dangerously armed Egypt by something like the recent Anglo-American suggestion of a demilitarized border strip

two kilometers wide. Nor do the Israelis put much stock in a reinforced guarantee of frontiers by the Western Big Three or even in a special American security treaty with Israel. The Egyptians may not necessarily be deterred by the threat of armed Western intervention; the powers may find it convenient not to intervene (they didn't when the Arabs attacked in 1948); intervention after a blitz assault may be eminently sincere and yet quite useless (Britain and France fulfilled their commitments to Poland in 1939, but Poland was already destroyed). In the Israeli view, the one "guarantee" the Egyptians will respect is Israel's possession of adequate arms. If Israel's ability to hit back is preserved, the Egyptians will have to take the risk of retaliation and defeat into account—and the risk will dissuade them.

What amount of Western arms is required to compensate for the deliveries of Czech arms to Egypt? Not an equal amount. Israel does not want an F-86 plane for every MiG-15, or a Patton tank for every Stalin. On the basis of the evidence, she is confident that her men will handle intricate matériel better than the Egyptians, and will be able to do more with less. Besides, she can't afford quantitative equality. One American F-86 costs nearly a half million dollars. Israel asks only for the right to buy *qualitative* equality. This means smaller amounts of weapons. But they must be of the *same types*.

Israel wants just enough modern bombers, fighters, and tanks to make the Egyptians understand they cannot be immune to counter-attack. If they understand this, they will not dare to strike. After that, and only after that, would a treaty between Israel and the United States be welcomed as added insurance.

It is estimated that, from Czechoslovakia alone, Egypt has obtained a quantity of weapons costing her \$80 million but worth at least \$200 million at current prices. Israel wants to buy equivalent Western-made types to a value of \$50 million.

She can and is procuring some useful matériel and secondary equipment in the

open market. But the United States, Britain, and France—through direct manufacture or supervision of patents in other countries—control the distribution of the more important heavier equipment. The United States is Israel's major potential supplier. It was to the United States that Israel, as long ago as November, presented a list of desired items for purchase; it is from the United States that Israel, at this writing, continues to hope for sale of the weapons on which her survival depends.

IF THE required minimum of arms is not made available within a reasonable amount of time, a desperate act by Israel will become distinctly possible. There is already considerable anxiety in Western capitals. American warships are ostentatiously visiting Middle Eastern ports; one hears talk about the readiness and availability of British paratroops in Cyprus, and so on. All this is by way of unobtrusive reminder—impartially to both Arabs and Israelis, of course—that the way of the transgressor is likely to be thorny. It is plain that Washington and London do not want war in the Middle East. But it is also plain that delivery of weapons to Israel, rather than the pointing of weapons at her, would be more effective statesmanship for peace.

As a matter of fact, Israel seemed closer to the brink of "preventive war" immediately after announcement of the Czech arms deal with Egypt than she seems today, though five months have gone by without the slightest alleviation of her fears. The intensity of the shock received from the Czech deal was dramatically revealed by no less peaceable and sober a citizen than Peretz Bernstein, General Zionist leader in Israel and lately Minister of Trade and Industry. Openly and flatly, Bernstein called for war right then and there.

Previously, moderates like Bernstein had relied on the existing balance of military power to keep Israel secure. In their opinion, Ben Gurion's doctrine of retaliatory raids against Arab infiltration only caused Israel to be branded as an aggressor in the eyes of

a world whose support she manifestly needed. Menahem Beigin's advocacy of an imperial march to the Jordan and beyond they rejected as entirely irresponsible. But now they saw a situation rushing at them in which, once the Egyptians had learned to use their new weapons, especially the bombers, Israel could not hope to defeat the enemy, or even hold him off long enough to benefit from world sympathy and assistance. Consequently the Bernsteins of Israel found themselves compelled to advocate the rigorous logic of war in self-defense before the hour grew too late for anything save dying.

But the government of Israel chose another way, and the people went along. They felt war was too monstrous a solution—not because of the possibility of an Arab victory, which occurred to hardly anyone, but for practical and ethical reasons. Even a victorious war could be disastrous if it cost the bravest and best of the country's youth and wasted the national economy. It would make remoter than ever any prospect of true reconciliation with the Arabs. It would invite international sanctions and even, however unlikely, the intervention of international force, against which there could be no effective resistance. Worst of all, no matter what the justification of the decision to attack, it would stigmatize Israel as an aggressor. The temper of world opinion, including that of world Jewry, it was felt, had evolved too far in an atomic age for any state, whatever the merit of its case, to escape condemnation if it chose violence.

INSTEAD, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett went to Paris, Geneva, and Washington, pleading for arms. Israel entered a period of prayerful waiting. The anti-war tendency, once crystallized, was only accentuated by the retaliatory raid at Lake Tiberias in December. This operation, undertaken by the army with the consent of apparently only one member of the government—Prime Minister-Defense Minister Ben Gurion himself—startled the Israeli public and even the cabinet almost as much as it did the Syrian

command and the UN. Uneasiness swept the country; perhaps the military were getting out of hand or the Prime Minister was losing all sense of prudence, and Israel might consequently find herself engaged in a terrible adventure without even wanting it.

Ben Gurion—sharply criticized inside the cabinet and rebuked to his face by his intimate party comrades of Mapai with a vehemence to which he had never before been required to submit—emerged chastened. Though remaining the chief symbol of Israel's martial readiness, he now lent his full prestige to a policy of vigilant patience. "The maintenance of peace," he announced, "is preferable even to victory in war." Nevertheless, no one in Israel thinks that the present anti-war policy is immutable and eternal. A four-day Knesset debate on foreign affairs revealed widespread conviction that Israel would be attacked, and that preparation for war had therefore to be pressed by all possible means. Sharett made it clear that, since neither government nor parliament could foresee the future, the only course to follow was to meet the needs of the present hour—to strengthen Israel's capacity to fight, by arms and by civilian preparedness, as well as to retain the sympathy of world Jewry and the world. But there can be no assurance that a worsening situation—the continued widening of the gap in arms—will not compel revision of this policy, even to the extent of sacrificing sympathy from abroad for the sake of survival at home.

Israel is going doggedly ahead with a costly and economically non-productive program of home-front defense: stockpiling food and essential materials in case of a general blockade, procuring mobile generators and other kinds of emergency equipment in case of air raids, constructing bomb shelters, and planning for the mobilization of all economic and manpower resources, down to the detailed substitution of women for men in civilian jobs, and of older women for younger women. The tension and strained nerves all this involves will not be re-

laxed by continued harassment from the Arab side (the latest manifestation of which is the Egyptian threat to fire on "unauthorized" planes flying over the entrance to the Red Sea; this has forced El Al to suspend its service to South Africa).

Meanwhile, Israeli military intelligence will watch the progress of the Egyptian army's education in its new weapons. Anxiety must inevitably increase as long as there are no compensating acquisitions of defensive strength by Israel. Ben Gurion said not long ago: "Our aim is peace—but not suicide." Each day that no arms come makes the dilemma more desperate.

THERE are feeble and there are sober reasons for not giving arms to Israel. I heard a feeble one firmly advanced while I sat in the American embassy in Amman one day last December, just as the riots outside against the Baghdad Pact were dying down. "There's a report this morning that Washington is going to okay the sale of a lot of tanks to Israel," said a distinguished member of the staff. "If that's confirmed, this place will be pulled down over our ears by the mob." The inference was that the government of the United States ought to draft no policies disagreeable to street rioters anywhere in the world. One is entitled to wonder if such a rule for diplomacy should also influence American policy in, let us say, Argentina or France—yet in the Middle East more than a few Western representatives tend to take the whims and passions of the ever threatening mob into serious account when considering how best to advance the interests of their countries.

A more impressive argument against arms for Israel rests on the fear lest the Arab world retaliate by turning further toward the Soviets. The Arabs know that this specter haunts the Western diplomatic mind, and they exploit it for all it is worth. Except in Iraq, which is receiving all the arms she can absorb from Britain and the United States, in every Arab country I visited I received complacent assurances from Arab spokesmen that they would not hesitate to make a deal

with Moscow if "a single bullet goes to the Zionists." The Syrians, with an eye on Soviet bargain prices, have announced they will buy arms where they can get the most for the least—"just like bananas." During a single week of my Cairo stay, Colonel Nasser breathed that warning at least three times publicly.

DOES it never occur to Nasser or the other Arab leaders that their collaboration with Moscow must inevitably strengthen the Soviets, and that if the latter should move into the Middle East the Nassers would be the first on the liquidation list?

The Egyptian leader's main stated objection to early American offers of arms grants was that they involved entry of a military mission to supervise instruction and use. He professed to be suspicious of such "imperialist" agencies. Well, now the Soviets are decidedly on the premises with a military mission—and it is notorious that such Communist visitors neither devote themselves exclusively to their contract functions nor are easily persuaded to leave once their contracts have expired. Doesn't this give pause?

It does not—because Nasser habitually underestimates the intentions of the East just as he habitually exaggerates those of the West. He has insisted that the arms traffic with Moscow is a purely commercial transaction, especially welcomed by Egypt because of her single-crop cotton economy, which the Soviet bloc is so generously absorbing. In the beginning, he even assured unnerved diplomats that no satellite "technicians" need come in with the Czech arms purchases. He thought Egyptian teams going to Eastern Europe could bring home all the know-how required. Later, he admitted ruefully that this would not be enough. But he remains confident that his guest "instructors" will tend strictly to business. And he actually sees the entire deal as a *blow* to Communism in Egypt.

Nasser's reasoning goes somewhat like this: "The only Communist threat is an internal one. Communism can prosper here only with a weak government and mass un-

rest. The deal with the Czechs strengthened my government and calmed the people. Now the people know that this regime is purely Egyptian, unlike previous ones, and doesn't work for any foreign power. Internal tranquillity is our best guarantee against Communism." Interior Minister Zakaria Mokhialdin pointed out to me: "We lock up our Communists. Do you, in America or England? And how about France? Or Italy?"

Moscow's attraction for Cairo is enhanced by the Egyptians' belief that Russia will stand by them against Israel. In the event of war, they figure, both sides may be blockaded; the Israelis will always be clever enough to get aid somewhere and somehow, but Russia will be Egypt's only hope. But the Egyptians also like to flirt with Moscow because they know it enrages the West. It is another way of celebrating their delicious new "freedom." Thus the Soviets today are the lions of Egyptian society; their propaganda displays are lavish and applauded; every sign of Soviet "amity"—such as the two-hour visit of the USSR's ambassador to the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, followed by official comment that "Russia now supports the Arabs and sympathizes with their causes"—is solemnly taken at full face value.

Egyptians pooh-poooh Western fears that every new handshake brings the Soviets deeper into the Middle East. Egyptians might understand the danger if it arrived in the shape of a Soviet expeditionary force; they simply do not see it in the form of popular Soviet diplomats, higher Soviet prestige, increased trade with the Soviet bloc, or the encouragement all this gives to fellow-traveling and to infiltration by crypto-Communists.

The disease, only beginning in Egypt, is close to epidemic in Syria, Egypt's ally, where key army officers—in a country with a tradition of colonel-dictators—follow Moscow's party line, and a solid minority bloc in parliament votes what Moscow desires. Soviet and satellite diplomatic missions have mushroomed all over Damascus. Red exhibitors from as far away as China (each with

a small battalion of "observers" who have a way of lingering after the show is packed up) are the favored participants in Syria's annual international fair. The Syrians consider all this Moscow-oriented activity as good clean fun, without ulterior design, a salutary counterpoise to nefarious Western domination—all in the name of national independence.

THE general Middle Eastern scene being so bleak, it is agreeable to report at least one encouraging thing—not very perceptible as yet, but nevertheless hopeful. The Czech-Egyptian arms agreement provoked as much revulsion among Westerners in the area as exhilaration among Arabs. In one country after another I found diplomats who, for the first time in my experience, were betraying signs of being fed up with the Arabs—disillusionment with their ways of negotiating and performing.

Not too much should be made of this. The typical diplomat is getting tired, yes, but only of his own Arabs, the ones in *his* bailiwick. The chap in Cairo, for instance, will say: "You never know what these blankety-blank Egyptians are going to do next. . . . But I hear that Nuri Sa'id up there in Iraq is a pretty sound character. . . ." Or in Baghdad, one hears: "It needs a miracle to get anything done in this country. . . . But they say the Lebanese are altogether different—real live wires. . . ." Nevertheless, it is encouraging that some real light is finally beginning to shine on the hitherto uncritically accepted Western portrait of the Noble Arab.

On a larger scale, though the West continues almost by conditioned reflex to seek commitments from the Arab world, it is noteworthy that more and more foreigners are beginning to agree on their futility. "How can you make a policy that's built on sand?" I was not infrequently and quite rhetorically asked in the last two months. "How can you be sure the Arab will still say tomorrow what he tells you today?"

There seems also to be some appreciation of the nature of Israel's security crisis—

though how much appreciation is conjectural after the State Department's grotesque decision in mid-February to release \$110,000 worth of spare parts to Israel as against 18 light tanks to Saudi Arabia. But even if Washington should do the unexpected and overcome its fears of Arab retaliation via Moscow sufficiently to give Israel some relief, the problem of what to do about the Arabs will still confront the West.

The fact is that a mere unfreezing of weapons for Israel will not solve the security problem, either for Israel or for the West. An approach must be devised to prevent such a decision's becoming a pretext for further Arab flirtation with the Soviets.

From the Western point of view, Arab embarkation upon an arms race will only increase the influence of the Soviets in the Middle East and Arab dependence upon Moscow. From Israel's point of view, such an arms race would keep her security in constant jeopardy. Moreover, it would constitute by itself a form of Arab economic warfare against Israel, if only because the Arabs would presumably continue to be able to buy arms cheap, while Israel would have to pay full price.

CLEARLY, something better is needed than just a license to Israel for arms purchases. What courses of action are available to the Western powers—especially to the United States—to satisfy Israel's defense needs and yet keep Egypt from going over wholly into the Soviet camp? Let it be noted straightway that this question may be academic: a basic ingredient of any effective American approach must be firmness—and there is no present reason to expect it. In the first shock of the Czech arms announcement, the United States was outraged enough to contemplate getting tough with the "double-crossing" Egyptians; as the impact wore off, fright crowded anger out and Washington now seems again to be dusting off the discredited methods of pious entreaty and bribe. Nevertheless, these unhappy tendencies do not absolve us from trying at least to determine whether other methods exist

for bringing pressure to bear on the Arabs.

In the Middle East I found a minority of thoughtful Americans who had accomplished the feat of being able to contemplate the Arabs coldly, with vision unclouded by romantic illusions about Arab prowess and dignity. From discussions with such hard-headed observers emerged the following plan of action:

Israel is asking to buy a quantity of arms from the United States which represents only a fraction of the Egyptian purchases from the Czechs. Israel wants this equipment as a deterrent alone, and is willing to give hard guarantees that she will not use it aggressively. Let the United States decide to give Israel these arms and obtain from her these commitments. Then let the United States, supported by Britain and France if possible, but alone if necessary, turn to Egypt, proclaim these decisions, and say:

"Arms to Israel—in the small quantities we are providing and with the absolute guarantees she is giving—do not threaten your security. For your self-defense, you will continue to hold an adequate advantage in strength. We therefore ask you to put the fear of an Israeli attack aside. We will help you and Israel to reach an agreement. Meanwhile we, the British, and the World Bank will proceed, as we have already indicated, to help you with economic development—especially the High Aswan Dam—which you rightly insist is so vital to your future.

"But you must not attempt to preserve your previous massive and provocative arms superiority over Israel by turning to Russia for more arms. If you do that, it will prove your aggressive intentions toward Israel and your hostility towards us. In that case, we will hit you with everything we have. We will ruin you in the world cotton market by dumping our surpluses. We will leave you high and dry on the Aswan project. We will press the British to get tough about your bad faith (insofar as you have admitted Communist technicians) in implementing the agreement which awarded you the Suez Canal base on condition you kept it available

for repossession by Britain in the event of Soviet assault. We will bring to bear all our influence to vote sanctions against you in the UN. Among other things, we will clap an oil embargo on you that will close down your bakeries, start food riots, and end your regime. And we will begin building Israel up militarily so that you will *really* have to worry about her. . . ."

SUCH a robust tone would be a major revolution in American Middle Eastern policy. It would replace weakness by firmness, and begin talking in the only language that overbearing dictatorships understand. Those who best comprehend the nature of the Arab—his respect for strength, especially when tempered by justice—believe the chances would be good for Egypt's acceptance of terms which treated her fairly but asked reasonable cooperation from her in return.

There is, however, a grave objection to this get-tough program: the obvious ability of the Soviet Union to help Nasser circumvent most of the sanctions. Conceivably, the Russians could prop up the Aswan works, buy up the cotton, break the general embargo—and keep pouring arms in at drastic markdowns. And in the UN, it is not certain that a Soviet veto could be frustrated or even that a majority would be willing to move against Egypt because of the Soviet arms sales. After all, the purchase of tanks and planes from the East *could* be regarded as a perfectly valid commercial transaction if one wished to put tongue in cheek, a habitual place for that organ with diplomats. Aggression is not aggression until committed, however loudly the intention to do so is proclaimed.

Nor can Britain be relied upon to undertake the risk involved in delaying her troop departure (now almost completed) from the Suez area. There is nothing in the Anglo-Egyptian Suez treaty which prevents Egypt from obtaining arms wherever she pleases. Of course, the spirit of a treaty designed to keep the bases intact for the British if the Russians invaded the Middle East would manifestly be violated if, in the interim,

Egypt allowed Soviet "experts" to take over her military establishment and those very Suez installations which she has pledged to maintain *against* the Soviets! After the Czech bombshell, this was pointed out to Nasser by the British embassy—but in a very small voice. Britain is not eager once again to be beleaguered inside a Suez cantonment by fanatic native masses. If Egypt permits the Soviets to infiltrate high and low, Britain may be goaded to tear up the Suez conventions—but by that time it will not matter, because the damage will have been done.

SOME observers are convinced there is a more potent remedy at hand for Egyptian stubbornness—much simpler and more effective than elaborate systems of sanctions, or even than the actual current hints of Anglo-American armed intervention. The remedy, they say, requires imagination on the part of the West, an intimate knowledge of Arab character—and courage. Hitherto these elements have not been conspicuously visible in Western policy. Acquired at this late date, they might nevertheless still accomplish wonders.

Until now, it is pointed out, Western diplomacy has never used the one fact in the Middle Eastern complex which gives the Arabs their greatest concern and serves as the sharpest brake on their pseudo-belligerency. That fact is the uncontested superiority of the Israeli army over any alliance of Arab

armies—and the deep, abiding Arab awareness of it. The safest defense the Arabs possess against Israel is the 1950 Anglo-Franco-American guarantee by which the West is more or less committed to intervene in case of an Arab-Israeli war. Suppose, it is daringly suggested, this guarantee were suddenly to be withdrawn. It is by no means too wild a conjecture that if this move came quickly—before the Egyptians learned to operate their new weapons—Arab arrogance would evaporate like magic. If not, it would remain for Israelis and Arabs to settle their differences in their own way and time, without external interference. The result, say those who know the assets of both sides, would not be in doubt.

But how could a diplomatic green light for an Arab-Israeli war possibly achieve peace? How could the dispute be kept local? What would, or could, the Soviets do? What are the risks and rewards of such an intrepid Western policy? And if the West balks at this policy, does Israel have any other way to utilize the psychological and physical advantage of her superior fighting skill and spirit? Can Israel devise and implement an *independent* policy in the cause of her own survival?

[*This is the second of a series of articles by Mr. Lehrman based on his recent extensive tour of the Arab states and Israel. A third article will appear shortly.*]

BRITAIN'S TRADITIONAL MID-EAST HOLD FAILS

Surrendering to the Trouble-Makers

GEORGE LICHTHEIM

LONDON

GR EAT events, they say, cast their shadow before them. Small events, on the other hand, may be serviceable in illuminating the past. By common consent Sir Anthony Eden's speech at the Guildhall in London last November was not a great event: it certainly did not make it easier for Israel and the Arab states to discover common ground, or to move towards that "territorial compromise" which has now become the publicly stated aim of British policy in the area. Instead it did something else: it reminded those concerned, as well as a number of bystanders, of the existence of a rather similar scheme that had to be shelved some ten years ago; and it consequently caused many people to wonder whether Whitehall might not be trying to revive a policy which was thought to have been definitely abandoned when Bevin rather reluctantly recognized Israel in 1949.

The scheme in question was baptized the Morrison-Grady plan when it was propounded in 1946, at which time it was still thought that semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish "cantons" could be carved out of British-mandated Palestine. Though the plan bore the names of the American Henry Grady and the Englishman Herbert Morrison, its "provincial autonomy" concept and

the settlement of frontiers which this implied had been worked out during the war by the British Colonial Office as an alternative to the partition scheme favored by Churchill and certain of his leading colleagues.

Nothing came of this 1946 project, which was promptly rejected by both parties to the Palestine dispute, but the interesting thing is that over two years later its substance was embodied in the proposals put forward by the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte, for modifying the General Assembly's resolution on partition in the preceding November. These suggestions envisaged the cession by Israel, in whole or in part, of southern Palestine (the Negev) in return for permanent possession of western Galilee. The scheme received the immediate and enthusiastic, although ultimately unavailing, support of the British government, which indeed had sponsored it while inducing the luckless Bernadotte to put it forward under his own name. A strongly pro-Arab British historian has remarked that "the British intention was evidently to preserve Arab control of southern Palestine, both as a potential military base and means of access between the Canal Zone and Jordan, and because of the oil deposits which it might contain" (George Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-50*, Royal Institute of International Affairs; Oxford University Press, 1954).

It has never been a secret that the miscarriage of this plan has rankled with the Foreign Office, and Eden's Guildhall speech of November 9, 1955, as well as the approving London *Times* editorial on the following day, were therefore scrutinized with close attention by the Israelis and their British supporters for evidence that the project was still at the back of official thinking on

THIS broad view of the collapse of British policy and direction in the Middle East which ushered in the present crisis in Anglo-American leadership follows up GEORGE LICHTHEIM's closer-focused view of the situation in Egypt—"Nationalism, Revolution, and Fantasy in Egypt"—in our January number. Mr. Lichtheim, a regular contributor, was born in Germany and brought up, from 1934 to 1945, in Palestine. He now lives in London, where he is a freelance commentator on international politics. His special field of interest is the Middle East.

the subject of Israel. Such evidence was not difficult to come by in the months that followed, although the Prime Minister was understandably coy in explaining to his critics in the House of Commons just what territorial "concessions" Israel ought to make to her neighbors, and, particularly, in what manner these concessions would help to satisfy Britain's Jordanian client. Thus it was not very surprising that Israeli official and public opinion reacted to Sir Anthony's speech with a violence which made it difficult for the *Times* to maintain the official view that it had set the ball rolling towards compromise and peace in the area. What rendered the whole performance particularly suspect in the eyes not merely of the Israelis, but of the British Labor party, was its peculiar timing (six weeks after the Czech arms deal with Egypt) and the plain implication it contained that this was an excellent opportunity for squeezing territorial "adjustments" out of Israel for the benefit of Jordan, under pressure of threats not to supply Israel with arms to defend herself against Egypt.

This charge was made, almost in so many words, by Mr. Gaitskell in the House of Commons on January 24, when he committed the Labor party to the support of Israel in a much more straightforward manner than had been the custom under Attlee's leadership. The subsequent parliamentary debate derived some of its significance from the fact that it took place immediately before Eden's departure for Washington: it was the Opposition's intention that he should leave with this kind of challenge still ringing in his ears. To those who, like the writer, sat through the hours of discussion, it came as no surprise that at one point Sir Anthony intervened briefly in order to throw doubt on the plain meaning of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration guaranteeing the Israeli-Arab truce frontiers: evidently his purpose had not changed. Nor is there any reason to suppose that it will.

ANGLO-AMERICAN conferences to settle the affairs of the world in general, and the

Middle East in particular, are now an old habit. The latest in the postwar series, which was held in Washington between January 30 and February 2, came at a time when long-range Western strategy in the cold war was under review, following the spectacular Soviet shift from defensive stone-walling to a policy of building up neutral blocs under Indian and/or Egyptian leadership. It is the fashion now to discuss all these international matters *en bloc*, a tendency very gratifying to geopoliticians with their gaze fixed on the map of the world; the political analyst, that despised animal, has to plow stonier ground. Where the strategists can afford to frisk over the whole terrain, the analyst is employed upon the humbler task of spotting political mines and mantraps.

To take an example that is far from obvious, although it should be: neutralism. The neutralism of India and Burma is that of semi-socialist governments too busy with the solution of their urgent economic problems to think much about the remainder of the world. The neutralism of Egypt, by contrast, springs from open or concealed dislike of the West, from a desire to wage war upon a neighbor, and from a corresponding unwillingness to give guarantees of peaceful behavior. Yet both the Indo-Burmese and the Egyptian attitude are alike labeled "neutralism" by the geopoliticians, and there are to be found well-meaning people who believe that the cure for such neutralism lies in dispensing economic aid, "with no strings attached," to whoever happens to be in control.

Or again, the Turkish government is anti-Russian because this orientation happens to accord with the secular traditions of Turkish nationalism, which is a relatively powerful force in a country that has always successfully maintained its independence. The Iranian and Iraqi governments, on the other hand, are anti-Russian because it suits the landed oligarchies in control of their affairs to pretend that all their internal enemies are Communists. The results look similar but the motivations are different, and so are the pressures underlying political life in these

three countries. Yet all three are members of the Baghdad Pact, a political contraption set up last year with British participation and American blessing, and now in some danger of falling apart.

These remarks, which could be spun out, are in themselves far from original. Yet the present writer, as already noted, sat through the whole recent debate on Middle Eastern affairs in the House of Commons (January 24) without hearing any utterances of this kind, although one or two Labor speakers came close to hinting that there might be something wrong with the *structure* of regimes such as Iran's and Iraq's. Even the government's most daring critics shied away from the suggestion that the recent riots against the Baghdad Pact and the Western connection in the British satrapy of Jordan gave a foretaste of what would shortly come to pass in the much more important case of **Iraq**, now the recipient of considerable oil royalties (and considerable arms deliveries from the United States and Britain). For in both these countries, and indeed throughout the area, pan-Arab nationalism—essentially a middle-class movement—has struck a tactical bargain with the Communists. This is why Colonel Nasser is now regarded with favor by nationalists throughout the Middle East.

A REMARKABLE dispatch from Jordan appeared in the London *Times* late in January, predicting a broad anti-Communist rally on the part of “men of property” frightened by the recent riots. Yet this is what British policy substantially amounts to: to promote rallies of frightened property-owners all over the Middle East under the banner of anti-Communism, and to line their governments up against Russia.

In the Middle Eastern context, “property-owners” of course means big landowners with a sprinkling of merchants and other wealthy townspeople. This policy takes no account of nine-tenths of the population, and—which is even more remarkable—it also takes no account of students, teachers, technicians, and the professional classes gener-

ally. The latter are thus left to choose between various brands of nationalism and/or Communism. All this has been pointed out so often—and by quite reputable people, too—that one suspects that even the Foreign Office has begun to understand it. If it nonetheless shows no sign of changing its orientation, it must be because from the British viewpoint there is no alternative.

Now this explanation happens to be correct. The fact is that, so far as getting together with Arab nationalism is concerned, the British missed the boat a long time ago, notwithstanding their efforts to placate Arab spokesmen at the expense of the Zionists, and later of Israel. They were thus left with the Hashemite dynasty, the bigger landowners, and those “men of property” generally whose political cowardice is a byword in the Middle East. Not that the Labor party has done much better; its brand of welfare socialism is not applicable to most of the area, and its present leaders have therefore wisely decided to concentrate upon the defense of Israel, now almost official Labor party doctrine.

Both these attitudes came out very clearly in the parliamentary debate of January 24, when Alfred Robens—Ernest Bevin's successor as the principal trade union leader in charge of Labor's foreign policy, but a personality very different from the old semi-literate Transport Workers' boss—pounded the table and demanded that the West back Israel against the Egyptian threat, while Eden smiled superciliously and his newly appointed Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, looked uncomfortable.

Labor's emotional capital has now been invested in Israel, that of the Conservatives in the Arab Legion—“a splendid body of men.” One does not like to grudge them their fun: the Arab Legion is a splendid force, and when its sixty British officers, headed by Sir John Glubb (Pasha), ride out with it on the heavy British tanks obligingly supplied by Whitehall free of charge, they must have a feeling that there is still some bite left in the old lion. If only one could rely on those “men of property” in Amman to hold the Reds and the pan-Arabs permanently at bay.

Unfortunately one cannot, and one reason is that the educated sons and daughters of those same "men of property" are solidly Communist or pro-Nasser. Even Middle Easterners don't live by subsidies alone.

MOST defeats have their roots in earlier failures. The current mess in the Middle East, which *inter alia* threatens to result in war between Israel and Egypt, goes back to the manner in which British control over the area was liquidated during and after the Second World War. The story is complicated, but in broad outline it is one of retreat from the seemingly unchallengeable position built up around 1945 as a result of victory over the Axis. But even then the foundations were hollow. For the authoritative support of this contention one can do no better than turn to Professor George Kirk, an indefatigable worker in the vineyard of Anglo-Arab cooperation and the author, among other works, of the solidly documented survey already mentioned, *The Middle East 1945-50*, a standard reference work not distinguished by particular tenderness for viewpoints other than the official British.

To quote some lines from the preface:

It had been Britain's policy between the wars to safeguard her essential interests in the Middle East by a series of balances and compromises effected with other foreign interests such as those of France or those of the United States oil companies, or with the more moderate nationalists themselves. This policy would continue to be pursued after 1945, but would call for all the greater finesse because the great depletion of Britain's financial resources by the war had lessened both her absolute power and her relative status as a world power. Britain had recognized with some reluctance during 1944 that the predominant interest in Saudi Arabia would henceforward belong to the United States, who were operating an oil concession that had begun to approach in productivity that of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and possessed an air base at Dhahran. The British war-time coalition favored, as an attempt to solve the Palestine question, the partition of that small country into a Zionist and an Arab state, and Churchill hoped to win the cooperation of the United States after the War

in a joint policy towards Palestine. The Foreign Office regarded the treaties of alliance with Egypt and Iraq . . . as models for Britain's post-war relations with those countries and it was hoped that the League of Arab States, whose formation in 1945 British policy had encouraged, would provide the political and social nexus of a system whose economic development might be furthered by some prolongation of the constructive work of the Anglo-American Middle East Supply Center. At the end of the war, however, the understanding between the Great Powers, on which the British concept of the post-war Middle East so largely depended, was rapidly breaking up. . . .

It is fair to say that this analysis still represents the official viewpoint. Its weaknesses are obvious: "understanding between the Great Powers" could never be a substitute for a constructive policy; the absence of that was the real flaw. In the British scheme—though Professor Kirk is not too clear on this point—such a policy was to be supplied by a combination of anti-Communism and, in his words, some prolongation of the "constructive work of the Anglo-American Middle East Supply Center"—in less elevated language, some considerable investment of American capital under British political direction. This is still the aim underlying the Baghdad Pact organization, whose Economic Committee is supposed to pull the partners together.

By now it is, however, understood in London that not only the economic but the political direction of the Baghdad Pact organization has to be American. So far so good, or bad. Americans perhaps underrate the bitterness felt by British Conservatives over the behavior of an American-sponsored potentate like the King of Saudi Arabia, when they see this monarch trying to dislodge the British from their remaining Persian Gulf holdings; especially when they also watch Egyptian money and propaganda being devoted to the same purpose, while American officials and newspapers seemingly adopt the same uncritical attitude towards Colonel Nasser that British Conservatives reserved for Mussolini thirty years ago. (Eden seems to have aired some of these British grievances in his meeting with Eisenhower.)

But none of this touches upon the central issue, which is the relation between the Western powers and those "moderate nationalists" (or "men of property") who were to have underpinned the whole structure. For it is literally true that the Arab League was intended to "provide the political and social nexus," unbelievable as this may sound today. Was it not composed of all the leading politicians who had not sold themselves to the Axis, and was it not backed by the majority of the landowners? How could such a contraption fail? Plainly, because "extremists" were enabled to work upon popular emotions, after disunity between the great powers, and the West's lamentable failure to prevent the emergence of Israel had opened a breach in the dyke.

IT is temptingly easy to blame this attitude on the Conservative party, and no doubt that party has by now become very largely identified with it. But to be fair, one must take account of the Churchillian element, which in 1945 seemed quite strong enough to impose the solution briefly mentioned by Professor Kirk: partition of Palestine, joint Anglo-American support for Israel, and a common Western policy throughout the whole region. That the lead given by Churchill in this direction was not followed in 1945 by the Labor government was only in part due to material weaknesses.

The critical element in the situation was the ignorance and inexperience of the Labor Cabinet members (particularly Bevin), which played into the hands of those who had decided to build on the Arab League. Already during the war, Churchill was at cross-purposes with Eden and other Conservatives who urged a policy of reliance upon Arab nationalism. With Churchill out of the way, it was comparatively easy for the Foreign Office to sell its plan to the well-meaning but bewildered Labor politicians suddenly called upon to steer the ship of state: all the more since the bulk of officialdom was instinctively in sympathy with the pro-Arab school.

While the war was still in progress it

seemed possible to attain the principal objective of keeping Arab nationalism under British control, while freezing the French out of the area, limiting American intrusion to Saudi Arabia, and even using the American-Saudi Arabian contact for the purpose of giving the Jews a small slice of what they wanted. In an earlier volume Professor Kirk had noted:

The British Foreign Secretary's speech at the Mansion House on 29 May 1941, followed by the Allied occupation of the Levant States, led to a revival of suggestions for Arab federation. These came from many quarters, and varied from proposals for a Greater Syria to a more grandiose scheme for a federation of all the Arab nations under the aegis of King Ibn Saud and including an autonomous Jewish state. As a result of discussions in London . . . the Middle East (Official) Committee were asked to study the question, after consulting the British representatives in the countries concerned. Their report indicated that at that time no scheme for political federation was possible and that the efforts of the British authorities should be limited to facilitating closer economic co-operation and the removal of economic barriers between Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan and to encouraging cultural contacts between the Arab states (*The Middle East in the War 1939-46*; Oxford University Press, 1952).

This is academese for saying that the British had decided to go slow with Arab federation, but that it remained the guiding idea. (Incidentally, the work from which this is excerpted still bears traces of the passions aroused in those years: large sections of it are devoted to a furious indictment of Zionism.) In effect Eden's Mansion House speech of May 29, 1941, was the starting point of a series of official moves which resulted, four years later, in the formation of the Arab League, the forcible expulsion of the French from the Levant states—and the decision to go back on Britain's (and Labor's) promises to the Zionists. On paper, indeed, the policy announced in 1941 did not preclude the fulfillment of those promises; in fact, however, the Foreign Office was determined to abandon them at the first opportunity, as being in conflict with the overriding aim of bringing Arab nation-

alism under British control. This has never been denied by apologists for the official line then adopted; what they have been unable to explain is why Arab nationalism has nonetheless turned against Britain.

The favorite explanation for some time was that Britain had to pay for America's sins, chiefly the sin of having allowed Israel to come into being. As trouble spread to areas like Persia, where this issue was hardly relevant, or Cyprus, where it was not relevant at all, this line became increasingly difficult to maintain. It has now been almost abandoned—save on occasions when it is considered proper to remind America of her responsibility for making good the consequences of earlier errors: mostly committed under the Truman administration, which so far forgot its duty as to extend support to Jewish and Egyptian nationalism alike, without inquiring what the effect on Britain's position might be.

THE extent to which such apologies for failure are still accepted by British public opinion depends of course on the ideological preconceptions of the audience. To a good many Conservatives (as the Commons debate of January 24 showed), "American oil" is almost as big a villain as Russia or Israel; even some Labor speakers thought they could detect the hidden hand of George McGhee, at one time Truman's assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, in most of the troubles Britain has had to contend with in the Persian Gulf area since the Abadan debacle of 1951.

The government of course is more sophisticated, although opinions of this kind are not altogether unwelcome to it. Its supporters in the press, on the other hand, suffer from the duality of their function: since the recent outburst of Conservative dissatisfaction against Eden they have been anxious to defend him against unjustified reproaches, but it is also part of their business to develop arguments that will impress their American readers. A publication like the *Economist*, for example, which is read by thousands of influential people in America, devotes a good

deal of its considerable ingenuity to the task of explaining Britain's Middle Eastern policy in terms suggesting that it is really in Washington's best interest to underwrite British moves such as the Baghdad Pact or the persistent attempt to truncate Israel's territory for the benefit of Jordan. On the other hand, a paper like the *Financial Times*, which is not much read beyond the confines of the London City, can afford to be more businesslike and factual. Commenting on Eden's departure for Washington, its editorialist (January 23) had this to say:

The brutal truth is that, while Britain's political and strategic commitments continue to increase, her economic strength has not been growing commensurately. One of the questions before the Anglo-American partnership . . . must be about readjusting the respective shares of the two Powers in the burden of the defence of the free world.

But how does one "readjust" without yielding on such key points as the British claim to political direction in the Middle East? Especially since the biggest military factor in the region (Turkey), the biggest oil producer (Saudi Arabia), and the only stable democracy (Israel) have already slipped out of control? Primarily of course by "balancing" one group against the other, and secondarily by trying to hold on to such positions as are still available. It is not the fault of anyone in particular that these positions are now almost identical with the remaining strongholds of Arab medievalism: Libya, Jordan, the Hashemite dynasty, the Arab Legion, the sheikhdoms on the Persian Gulf. Neither the Syrian republic nor Israel (whatever their mutual dislike) fit into this pattern. Nor does the Egyptian dictatorship of Colonel Nasser.

In this context, the Arab-Israeli issue is almost negligible, and the constant reiteration of the now familiar assertion that it is only this "dispute" which prevents the Western powers from inaugurating an era of peace and harmony in the Middle East must take its place with other official legends. The truth is rather that the collapse of British control since 1945 has led to a situation

where countries like Egypt and Israel can drift into war simply because there is no one to stop them. Intrinsically, the Arab-Israeli problem could have been solved years ago if the Western powers had forced the Arab states to resettle the refugees by refusing to supply funds until this was done. But that would have meant "taking sides," and "taking sides" is not considered good policy in quarters where it is still thought the height of wisdom to "keep a balance."

For further proof of the contention that Britain's troubles in the area are not "caused" by the Arab-Israeli conflict, but on the contrary have themselves given rise to this conflict and then rendered it insoluble, one need only turn to Cyprus, a locality in the Mediterranean which by common consent lives wholly outside the Israeli-Arab complex.

Anyone wishing to understand how and why a colonial administration collapses before the onset of popular nationalism can do no better than buy a ticket to Cyprus while the struggle is still going on and study the situation there. He will incidentally obtain second-hand information, as it were, on what occurred in Palestine in 1945-48. It is almost like taking a trip in Wells's time machine: in Cyprus one finds the same confrontation of nationalist forces and colonial bureaucracy, the same fanaticism (though a great deal less of it) on the nationalist side, matched against helplessness (occasionally eked out with brutality) on the other; the same bewilderment and confusion "at the highest level," i.e. in Whitehall.

With its Greek and Turkish communities at one another's throats, the Greeks demanding *Enosis* (union) with Greece and the Turkish minority naturally not liking this one bit, Cyprus is a vivid example of the sort of thing that happens when supra-national control over a multi-national area comes to an end because the imperial power is no longer strong enough to impose its rule. It is not a matter that can be set right by diplomatic bargaining, "keeping the balance," "inducing both sides to make concessions," or any other of the techniques

favoured by Eden. Bargaining can only take place within a stable framework. Once the framework has collapsed, or looks as if it is collapsing, all parties are thrown back upon self-defense, and ultimately upon a policy of self-preservation. This policy is described as one of "intransigence" by critics who have no clear notion what it is like to live under conditions where physical extermination becomes a possibility to be reckoned with. Such a reaction towards ordinary self-preservation is common to people of the most varied historical or religious backgrounds, whether they are Greeks in Cyprus or Jews in Israel.

ONCE the disintegration of Britain's traditional position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East had become obvious, it was inevitable that America should step into the breach. Likewise it was to be foreseen that America would to some extent be influenced by traditional British ideas about the Middle East. In this respect the two proclamations issued in Washington at the close of the recent Anglo-American talks contain no surprises. The current blend of Anglo-American statesmanship is adequately reflected in the dreary platitudes of the communiqué, while the lengthy, boastful "Declaration of Washington" supplies the ideological sugaring. Eventually, perhaps, these joint conferences will get around to drafting an all-purpose Anglo-American "charter," for use in every kind of weather, by standardizing the terms employed on such occasions ("We are conscious of our responsibility towards mankind"; "We will explore every avenue leading towards a compromise," etc., etc.).

In part, the growing futility of these Anglo-American confabulations is undoubtedly the fault of the British government. For one thing, the British are inclined to pull such punches as they still have—for example, in the matter of Washington's continued disposition to tolerate the grotesque behavior of Saudi Arabia. Worse, a trip to Washington and an address to Congress have now become a recognized maneuver in British home politics: it does not matter much what,

if anything, is decided, as long as the Prime Minister of the day can be said to have "presented the British viewpoint," or simply to have got his personality across to the American public (not an easy thing in Eden's case). For another thing, it is getting difficult to argue that British expertise **only needs to** be backed by American power in order to produce results: the Trieste settlement was probably the last occasion when such a claim could be made with any degree of plausibility, and Eden's ambition to re-enact this modest triumph on the scene of the Arab-Israeli conflict has already landed him in one of worst entanglements of his premiership.

But when all these points have been conceded, Washington's responsibility for the West's increasingly unfavorable posture in the cold war looms very large. It is not merely that, in the words of the *London Times* (February 3), "America's lack of realism where Taipeh and Peking are concerned is not likely to be remedied in an election year. Some time Washington will have to wake up to sense, but not yet." In a very general way, the American preference for florid nonsense over ordinary sense, whatever the issue at stake, seems to Britons and Europeans to be rooted in mental habits which cannot be eradicated in a hurry, although Mr. Kennan and his friends are doing their best to that end. The "Declaration of Washington" is only the latest manifestation of a state of mind which makes intercommunication needlessly difficult.

Yet while they insist on muddling up politics and morality in the worst Victorian manner, the Americans seem to critical British observers to have simultaneously inherited some of the characteristic habits of the Baldwin-Chamberlain era. Appeasement of the unappeasable marches hand in hand with pious invocations of the deity. That, at any rate, is a genuine novelty: Victorian statesmen had a tougher political hide. Now

and then one encounters a flash of Palmerstonian toughness even in present-day Britain. Consider, for example, this editorial comment in the *Conservative Daily Telegraph* (February 3):

It remains doubtful whether the British Ministers have shaken—indeed they may even share—the impression that the Saudis and Colonel Nasser are bulwarks against Communism and must be supported to the hilt, politically and economically. What a vista of blackmail this conviction opens up! It is, of course, important to keep oil flowing in our direction and to prevent swarms of Russian technicians entering Egypt. But all the cards are not in the hands of the Middle Eastern trouble-makers into whose hands Anglo-American policy appears to be playing.

TO A good many people in Britain it seems odd that the United States, now standing on a pinnacle of power, should need this kind of advice. Perhaps it is unnecessary: at this distance it is difficult to judge. All one can say is that the recent conference has done little to alter the prevailing impression that Washington and London are allowing the Middle East to drift into anarchy from sheer unwillingness to take a firm line with the various budding Mussolinis in the area. The British, who made this kind of mistake in the 30's and paid heavily for it, are today tempted by weakness rather than by conviction to repeat it. The conviction is being supplied by the Americans—witness the current fantasies about the "Arabian Bismarck."

It is a depressing thought that the necessary experience may have to be gained at the cost of another round of war between Israel and the Arabs—with the cards heavily stacked against Israel. There is nothing "inevitable" about it: if such a war comes, the responsibility will rest squarely upon the signatories of the latest addition to the West's mounting collection of unread statements of principle.

THE COMMUNITY AND I: TWO YEARS LATER

The Wine, or the Blessing?

EVELYN N. ROSSMAN

A FEW weeks ago I came to New York to visit my parents and enjoy the city. The train could not move fast enough to please me. I was as impatient as my children, who stood on their seats and took turns jumping on me. "Why does it take so long to come to Grandma?"

But in four days we came back to Northrup, chastened and subdued, as relieved as if we had been rescued from a disaster. Just as in other homecomings I was moved by the sight of the church spires as we approached the town, though I've never been in the churches. I liked the old houses and unpretentious stores. Horns tooted to attract our attention. We stopped again and again to greet our neighbors. "Hi," we called to each other. "How are the children?"

In a few minutes the children were running wildly through the house, racing, shouting, banging doors to use the energy accumulated in the train and apartment house. I went from room to room, enjoying my possessions as if I had never seen them before. I was home.

There was no doubt that New York was home no longer. Even the anxiety that the city always brought was gone. I could remember when coming out of the subway in the neighborhood where I grew up made me shudder for a moment. It was as if I were suddenly eighteen years old again, looking

for a job that wasn't there, unsure of friends and future. This time I was just another visitor, surrounded by husband, children, and valises. I walked along a busy street feeling like a horse that needed blinders. I'm used to looking at people, but there were too many. My head ached. Everything seemed blurred. It seemed that it was easier, and more possible, to live in Northrup.

Northrup, however, has changed since I wrote about it two years ago and we have changed with the town. The years have increased our understanding of ourselves and our neighbors. We are beginning to learn what we can expect; what it is too soon to hope for. Jews continue to come to the town and Jewish organizations have grown and prospered. The Jewish community, however, is less unified than ever.

The town's building boom has not abated. More than three hundred people move in each year, and every ride out to the edge of town is a surprise. Streets stretching like tentacles from the main thoroughfares meet each other in the woods and fields. New houses are larger and more expensive than the old ones. But there are only a few large estates, tucked away on the outskirts. Between their seclusion and the developed areas of town stand a few one-room shacks where sick or shiftless people sit huddled around a fire in winter, with their large families, waiting for the welfare worker or truant officer. The town has attracted middle-income people for the most part, salesmen, professionals, and small businessmen.

Four out of every five newcomers are Jews. The neighborhoods in which they settle are completely Jewish. Very few of them buy the large rambling houses in the old sections of town where the oldest Jewish residents still live.

OVER a year ago (in our issue of November 1954) EVELYN N. ROSSMAN—the name is a pseudonym—described the process by which she and her family, as part of the general migration to the suburbs and beyond, settled in the small New England town of Northrup (also a pseudonym). Now more at home in Northrup than she ever was in her native New York, Mrs. Rossman continues her reflections on the new Jewish life in America.

The large new developments and the thriving Jewish organizations seem proof of a vital and well-organized community. Those outside it often speak as if it were a formal organization of like-minded people with definite goals and programs. Those close to it, however, are aware that the organizations have grown because of fortuitous circumstance and a handful of strong personalities. The term "community" refers to place, not to common ideals or desires. It is as unrealistic to speak of "the" Jewish community as it would be to call the rest of the town a "Christian community."

TEN years ago the Jews of Northrup were as close as a family. Five years ago they were already divided by age, money, and education. Today there are other divisions. The length of time one has lived in the town, one's reason for coming, the kind of Jew one is—all these are as important as whether one has a maid or not, and whether one is of the older or younger generation.

A newcomer to the town today finds it harder to make friends than two or three years ago. Established social groups do not seek or welcome new people. Each new neighborhood forms its own cliques. Each little social group is very much like what the Jewish community once was, except that it is homogeneous. Those who do not belong with any group are like people without family. The social group is a substitute for those who are away from parents and relatives, and the family feeling thrives on real or imagined coolness from outsiders.

Two years ago there was a couples' club at the Temple that tried for a country club atmosphere. Now it has been replaced by dozens of little clubs. Some eat together. Others play cards or parlor games. A small group plays chamber music; another discusses the Bible and Jewish history. The women are the ones who organize and maintain the groups, whether they play charades, gin rummy, or Mozart.

The Jews who came to settle here in earlier years often adopted the interests and prejudices of the Jewish oldtimers. Today,

the new people are unaffected by the older groups. They only talk to each other. Many have come to Northrup simply because there are Jews already here. They come from Jewish neighborhoods in the nearby cities and want to live as they always have. They have increased the membership lists of the Jewish organizations, but they do not depend on these latter for friends.

Older women who have lived in Northrup for twenty years or more find less and less pleasure in the large, crowded meetings of the Ladies' Association or Hadassah. They meet in the afternoon instead to sew or knit or play cards. They are ill at ease when no one knows who they are. Many have forgotten their early struggles and only remember that they were once "the" Jews in town. They came to all the town functions, sure of their respectability and worth. They had non-Jewish friends they no longer have time to see now; in the old days they did not worry about the voices, manners, or clothes of fellow Jews. Some speak of the poor neighborhoods from which many of the newcomers come with a disdain that shows how they have forgotten that they grew up there too. Feelings are mixed and confused. One grandmother stands at the door during a crowded meeting and enjoys the excitement. "*Ich shep naches fun die kinder,*" she says. Another leaves in a huff because she has not been properly received.

The people who came to the town five or more years ago share with the oldtimers a dislike for the newcomer who is not civic-minded and doesn't come to the town to stay. Their feelings are hurt by those who want to retain their urban anonymity and do not care what anybody thinks of them. An old resident complains sadly, "Whenever I saw a Jewish face I said hello. Now people look in my face and don't answer. I feel embarrassed. I can't stand when people pass me by."

The Jews who have lived in Northrup for a length of time tend to be more like the older Gentile residents than like the newcomers in their feeling toward the town. They have come to love a place because it

belongs to them. They are possessive about home, land, community, and town, and they feel uneasy about people who buy houses casually as if they were renting an apartment. Real estate agents have fostered this tendency: "If it isn't perfect, live in it a few years and I'll find you a better house," they promise. Mortgage payments are computed like rent and down payments are small if there is no parent to subsidize the home-buying. The early arrivals hoped to stay. "I don't care if I never move again," was commonly heard from those who had traveled during the war and after. Today one hears as often, "I don't have to stay here forever." The town is considered a stepping stone to more fashionable and convenient places. Northrup does not compare with other booming Jewish communities, where more prosperous business and professional people go. There are few mink coats at Temple or Hadassah meetings. Many women earn the contributions they make by sewing aprons and selling cosmetics, housewares, and clothes.

THE longer one lives in Northrup, the more easily one succumbs to the idea that one has an identity in it. We imagine that we know ourselves because so many people recognize us and believe they know who we are. Though it may all be an illusion, it is a wholesome way to live. The stronger the feeling of identity, the greater one's sense of civic responsibility is likely to be. Yet, as the town grows, it is inevitable that the proportion of responsible people should decrease, and those who were here at the time when the proportion of responsible people was greatest cannot help but deplore the change and resent the ones who brought it about.

Many Jews have been moving out of the town as well as into it. Those who came to Northrup only because they could find no place to live in the city went back as soon as they could. Engineers, teachers, and salesmen move as their jobs change. There are also shifts within the town. Families sell small houses and buy large ones. Some who

only two years ago would not have had the courage to live without neighbors close by have shed their agoraphobia and bought a few acres in an isolated area and become what their neighbors derisively call "Yankees." Everything changes, but still remains the same. The inexpensive little houses are quickly sold to young couples from the city, who see them as their former owners did when they came. "So much land," the newcomer says of his tiny garden. "It's good to have room to breathe." But his neighbor looks out of her window, counts his children, and plans a high fence to protect her rose bushes. In a few years hedges and fences have become as common as they were once unusual. . . .

Among the earliest and the most recent Jewish residents we find an articulate minority who make it plain that they came to a small town hoping to live a more "American" and a less "Jewish" life. They came, ironically, to escape a Jewish neighborhood. One woman once commented that she had never felt part of America until she settled in the town. She claimed that the Yiddish-speaking environment she knew had always made her feel like an outcast. To be an "American," one needed a Cape Cod house, a picket fence, a cat and a dog. She wanted to live with and like non-Jews, and hoped to put her past behind her. When she sent her children to Sunday school, it was because the Christian children went to Sunday school. She expected to be able to enjoy a Christmas tree without complaints by Jewish neighbors. She joined the Temple, though she preferred the services at the Unitarian church; she paid dues to the Temple couples' club only because the local country club was closed to Jews.

When the Jewish population was small some of its leaders were drawn from just such people. But as the reputation of the Jewish community grew, more people moved to the town just because it offered an opportunity to live among Jews. People came not only from the cities, but from all the little surrounding towns where ten or fifteen Jewish families lived in isolation. One met

more and more people who had lived in small towns all their lives, people who did not like to live in a city but were weary of their role as "the Jews" of a town. They were happy to find a place where they could be themselves without feeling peculiar. They were eager to conform to whatever pattern the Jewish community set and were not interested in the town itself. They expected their role in it to be limited by their Jewishness, as before.

The largest group to come to Northrup, however, were not searching for "American" or "Jewish" values. They came after the neighborhoods had been built up, the Temple and Hebrew school established, and after stores catering to Jewish tastes were in business. They chose Northrup because they could afford it and because it was close enough to the city. They thought of it not as the beginning of the "country," but as the outskirts of the city. Most were unself-conscious Jews, totally unsympathetic to the idea of assimilating in the town. They also found the idea of a unified Jewish community a naive notion. The energetic people in this group preferred to spend their time organizing nursery schools, youth centers, and improved transportation facilities, so that their children could enjoy the same things they had had in the city.

Only two years ago it was impossible to organize a B'nai B'rith or Zionist group without irking those who wished to limit the number of Jewish organizations out of fear that they would compete with each other. Newcomers, however, were not concerned with the approval or the disapproval of the *machers*. They set up their organizations and found members for them. Their program often duplicates others already in existence, but they do give another set of officers a chance to enjoy the exercise of authority. The Temple organization now seems eager to embrace the other organizations rather than thwart them. Its rabbi no longer seems concerned with unifying opinions and practices. The Temple now hopes to reach individuals through the groups they join.

The organizations people join tell us very

little about what they believe. Though the Men's Association insists that all members be of "Jewish faith," "Jewish ancestry" would be the more accurate word. Parents send their children to the Hebrew school, not only because they approve of its curriculum and methods, but also because it is the only such school available. Hadassah members are not necessarily Zionists, and B'nai B'rith members are not any more concerned with American affairs than the members of the Community Center or the Zionist groups are. Each organization must cope with diverse opinions. The leaders often do not speak for the majority. The lay and professional leaders are frequently in conflict with each other. The rabbi and Hebrew teachers are educated and committed Jews interested primarily in the survival of Judaism and the return of Jews to the faith and culture they have neglected, whereas the lay leaders are frequently uneducated, and concerned only with everyday Jewish interests. Some are idealistic, others merely ambitious.

THE first rabbi to live through the growing pains of the Jewish community of Northrup left a year and a half ago. His departure—with good wishes, testimonials, and sighs of relief—had been inevitable. It is doubtful that any rabbi could have survived the confusion. He was like the first child of tense, aggressive, and insecure parents who never wanted a child in the first place.

The search for a new rabbi took more than a year. The families that offered their homes to visiting applicants grew weary of flounder, lettuce, and cottage cheese. Many prospective rabbis were rejected before their sermon was heard because they demanded more *kashruth* than their hostesses could guarantee.

Meanwhile all social talk centered upon whatever rabbi was visiting. Services were well attended by the curious, who wanted to see who the new man would be. People asked themselves and each other what to expect and what to demand. It was agreed that

a European rabbi, or a scholar, who might have contempt for the local lack of religion and scholarship, would not be happy in the town. One individual voiced the feelings of many when he said, "I don't want to be pushed. I don't want to be made to feel guilty. I feel I'm a pretty decent guy and I don't want anyone to tell me different."

When the quest began it was for someone who would make a good impression upon both Jews and Gentiles in town. People spoke of "someone who will do what the congregation wants," of a "regular guy" with the children. Some found the search for a rabbi so stimulating that it was seriously suggested we have only visiting rabbis preach to us on Friday nights.

But the long search became embarrassing. Visiting ministers joked about the hard-to-please congregation. It was agreed that a leader was necessary as a spokesman in the town. The early objectives changed. More and more one heard the desire expressed for someone who would be sincere. Even the people who were strong for a practical man, not too much of an idealist, spoke about somebody "honest" whom they could admire.

When they finally did choose a rabbi, it was because of his youth and his integrity. They accepted him not for the opinions he held, but for his honesty in stating them. Whether they will be able to accept him as an authority remains to be seen.

It is generally believed that the rabbi can make his greatest contribution as a teacher, educating parents as the Hebrew school educates children. But first he will have to find those who have the self-discipline and alertness to be students; then he will have to adjust his teachings to the various levels of understanding. He may find it hard to teach people who come to Temple for "peace of mind," not for disquieting and probing thoughts. It may be hard to teach those who want to feel, not think, about Judaism. He may not find many who share his view that education should bring doubt and dissatisfaction, self-improvement and concern for others. Those, however, who do

share this view have been waiting a long time to hear this said and they will listen to and support him.

THE divergence between professional and lay opinion in the running of the Hebrew school is as great as in the Temple. The school was organized by a group of parents, began as a Sunday school with volunteer teachers, and grew into a four-day Hebrew school with no Sunday school program for children over eight. It is governed by a lay committee that hires the principal and teachers, but all important decisions are made by the principal and the Temple rabbi. Standards and curricula are prescribed by the Board of Jewish Education in the nearby city. The Board, however, is more concerned with high standards of learning than with the realities of life in Northrup.

Many parents are bewildered. The organizers of the school did not realize that it would escape their control so soon. Parents hoped for a smattering of information that would give their children security in what they feared was still a hostile world. They hoped to discover Jewish heroes and explanations that would take the woe out of Jewish history. They wanted their children to learn *about* Jews, not *how* to be Jews. But all the teachers were firm in stating that it was the latter, not the former that they would teach.

Many parents found themselves in a position like that of the immigrant parent who sends his child off to a school that has no relation whatsoever to the child's home. Some parents are able and willing to learn from their children. Others feel so threatened by the old attitudes which they have rejected that they do their best to negate whatever their children learn at the Hebrew school.

The problems are built into the situation. The greatest is the lack of teachers. The committee interviewing teachers finds it must choose between two or three men or women, fifty and sixty years of age, Yiddish-speaking representatives of the old genera-

tions and the old values. Teachers born and educated in Russian or Polish villages, even after half a lifetime in this country, retain many of their prejudices and stereotypes and find it hard to advise children challenged by the temptations of a non-Jewish community. Still, many parents have great respect and affection for these teachers and hope that their children will be influenced by their zeal and sincerity. Others doubt whether there can be any communication between the generations.

Hebrew education at our school is hampered by many compromises. There is a constant tug-of-war between parents who want a minimal Jewish education, in keeping with their own amount of Jewish learning, and the professionals, who press for as many Hebrew school hours as possible. The elimination of Sunday school will in time increase the number of children who get no Jewish education—or it will bring about the founding of another school. The professionals may, however, eventually succeed in convincing more parents that the hours spent in Hebrew school are truly well spent.

The children, meanwhile, are well aware of the feelings of their parents, and respond to them. Some accept Hebrew school as a social activity, the preparation for Bar Mitzvah and Bas Mitzvah parties. Others think of it as time that could be better spent in scouting or dancing, or at piano lessons. A few children insist on going to Hebrew school simply because their parents are reluctant to send them. One way or another, the teachers bear the brunt of the confusion. The children come directly from public school with their capacity for attention and sitting quiet used up. They're hungry, and bored and eager for diversion. The teacher looks at row after row of jaws grinding bubble gum. Spitballs fly across the room. Comic books are hidden behind Hebrew grammars. Whether or not the teacher is permissive, the children behave as if he were. It is understood that Jews are part of the family and can put up with the worst manners. Teachers scold and shriek and shout, control and patience tried beyond be-

lief. Even holiday celebrations turn into tedious, disciplinary lectures that have no joy or taste.

Despite the changes that have taken place in public school education, the Hebrew classes in Northrup are not very different from those of twenty years ago. History is taught as a series of unconnected stories. Hebrew is studied more as the language of the Bible than as the living language of Israel. Most of the learning depends upon memory rather than intelligence, and many of the bright children are discouraged by the word-by-word study of the *Chumash*, which leaves little room for personal reactions.

NEVERTHELESS the majority of Jewish children in town do go to Hebrew school, and few parents ignore the social pressure for a Bar Mitzvah. Even the non-conformists who do not send their boys to study cannot let their thirteenth year go by uncelebrated. One finds notices in the local paper indicating that "thirteen boys were invited to the thirteenth (Bar Mitzvah) birthday of so-and-so. Gifts were given and a delicious Chinese dinner was served."

The usual celebration is in the form of an elaborate *kiddush* after the Saturday morning service. To the schnapps, herring, and honey cake of the old day have been added great quantities of *kishke*, chopped liver, gefilte fish, jello molds, and Chinese egg roll. In the evening there are often dinner parties with hundreds of guests, an orchestra, photographers, and a master of ceremonies. The cost of the celebration depends less upon what the parents can afford to spend than upon family tradition.

Though one may hear criticism of the quantity or quality of the celebration, it is agreed that it is impossible to watch a thirteen-year-old, suddenly sobered and disciplined by the book and the people before him, without being moved. There seems to be a need, however passing, for ceremony and order, for knowing one's part and playing it according to the rules—even where otherwise there is laziness and lack of interest in rituals and disciplines.

When parents ask what the Hebrew school hopes to accomplish by three, four, or five years of study, the answers are vague. They may be told that it is only preparation for higher study in a Hebrew high school or college. Yet the children interested in such higher study can be counted on the fingers of one hand. It is hoped that the majority will acquire a feeling of pride and loyalty that will help them mature into good Jews who know their responsibilities to family, temple, and community. The actual curriculum has, however, little relation to such an aim.

Though the average parent asks few questions about goals and accomplishments, few meetings run their course without an outburst from some angry individual speaking for a discontented minority. "How about teaching the kids good citizenship!" one parent exclaims after watching a U.J.A. film on Israel being shown to the children.

Another sits tensely through a Parent-Teachers meeting at the Hebrew school and waits for the chance to say, "I came here tonight to protect myself from this community. I don't want you to run my life and tell me what to do." His wrath had been aroused by a communication to the public schools listing the holidays on which Jewish children would be expected to be absent. Those included Shavuoth, Simchas Torah, Succoth, and the last days of Pesach, as well as the High Holidays. This angry parent felt that his children were being forced to observe holidays he himself never bothered with, and that they would be embarrassed going to school when the other children stayed away. "Why don't you take a poll?" he shouted. "Why don't you find out how people feel before you send notices?"

Though few become as angry as he, every holiday brings confusion. The Hebrew school tells children to observe the festivals. School teachers are annoyed at disrupted classes. Many are teaching Jewish children for the first time and no one has troubled to do more than give them a list of the dates when absences could be expected. Hebrew teachers assure their students that non-Jews

will respect them for observing their religion, but public school teachers who know nothing about the holidays don't know whether to respect or deplore them. A few teachers in the early grades call parents directly for information. One stencilled large sheets with "Leshono Tovah, Happy Chanukah, Happy Pesach, etc., etc." for the children to color and present to their families or friends. They get neither information nor encouragement from the Hebrew school, however, because the belief there is that there should be no religion in public school of any kind, Jewish or Christian.

THERE is still very little social communication between adult Jews and Gentiles in Northrup. Those few who want to make friends outside their own religion can, but the majority make no effort to do so. People meet and work on community projects together. Everyday relations are very polite, formal, and respectful, but only rarely personal. The town remains atomized into little groups, each with its own exclusiveness, prejudices, and values. The Protestant groups are far from united, and Catholics and Jews usually remain as apart from the others as the Protestants do.

Public school, however, has broken down many of the barriers, especially among teenagers. At grammar school Jewish children are as a rule in predominantly Jewish classes, but at high school they become a small minority. It would appear, however, that the more friendly Jewish children become with Gentile children, the more concerned their parents get. There is great fear of intermarriage. Parents who always lived in a closed Jewish environment suddenly feel exposed to an unexpected danger. The fear seems no less on the part of those whose Jewish understanding is small than on the part of those who have had good Jewish backgrounds. They do not seem aware that their fear reflects their lack of faith in Jewish life and their inability to share their feelings with their children.

These concerns, however, have set in motion an organization to cater to teen-agers.

Clubs and athletic activities that once had little support now receive funds and attention. Membership in the youth center is reserved for children of the "Jewish faith," guests can come on only one night a week. These decisions were made by a small group of people with the encouragement of the professional leaders of the community. Many parents are not yet reconciled to them. Arguments continue, but teen-agers join and enjoy the juke-box and paddle tennis, the basketball and ice-skating parties; the leaders feel that they are protecting the youth from "outside" influences. A minority of Jews sees this as a step, and an unnecessary one, towards further segregation. The majority worry about how much it will cost and whether it is all really necessary. There is no town-wide youth center. Each church has its own youth activities and is determined to keep as many young people under its supervision as possible.

ONE may still hear a Hadassah member suggest that her organization spend more time rolling bandages for the Red Cross or recruiting people for Civil Defense than for the Medical Organization in Israel. The Jewish Ladies' Association still prefers fashion shows and penny sales to discussions of Jewish affairs, and the Men's Association relaxes with magicians and sports commentators. Nevertheless, all the Jewish organizations are influenced by a minority eager for the survival of Jewish values and religion. The older conservatives are quick to insist that the acceptance and understanding of the majority is not too important. They comfort themselves by remembering that Judaism has always depended upon a few, that it is too difficult for the majority.

The power of this minority is apparent on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, when it makes the arrangements and the majority conforms. Outsiders are surprised to find a large youthful congregation united in *tallis* and *yarmelke*. The services are long and tedious. The reader is as capable as could be expected in view of the small sum paid for his services. Yet on these days the need

to be with other Jews seems to make it possible to accept the authority of the minority, even though *tallis*, prayer book, and skullcap will be put away for another year when the *shofar* stops blowing.

The attitudes toward giving are likewise set by this minority, whose members go out on a fund drive as if they were collecting taxes instead of charity. Those who accept the Jewish view that giving to others is a duty and a responsibility are not surprised. Others cannot understand why the Red Feather or Red Cross worker *asks* for a donation, whereas the U.J.A. or Israel Bond representative is likely to *tell* people what to give.

The reception the volunteer fund-raisers get depends upon the Jewishness of the people they visit. "I always give," one woman said. "It makes me feel better. For instance, when my husband came out of the hospital I had to give a few dollars to the Temple. I made my girl a birthday party. It cost so much, so it cost another two dollars and a child in Israel has milk to drink. My parents were the same way. It had nothing to do if they had or they didn't have. There were always boxes to throw a few cents in; a dollar for the old-age home, a dollar for the orphans, a dollar for the rabbis. I can afford more than my parents, so why shouldn't I do the same?"

Another woman, however, told the man at the door, "I don't see why I have to support everybody. Why should I give up my few little pleasures for people I don't even know? It would be different if I were rich and had money to burn." Most people react somewhere between these two extremes. They may grumble, "Always asking for money, do you think we're made of money?" but find it hard to say no.

Fortunately, the Jewish community organizations of Northrup do not depend upon the zealous minority alone. Most of the work is done by men and women who enjoy it for its own sake. The women who enjoy selling tickets, food, or clothing, and the men who find excitement in arranging an auction or in hiring painters and carpenters contrib-

ute many hours to the Jewish community. They feel that they have a stake in it even though they do not concern themselves with Jewish survival, religion, or Zionism. Some expect the rabbi and teachers to give meaning to the Temple and the school they have built. Others, though unsure of their ideas of what Temple and school should accomplish, are still not ready to be told.

The lay leaders come from both groups. They may speak for the dedicated minority, or else they are active in the community—and say so openly—because they like the challenge of organizing, the stimulus of speaking in public, the pleasure of being known and admired. The rabbi and teachers find that the leaders most helpful to them are the ones who, whether educated or not, have respect for authority and do not believe that it is right to quarrel with “experts.”

IN WRITING about Northrup in 1954, I questioned whether the community would meet the needs of serious-minded people. Today that question seems irrelevant. It is apparent that the planners think in terms of their own understanding and taste and assume that what pleases them will please everybody. The program chairman who prefers fashion shows, penny sales, and magicians arranges for just such a program. The more sophisticated activities are planned by more mature people. If they do not come off, it is because the “serious” people are not serious enough to work for what they want. If any attention is paid to the minority that likes to think and learn, it is because there are a few who have the strength, the will, and the patience to battle the majority who want to relax, who do not want to be surprised, disturbed, or questioned.

Today it seems more important to ask whether the educated and “serious” people in the town will work to make it the kind of community they would like to live in.

In a small town where everyone can still stand up to be counted, it seems improper to criticize anything without doing something, or helping do something, about it. If there is to be an intelligent and liberal rabbi, an adult education program, a good school for children, teachers who can teach, and a youth center with a positive purpose, there must be discerning people to work for them.

If the people with education and understanding do not accept their responsibilities and try to become leaders, if the Jews in Northrup remain short-sighted enough to prefer leaders unconcerned with ideas and ideals, then it is not unlikely that a few years hence will see the end of our community as a *community*. Northrup will then have become just a Jewish *neighborhood*, closer to the city than the town.

Yet more Jews in Northrup *are* becoming interested in Jewish things every day. More are studying and reading than before. The new rabbi has stimulated and encouraged many people who were never interested in Jewish affairs before.

Perhaps the Jews of Northrup may settle down to Jewish living when the excitement of building and moving is over. If they do, they may find that there are many occasions in Jewish life when one eats or drinks for the sake of the blessing, rather than for the food or the wine. Similarly, in Jewish activities there is need for blessings that are not formalities but real expressions of feeling and understanding, in order to make the material work accomplished more meaningful than it is now.

Perhaps in ten or twenty years it will be possible to compare our Jewish suburban life to a Passover feast and we shall know whether we have come for the Haggadah or the *knaidlach*. Today we may have to feed the hungry people before we can tell. Later it will be up to those who can read.

TOYNBEE AND THE CULTURE CYCLE

His "Study of History" Studied

FRANZ BORKENAU

THE last four volumes of Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History* (VII, VIII, IX, X), despite their enormous mass of new detail, add nothing to the basic ideas already stated in the first six. But as the chief interest of Toynbee's work lies in these ideas and assumptions, it is worth dealing with them again as they are revealed in the later volumes, leaving aside a treatment of their particular content, which in any case would defy the limits of this essay.

According to his own account, Toynbee conceived his theory of history at about the same time that Oswald Spengler was formulating his own somewhat similar ideas. It would therefore be wrong to accuse Toynbee of an unacknowledged dependence on Spengler's work. However, since Spengler's *Decline of the West* appeared much earlier than the first volumes of *A Study of History*, one regrets that Toynbee has paid so little explicit attention to it; all the more so as his relation to Spengler constitutes the starting point for any serious assessment of his contribution.

HAVING in our May 1955 number called A. J. Toynbee to account for his *Study of History's* animadversions on Jewry and Zionism, FRANZ BORKENAU here renews his critique of the British historian's monumental work with a more general examination of its key ideas. Mr. Borkenau, a regular contributor, is perhaps better known to our readers as a political observer than as a philosopher of history, but his first love has always been history, and he has published many studies in that field in journals abroad. Born in Vienna, Mr. Borkenau went to England with the advent of Hitler. After 1945 he returned briefly to Germany as professor of history at the University of Marburg. He is the author of *The Spanish Cockpit*, *World Communism*, and *European Communism*.

Spengler's real originality did not consist in his ideas about historical rise and decline as such. Those had been a theme of European historical speculation since Machiavelli. Where Spengler went beyond such thinkers as Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Gibbon, and Burckhardt was in applying the concept of rise and decline to whole civilizations or cultures, rather than just to nations and countries. The notion of a frame of historical development larger than the political-linguistic unit formed by the nation-state had always been latent in Western Christian thought, and by the early 19th century the German historian Leopold von Ranke had made it explicit in his attempt to write a collective history of the "Romanic and Germanic" nations. Ranke, however, was blind as well as hostile to the larger processes of cultural change, and did not visualize Romanic-Germanic (i.e. Western) history in terms of rise and decline. Spengler's achievement was to combine the idea of a supra-national civilization or culture with that of a cyclical development in history. The theory of culture cycles that he created now dominates our historical thinking—at least our thinking about such grandiose historical phenomena as civilizations and cultures. We see evidence of this in the universal employment of the term "the West"; and "rise and decline" are words which we often employ to express our present anxiety about the future of our way of life. Here Toynbee has to be regarded as Spengler's epigone; his claim to have made his discoveries independently cannot take away from Spengler's achievement and precedence in opening our eyes to this whole new constellation of ideas.

Spengler next tried to extend his view of the culture as a historical unit from the West

to the other groups generally accepted as "higher civilizations." In doing this he found it necessary to establish a strict definition of the central experience peculiar to each culture. That is, he wanted to identify and isolate a unique heart and core whence the whole development of any civilization flowed. It was in this attempt, praiseworthy in itself, to define just what differentiated and separated higher civilizations from all the others that Spengler made his basic errors. Following a current of thought popular before 1914, but now half forgotten, he treated all the outward expressions of a civilization as "symbols." Symbols of what? Spengler's implied answer was: symbols of the inexpressible inner core, the "soul," of the particular civilization, which is supposed to be its highest contribution to the domain of values. But these are empty words, empty German words, serving only to conceal the total denial—implicit throughout Spengler—that a civilization is built for human survival and human needs—and a total denial that what happens to human beings in history matters; that the fruits of human experience can be accumulated over the long run and passed on from one civilization to another.

Nor was that "symbolism" improved by the Kantian element Spengler infused into it. Kant argues that space and time are *a priori* patterns which we impose on the chaotic raw material we receive from our sense impressions; these patterns, however, have no intrinsic relation to ultimate objective reality, the "*Ding an sich*." Spengler historicized this philosophical idea by maintaining that each and every civilization had its own unique conception of space, which was reflected in all its expressions and works. This notion in itself is hardly worth serious discussion—especially when we see how Spengler derived from it the entirely untenable theory that the mathematics developed in the various civilizations were basically dissimilar, that a mathematical truth for one culture was not one for another.

But where Spengler sinned through extravagance, Toynbee sins through trivi-

ality. If his dictum that "all civilizations are fundamentally contemporaneous" means anything, it means that there are no radical differences among them. What significance, then, does human variety itself possess? Toynbee's view—that differences don't matter—betrays an ultimate pessimism about the meaning of human development equal to Spengler's, if not as conscious or consistent.

Moreover, the "philosophical" contemporaneity he claims for all civilizations opens the door to many forced and far-fetched comparisons and the perception of similarities where none exists. A major instance of this is his assertion that the decline of every civilization is marked by the period of a "universal state"; yet a universal state marks the beginning, not the end, of Ancient Egypt's history. Another example is his claim that all higher civilizations end with the establishment of "universal churches"; yet there have been only four or five such churches, and Toynbee himself lists twenty-one higher civilizations. Conversely, he holds that a "universal church" is always coterminous with a single civilization. This point may appear rather technical, but it is responsible, as I will try to show later, for Toynbee's faulty analysis of his most important and—for him—most specialized subject, the history of the Near and Middle East.

In his later volumes Toynbee does try to make amends for his original contention that all civilizations are philosophically contemporaneous by distinguishing three different "generations" of cultures: the "primary," river valley civilizations, then the pre-Christian and pre-Buddhist ones, and finally the Christian and Buddhist civilizations with their offshoots. But since he continues to cling somehow to "philosophical contemporaneity," and to insist on strained and artificial analogies between cultures moving on altogether different levels, this modification in terms of "generations" creates confusion rather than clarity, and remains unreconciled with the rest of his position. In any case, Toynbee's unrestrained penchant for finding parallels wherever he looks in history frustrates any serious attempt on his

part to discuss the specific characteristics of the various civilizations. Spengler at least correctly posed a great problem—what distinguishes one culture from another?—even if he failed to solve it, but Toynbee loses sight of the problem entirely, and thus falls short of his predecessor.

At another and more important point, it is Spengler who comes off worse, however. His belief in a particular spatial "*Ursymbol*" (primordial symbol) for every civilization allows him to postulate the absolute uniqueness of all cultures. For him, civilizations are—to use Leibniz's term—"windowless monads," unable to understand or communicate with or profoundly influence one another. Each comes out of nowhere and, though leaving behind material ruins, bequeaths no genuine spiritual remains to humanity. Here Spengler (though he was himself a brave and outspoken anti-Nazi) reflects most clearly the destructive mood, the cultural nihilism, of pre- and proto-Nazi Germany. Toynbee is obviously right in opposing, to this cruel nonsense about civilizations being hermetically sealed off from one another, his notion of cultural "affiliation."

Historians have long been aware that civilizations, whether contemporaneous or separated in time, exert influence upon one another. It is also normal for younger civilizations to spring from older ones; the larger part of Toynbee's last four volumes is devoted to the discussion of such cases of culture contact and "affiliation." But though undoubtedly superior to Spengler in this aspect of his thinking, Toynbee, for all his learned parallels, falls considerably below the standards of historical research obtaining today. No serious historian would question the fact that many extraneous influences go into the making of a young civilization, but Toynbee simplifies the matter unduly by maintaining that each younger civilization is affiliated to some older one in the relation of child to parent. Must such children be limited to only one parent?

The most relevant case in point is Western civilization. According to Toynbee, it is affiliated in its origins with "Hellenic" civil-

ization, that is, the civilization of classical, Greco-Roman antiquity. So far so good—but what about Christianity, which is surely a force largely unexplained by Hellenic culture? Toynbee's answer is that Christianity is the universal church that developed out of Hellenism in decline. But where, then, do Jewry and Judaism come in? Toynbee assumes they played no part at all in the emergence of Christianity.

I am forced to rehearse the obvious: Christianity was a product, originally, of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, of what Toynbee calls the "Syriac" civilization, but in its mature form it represents a merging of the "Hellenic" and the "Syriac" spirits. Hence Eastern Christianity was "affiliated" to two civilizations, not just one. Western civilization is likewise "affiliated" to two civilizations, the Hellenic and the Syriac—and even in this reckoning Northern barbarian influences on the West are left out, as are Transjordanian (neither Hellenic nor Syriac) influences on Christianity. A generalization that, like Toynbee's, does not provide for the possibility of a nascent civilization's having multiple affiliations is clearly unsuited to serve as the starting point for a philosophy of history and of civilizations.

SPENGLER, whose nihilistic mood was typical of the old Imperial Germany (Toynbee is quite wrong in seeing the *Decline of the West*, which was published at the height of the German victories in the spring of 1918, as reflecting Wilhelmian Germany's defeat in World War I), was completely amoral—as rigidly so as Marx, with the sole difference that for Marx morality reflected class, whereas for Spengler it reflected the "*Ursymbol*." Toynbee, by contrast, abounds in moral sentiment. But this is no reason for giving him a plus mark. In my recent review of Toynbee's attitude towards modern Jewry (COMMENTARY, May 1955), I gave some examples of how he applied his moral principles in discussing history and politics—thus, he found the Israelis' treatment of the Arabs of Palestine morally equivalent to the Nazi treatment of the Jews of Europe. It

would be altogether mistaken to think that this kind of moralizing is restricted to his section on the modern Jews and is attributable solely to the indubitable hostility he feels toward them. Quotations to illustrate his "moral" attitude can be gleaned in plenty from any part of his work.

The effect of a moralizing approach to history can best be seen in Toynbee's treatment of the problem of "decline." Decline, it turns out, sets in whenever a civilization is unable to cope with the "challenges" that face it. In substance, however, this is the same thing as saying that men die when their bodies prove unable to fulfill their organic functions. The real questions as regards both men and civilizations are: *which* functions break down, and *why* do they at one moment rather than another? Toynbee offers no explicit or rational answer to these rather elementary questions. Throughout his work, he seems to explain every case of decline by the wickedness of the particular civilization at the stage when decline ensues, by some "sin" that it has committed. But in view of the terrible atrocities and crimes that have characterized the early, "rising" stages of every high civilization, our own Western one not excepted (see the early medieval *Penitentials*, which make one blush for the gross and wicked conduct they imply on the part of the ordinary man), how can it be said that periods of decline are intrinsically more "sinful" than others?

THE decline of a civilization may indeed have something to do with sinfulness, but if so, it is with special *types* of "sin." The problem is why certain types of sin are connected with decline; put thus, the question might provide the starting point for a serious inquiry. Every time Toynbee comes across such an opportunity, however, he escapes into the doctrine of free will, which in this case is a veritable *asylum ignorantiae*. He contents himself with saying in effect that men sin because they sin, just as civilizations break down because they break down. This will do for a sermon, but not for a philosophy of history.

Toynbee's underlying assumption that in every situation there is but one good choice, which man has only to see and make, will cause modern economists (who stress the subjectivity of all economic choice) as well as modern theologians of all faiths (who stress the ambiguity and paradoxicality of all human action) to shudder. Of course, Toynbee may retort that both the economics and the theology of our day are wrong, but in that case let him *show* that they are wrong and really defend his own views.

I happen to think that the apparent "skepticism" and "subjectivism" of modern thought about man and his behavior contain new and important elements of truth. It turns out that the choice facing a human being who exercises free will is never between *one* good and *one* evil. In the first place, anything a man does affects not only his own moral character, but has consequences for many different sides of life: the family, the community, economics, politics, aesthetics, religion, etc., etc., all at one and the same time. In the second place, the real difficulty of making a choice stems from the fact that every good involves its own evil, so that a choice is generally among different goods each of which entails some evil.

Towards the end of his work Toynbee addresses himself to the two great modern problems of war and unemployment. He abounds in good advice—e.g., unless we avoid war we shall all perish—but nothing more pertinent or concrete than that. What, again, he does not seem to realize is that the solution of major problems, now as in the past, requires us to make compromises; that we cannot choose between absolute good and absolute evil; that any effective steps we can possibly take against either war or unemployment must at best strike the perfectionist as half-measures. There is no help for it. A predominantly moralizing approach like Toynbee's to the difficulties of human existence means only to evade and dissemble the humiliating experience of one's ordinary human inadequacy—and to do this by riding the high horse of moral superiority to, and contempt for, one's fellow human beings.

THE inescapable subjectivity, the ineluctable ambiguity of all human choice and action have a direct relevance to the problem of the rise and decline of civilizations—but a relevance that Toynbee's sermonizing obscures. A civilization is essentially a bundle of closely correlated beliefs and rules of conduct on the basis of which various communities act and interact. Now these beliefs and rules at bottom constitute social choices, and hence always lead to the adoption of one style of life to the exclusion of others. They may imply the rejection of whole areas of human possibility that in themselves are as justified or even more attractive than those actually adopted. But debate about this must be halted at some point or other in order to make the accepted rules valid and binding. To invest them with such validity, they are legitimized on a basis supposedly, but never really, unchallengeable.

The acceptance of conventions on the ground of a legitimization that is treated as unchallengeable is called traditionalism. All civilizations are traditional in some sort in their early stages: questionable rules of conduct are handed down unquestioningly from one generation to another. A civilization emerges precisely as such traditions are established; it rises as they are elaborated and as society is permeated by them. The traditions themselves arise under the pressure of disorder and disarray, for the emergence of most higher civilizations is presaged by the collapse of traditions left over from anterior high cultures and from the primitive tribal units in contact with them. Almost every civilization is born out of a "dark age" of chaos in which no rules of behavior are accepted as unquestionably valid.

The choosing of tradition rather than non-tradition, of cut-and-dried rules rather than chaos, carries its own evil with it. All rules are ambiguous, all rules are inadequate, all rules exclude essential and valuable parts of human experience. Though, formally, tradition is rooted in some principle of legitimacy, in actuality it derives from the need to avoid chaos. That need decreases, however, in proportion to the success with which

civilization fulfills its primary purpose of stabilizing a social order; and with the decrease of this need, greater and greater scope in questioning the social order is permitted. The very increase of social adjustment, by making the social processes and the "tissues" of society more complex, undermines that simplicity of basic conventions which alone gives social processes and tissues their firmness. A stage is reached at which the elements of disintegration get the upper hand, and a gradual loosening of tradition and of established rules sets in.

These forces of disintegration, far from being in the service of unbridled drives and urges, operate in obedience to a fuller truth and for the sake of a more exact social adjustment. They are indeed the very forces that, after a certain point, keep society and civilization moving. Without them there would be no human development, no history at all, but only changeless social stability and/or that passive surrender to new and hostile forces which we see in the case of some primitive, ossified societies upon whom more dynamic cultures impinge. Only at a very late stage in the development of a civilization, when tradition has been deeply and irreversibly undermined, do the drives formerly suppressed by rules of conduct break out into the open again; and it is in this phase that "moral" decline becomes a major factor in cultural change.

I think we can see now how the basic ambiguities of human existence, stressed in closely related terms by the social sciences on the one hand and by theology on the other, open a direct avenue to an understanding of the culture cycle. What appear in social science and theology as the innate limitations and ambiguities of the human condition, figure in history as the repetitive alternation of opposed attitudes. Toynbee himself has occasionally pointed out the occurrence of such an alternation—as, for instance, between an immanent and a transcendent God. Any number of similar alternations could be adduced. (It might even be argued—there isn't the space to go into this here—that on some fundamental ques-

tions, like the belief in survival after death, cultures seem to take views antithetical to those of the civilizations with which they are "affiliated," and under whose tutelage they are supposed to be.) The culture cycle as a whole might be described as an alternation between rigid traditionalism and tendencies to disruption and chaos. And history knows of no resting point in this up-and-down.

Yet not all processes in history are repetitive, and attitudes that have been discarded tend to return, not unchanged, but on a "higher level"—enriched and deepened by new elements acquired during their period of discard.

Toynbee is right in calling our present age one of moral disintegration, but he never identifies the roots or specifies the future implications of our crisis. He does not seem to realize that disintegration is just as creative, if less pleasant, a process as integration, and that new civilizations can never arise without the disintegration of old ones—in other words, he fails to treat the matter historically. And he also fails to understand that the framework of a stable civilization cannot accommodate *all* human ends, and that some of the most important of human objectives cannot be attained without an intervening period of deep crisis. It is precisely to accommodate these realities that a theory of cultural affiliation has to be framed, and precisely in this respect that the culture cycle has universal meaning. But here as elsewhere Toynbee fails to show a firm grasp of his own theories. Cultural affiliation or no, he regards the disintegration of culture or civilization, wherever he finds it, as an entirely negative process, and here he agrees wholly with Spengler.

This comes out most conspicuously in Toynbee's angry rejection of modern technology. I myself heard him say, at an Anglo-American historical conference in 1935, that the ancient Greeks had already achieved all that could profitably be done in the line of material civilization, and that our own modern technology was one big mistake from first to last. His argument was, of course, nothing but a play upon the am-

biguous sense of the word "material," which means two entirely different things when applied to ancient Hellas and to modern Western civilization.

All civilizations have striven for greater knowledge about nature and man. But the West alone has to its credit truly gigantic achievements in the department of rational, useful knowledge. These achievements, however, have been paid for by an unprecedented cultural crisis that may threaten the very existence of mankind. The West's accomplishments in scientific knowledge came almost entirely in the later stages of its historical development, when skepticism, rationalism, and anti-traditionalism abounded, and when there was a decline in positive religion and inherited moral standards. Does it follow, then, that the first, tradition-bound phase of our own or any other civilization is to be judged as better than our intensely modern and advanced one? This is what Toynbee seems to imply, but the implication has only to be stated to be rejected.

HIGHER civilizations, I noted a short while back, almost always arise out of barbaric ages whose chaotic disintegration and paranoiac savagery make the reshaping and reestablishment of tradition an overwhelming necessity. According to Toynbee, barbaric or "heroic" ages are good for nothing except the production of epic poetry. Nevertheless, where there is a relatively weak infusion of barbaric influence into a newborn civilization, the result is usually insufficient cultural vitality. Obviously, close contact with barbaric peoples can prove invaluable to a civilization in its first stages.

Eastern Christianity offers the classic example of a civilization that suffered because insulated too soon from contact with non-civilized peoples. Nothing could have been a more potent agent of rejuvenation for a moribund civilization than the newly fledged Christianity of the Middle East. Yet Byzantium, the heir of Rome, was incapable of exploiting this historical chance to the full. Once barbarian influences from beyond the Jordan and other border areas had been

warded off and suppressed, the Eastern Roman Empire stiffened into a rigidity out of which it never stirred. And Islam, the illegitimate child of Byzantium, soon followed the same course.

The "second generations" of both the original Chinese and Indian civilizations experienced a similar premature ossification. True, as the centers of these civilizations moved steadily southward they moved into barbarian territory; but at the same time they moved away from the more vigorous barbarian pressure on their northern confines. Meeting relatively little barbarian resistance in their southward migration, both "affiliated" civilizations soon fell into a stagnation like the Byzantine. On the other hand, where there were large-scale, vigorous barbarian invasions, like that of Greece by the Dorian tribes, or where the center of a culture was transplanted to the homeland of the invading barbarians, as happened with both the ancient Hebrew and the modern Western societies, the ultimate result was a civilization more creative than most others.

Barbarian peoples, whose primitive cultures are almost always in process of disintegration by the time they appear within the ken of history, cannot but be deeply affected by the higher civilizations with which they come in contact. And history shows that the permanence of barbarism is not the real threat to civilization—barbarism being almost everywhere a passing phase—but the paralysis and stagnation of civilization itself. Such stagnation is not effectively dispelled where the heirs of an old and high civilization can achieve quick and overwhelming cultural ascendancy over barbarian neighbors and "converts"; when that happens, the old, exhausted forms of faith and life are able to reassert themselves before experiencing an access of vitality from the younger peoples on which they are imposed. It would seem that the emergence of a strong new civilization in the "second generation" or later depends on the intrusion of energetic barbarian peoples, secure in their own homelands, who in the course of many centuries imbibe the spirit and transform

the ways of the older civilization or civilizations to which their culture affiliates.

If it can be said that the Western is probably the most vigorous of all civilizations since the river valley ones of the "first generation" in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and China, this is certainly due to the great part played in its development by barbarian peoples who stayed put in their homelands in Northwestern Europe. Western Christianity could not have become the powerful, vital religion it did without drinking at that source. (To avoid common misunderstandings, let me say that when I speak of "Northern barbarians" I have in mind such figures as Charlemagne and William the Conqueror, not agitators from the slums of modern big cities, like Hitler—who exploited a new-fangled and entirely mythical barbarian "past" to justify his gangsterism.)

THE part played by barbarians in the affiliating of new civilizations with old ones is as repetitive a phenomenon as the culture cycle itself. One can sum it up by saying that "affiliations are the more successful the greater the extent to which they take place in a barbarian milieu." Toynbee's rejection of this view has involved him from the start in a number of astonishingly oblique interpretations. The oddest was his attempt to extract Sparta (and with it, by implication, the Doric core of the Hellenic world) from the context of Hellenic civilization and treat it as a separate, "arrested civilization"; yet Sparta was obviously a residual survival of the earliest, most decisive age of Hellas, and retained the vitality to play a crucial role throughout its climactic phase.

Toynbee hardly does much better when he treats the early medieval civilizations of Ireland and Scandinavia as "abortive" but independent cultural units. Admittedly, the different historical elements that go to make up any civilization are at first more or less independent of one another. The ultimate relation of these elements to the new culture arising from their fusion must depend in the first place on their individual share in creating it. Now it seems plain that much of

what makes up Western as opposed to Eastern Christianity is of Irish origin; nothing but a stubborn blindness to the importance of barbarian influences in the emergence of new civilizations could have led to neglect of this essential fact. As for Scandinavia, it is not the Old Norse literature and religion, so beloved of the Nazis, that form its essential contribution to emergent Western civilization; these features of Old Norse culture must be considered rather as survivals of a pre-Western Germanic stage of development that was preserved in Scandinavia longer than in Germany and was able to reach fuller maturity there because of Scandinavia's greater distance from the Christianized parts of Europe. What was crucial to Scandinavia's relations with the rest of Western Europe was the unmatched role the Vikings played in the creation of the modern Western state: first through the centralized government of Normandy, then through the establishment of the Kingdom of Scotland and the conquest of England, and finally through the conquest of Sicily, where a momentous merger of Eastern and Northern systems of government took place. To shut the Vikings out of the political history of Europe is tantamount to eliminating its intelligible frame of reference. Needless to say, once Western civilization had broken out of the chrysalis state, it reacted upon the Irish and Scandinavian elements that had helped bring it to life, and eventually drew them into its own orbit.

THESE examples raise the more general problem of the role of geographical areas in the emergence and later history of a high civilization. Though a full discussion of this would exceed the limits of the present article, it can be stated as a general law that areas destined to become altogether marginal in the later stages of a civilization usually play a dominant part during its creative phase—the period when it does not yet possess a cultural center of gravity. Thus such border regions as Thessaly and Crete were of focal importance to prehistorical Hellas.

Geographically, the genesis of a civiliza-

tion usually consists in the invasion of forces from outside that finally converge and become concentrated in one or more centrally located areas. These areas, generally, start out as border regions, lying between the domains of an older civilization and those inhabited by the barbarian peoples who now infuse the new civilization with their vital energy. Thus all three cradle areas of Western civilization—Normandy, Lorraine, and Burgundy—were places where Latinized influences met and cross-bred with Germanic ethnic and cultural elements. The same cross-breeding defines the relation between the Indus and the Ganges valley cultures in the "second" Indian civilization; between lowlands and plateau cultures in both the pre-Columbian civilizations; between North and South in Mesopotamian civilization; and so on.

If adequate weight is given to this recurrent fact, a clear pattern for the culture cycle begins to define itself. During the prenatal phase of a "second generation," or affiliated, civilization, two important but separate areas are involved, one the homeland of the anterior, parent civilization, the other the homeland of the barbarians who threaten it. When the civilization is finally born, a new cultural center usually materializes in the borderland between the two, and the further history of the civilization tends to be marked by an alternation of cultural and political dominance between the two areas.

Thus the constant struggle for preponderance between North and South is an obtrusive feature of the history of the West. In the beginning the regions fairly close to the northern limits of our civilization predominated; gradually the center of gravity moved southwards until it came to rest, in the 15th and 16th centuries, in Southern Europe. The original trend in the West, therefore, would appear to have been away from the homeland of the former barbarians to that of the old, parent civilization. Then, however, a fierce reaction set in—the Reformation, which led to a large-scale breaking away of the old barbarian countries from their cultural servitude to the South. Once

this partial cultural scission had been achieved, the old barbarian domains reasserted their political leadership and the center of political power again moved northward—to turn westward across the Atlantic in our day.

The swing back toward the old barbarian lands has usually coincided with a great crisis such as seems to have marked the middle of every culture cycle, and in which the shifting of the center is as a rule compelled by a religious upheaval—e.g., the Reformation or Islam. In such an upheaval, the different cultural and spiritual inclinations of the recently civilized barbarians reassert themselves against the traditions of the older cultures to which the barbarians had submitted during the early development of the particular civilization. In the Islamic “movement,” a genuinely Oriental attitude took the field against the half-Hellenized Orientalism of Byzantium; during the Reformation, a Germanic belief in destiny, clothed in the doctrine of predestination, asserted itself against Roman Catholic Hellenism.

These geographical shifts are, of course, tied up with the rise and decline of a civilization, but even more intimately and decisively with the profound, pivotal crisis that seems to overtake every civilization around the middle of its life-span—a crisis arising precisely from the fact that a “second generation” civilization tends to be a symbiosis of two vastly different elements. In connection with this point, the story of the Renaissance and the Reformation in the West throws much light on the history of Byzantium and Islam. Though these last constitute the field most congenial to Toynbee and the one wherein he lays claim to being an expert in his own right, it is the field in which he fails most signally. Whatever else one may say about his relation to Spengler, his *débâcle* here must be laid to his neglect of the findings of his predecessor.

WITH some justification, Toynbee advances the idea of a “Syriac” civilization that arose between Sinai and the upper Tigris in the second half of the 2nd mil-

lennium B.C.E., finding its main political expression in Assyria and its “universal state” in the Persian Empire of the Achæmenians. One might conclude that Alexander’s conquests and the ensuing Hellenization of the Middle East marked the death of this civilization and the emergence of a new affiliated civilization from the fusion of the East and Hellas. But this would introduce the notion of a double parentage, which we have seen that Toynbee implicitly repudiates. He prefers a different conclusion: that, with Alexander, the Syriac civilization, far from dying, went into a deep slumber that lasted for a thousand years and reawakened when the ‘Abassid Caliphs defeated the Omayyads and moved the capital of the Caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad in 750 C.E. The Syriac civilization’s new lease on life lasted until 1922, when the rump of the Ottoman Empire was secularized—and not even this late date marks its conclusive end.

Why, however, should the Syriac provide the only known example of a civilization’s capacity to hibernate? If this is hibernation, then one can discover similar cases elsewhere: how the Indus civilization slept until it re-emerged as the “Indic” or classical Indian civilization, only to doze off again and re-emerge a second time as the Hindu civilization; how Hellenism slept until it awoke transformed into Western Christianity; how Mayan culture fell into a slumber before reawakening as the Toltec-Aztec culture; and so on and so on. In other words, the Syriac civilization offers a typical example of the process Toynbee describes as “affiliation,” but for the sake of a romantic whim, he makes it an exceptional case.

Yet Spengler, too, sensed something untypical in the history of the Middle East. In his view, the Middle Eastern civilization that he calls “Arabic,” and Toynbee “Syriac,” never fell asleep, but for centuries wore the mask of Hellenism. To cover this situation, Spengler devised the term “pseudomorphosis.” This was meant to express the fact that the overwhelming formal strength of Hellenic tradition, which survived the

death of Hellenic civilization itself, prevented the Arabic world from realizing itself naturally and natively; instead, it was compelled to cast its utterly un-Hellenic thoughts and feelings in Hellenic molds. This, according to Spengler, explains the fierce reaction when at long last the Arabic world found its own indigenous expression in the form of Islam.

The concurrence of two minds as different as those of Spengler and Toynbee in finding an exceptional character in Middle Eastern history suggests the existence of truly exceptional objective circumstances in Arabic-Syriac society. These circumstances—they are not really unique but only rather infrequent—are revealed by a comparison of the Middle Eastern culture cycle with that of Western civilization. Normandy, Lorraine, Burgundy, and Saxony—only a short time out of barbarism or else newly barbarized—were the dominant areas of the West in the earliest phase of its culture cycle. By contrast, the Middle East, in the earlier phases of its culture cycle, was dominated not by such half-barbarian areas as Iraq, let alone Arabia proper, but by Antioch, Alexandria, and Byzantium—its most Hellenized centers. But the preponderance of the barbaric element in the early evolution of Western civilization, and the contrasting preponderance of Hellenism in the early stages of Middle Eastern civilization, confront us with a relative, not an absolute, difference.

What is present in both situations is the merging of two old civilizations in a barbarian setting. If in the Middle East the old culture area predominated, and in the West the old barbarian one, the reason for the difference is not far to seek. The barbarian setting in which the Middle Eastern civilization arose was the same disadvantageous one that Byzantium, the civilization of Eastern Christianity, had to cope with; and when, with Mohammed, its original Arabic elements erupted to the surface of Middle Eastern civilization and took control of it, it was at a late stage in its development. Spengler's term "pseudomorphosis" is not adequate for the analysis of this his-

torical process, and Toynbee's theory of "hibernation" is even less so.

But Spengler, unaware of Toynbee's "sleeping beauty" theory, at least kept a firm grasp on the essential unity of the whole historical phase that began with the Roman Empire and ended in a new barbarization following the fall of the 'Abassid Caliphate in the 12th century. Lacking Toynbee's compulsion to insist on the notion of a final "universal church," Spengler—to my mind, correctly—identified Islam as, at bottom, a Christian heresy.

We did not know in Spengler's time, as we do today, that Mohammed gleaned his basic ideas neither from Orthodox Christianity nor Orthodox Judaism, but from the Ebionites, a residual Judeo-Christian sect. Nonetheless, in the Christian heresy of Monophysitism there lay a clear connecting link between Orthodox Christianity and Islam; with this evidence in hand, Spengler was able to discern in the rise of Islam a fairly exact parallel with the rise of Protestantism in the Western world. And he also saw a similar analogy between the rise of Assyria in the 9th century B.C.E. and the pivotal change in Hellenic civilization at the end of the 6th century B.C.E.—a parallel he also drew with pivotal moments halfway in the evolution of other civilizations.

And if the geographical plan of the Arabic civilization was untypical in the beginning, it was not so later on—the emergence of Islam in its second phase made it conform to the standard pattern by shifting the cultural center to an area that had previously been the homeland of barbarians. Yet insofar as the post-Alexandrian civilization of the Middle East attained its "natural" geographical plan only with the triumph of Islam, its previous geographical structure must be considered an aberration, and Spengler's coinage of the term "pseudomorphosis" to describe it has some justification.

IN THE final stages of their respective interpretations of Middle Eastern civilization, Spengler and Toynbee again converge, only quickly to separate once more, and in the

most dramatic way. Spengler, owing perhaps to his systematic effort to isolate and define the individual identity of each civilization, was generally ahead of Toynbee in analyzing the political structures of civilizations in their own terms. Such obvious features as the role of the *polis* in Hellas and of the nation-state in the West assumed for him the status of major symbols setting off the respective civilization from all others. Within this context, Spengler discovered that, for the post-Alexandrian civilization of the Middle East, the religious community, usually in the form of a church, played the political role assigned to the *polis* in Hellas and to the nation-state in the West. Here he concurred in the main with Toynbee, who (as we pointed out in our previous article of May 1955) insisted on the basic importance of the *millet* system of communal organization in the Near and Middle East.

Yet once again at this juncture Toynbee, having barely announced his own formulation, proceeds to disregard it. If the *millet* is the counterpart of the "parochial" political units of other civilizations—and what else can it be?—it should follow that the sum total of the *millets* of the Middle East formed the body and political substance of the post-Alexandrian civilization of the region. This view was consistently adhered to by Spengler, who regarded Orthodox Christianity, Monophysitism, Nestorianism, Talmudic Jewry, Sunnitic and Shi'itic Islam, etc., etc., as the "nations" of the post-Alexandrian culture area and culture cycle. (This idea, incidentally, seems to me to be Spengler's most relevant contribution to the study of history, far surpassing in value the more general notions of his system.)

Toynbee, on the other hand, in one of those illogical reversals which characterize his whole work, suddenly, after having asserted that the *millet* system defined the political order of Syriac civilization, turns around and proceeds to treat each *millet* community as a separate civilization. Thus we are presented with Orthodox Christian, Nestorian, Monophysite, Judaic, Sunnite,

and Shi'ite *civilizations* (why Toynbee does not extend the classification to the Druzes, Maronites, and numberless other sects scattered through Syria and the Lebanon, I do not know). Spengler's signal insight into the fact that this whole welter of religious communities expressed various aspects of one and the same cultural current, is discarded by Toynbee, who thus creates the greatest confusion in the field where he is supposed to be most expert. . . .

IN SUM, however, the basic objection to Toynbee's treatment of the culture cycle—his main subject—is that he does not sufficiently investigate the factors which, taken together, constitute its actual dynamics. The formula of "challenge and response," however unobjectionable in itself, is far too abstract and general to cover even the most elementary problems of cultural development. Fundamentally a biological notion, it cannot furnish the key to any of the special problems of the subject in hand. Rather, it permits Toynbee to evade them all by easy references to "free will."

My own observations in this article do not pretend to any finality. I shall be satisfied if they have given the reader some sense of the vastness of the problems implicit in any study of the culture cycle and of the general forms under which civilizations arise and develop. And I shall be satisfied if my remarks have conveyed a notion of the great gaps that remain in both Spengler's and Toynbee's elucidation of even the more elementary aspects of the subject.

When Spengler broached the problem of the culture cycle toward the end of the First World War, he caught the general public's attention in Germany and elsewhere, but the dire emergencies brought on by the depression and the rise of Nazism and Communism pushed such questions into the background. In this interlude of relative calm, it is well that we return to them. The answers they require are more crucial even than those that we must devise for the most pressing problems of the moment.

A CASE STUDY IN DUE PROCESS

James Kutcher and His Pension

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM

JAMES KUTCHER'S involvement in the great events of his time was almost accidental, and for the most part passive. The son of a Newark fur worker, he graduated from high school during the depression, only to find that his father's vanishing earnings made it impossible for him to go on to college and become a teacher as he had planned. Instead, he went to work. Only there was no work. For years he alternated between unemployment and odd jobs. He joined the Young People's Socialist League and the Socialist party. In those organizations he appears to have been a conscientious but never in any sense a leading member, even locally in Newark. Then, for a short while, the American followers of Leon Trotsky joined the Socialist party. They were expelled after some months, but during their stay picked up a few recruits, of whom James Kutcher was one.

The specific reasons for his conversion to Socialism and then to Trotskyism do not emerge clearly in his autobiography, *The Case of the Legless Veteran*. But it seems highly improbable that they were ideological; neither in his book, nor in his recorded testimony before any of the hearing boards he has faced in recent years, does Kutcher give any impression of familiarity with or even interest in the fine shadings of doctrine which distinguish Trotskyites from all other men, and the Socialist Workers party, to which he belongs, from all other Trotskyites.

IS THERE a distinction between genuine measures for national security and bureaucratic harassment? The "Kutcher Case," which is reviewed here by MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM, raises this question sharply. Author of *American Security and Freedom* (1954), Mr. Goldbloom is well-known to our readers as a reporter on civil liberties issues.

On the whole, Kutcher seems far more likely to have been motivated by personal loyalties; one gets the impression that these have, in his case, always been rather strong.

So far, his life was essentially uneventful. But it diverged from the pattern of millions of his contemporaries, who, while they had more or less similar experiences during the depression, did not become Trotskyites. Those who did never exceeded a few thousand in all. Except to the Communist party, which customarily cited them to the Dies Committee and similar bodies as proper objects of investigation, the Trotskyites hardly seemed a major menace. Kutcher's Trotskyism seems to have supplied him with a social life of sorts, to have caused him to join a certain number of picket lines and distribute a good many leaflets, and to have filled many of his leisure hours with the addressing of envelopes. Essentially a shy and almost timid man, he appears to have done little if any direct proselytizing for his cause.

Then, on January 21, 1941, he was drafted into the United States Army. As a Trotskyite, he was opposed to the war; he was also theoretically committed to trying to win other soldiers over to the Trotskyite point of view. In fact, according to his own testimony and that of fellow soldiers, he did nothing of the kind. Instead, he tried to become a good soldier, obeyed orders, and on November 9, 1943, was seriously wounded by a mortar shell near San Pietro in Italy. On the same evening, both his legs were amputated. Then came almost two years of treatment and training in the use of artificial legs. Finally, on September 27, 1945, he was discharged from the army.

He received a disability pension. This, together with the small Social Security pay-

ments received by his parents (and the fact that they lived in a low-rent public housing development), just about met the family's expenses on a very modest standard. The rising cost of living placed Kutcher under increasing financial pressure; even more important, he wanted the feeling of usefulness and belonging that a job would give. He therefore took and passed a civil service examination, and in August 1946 he was appointed a clerk in the Newark office of the Veterans Administration.

Of this job, Kutcher writes:

My pay started at \$38 a week, rising to \$39 a year later. Veterans who wanted to get a loan under the GI Bill to buy a house or start a business had to come to the Loan Guarantee Division for a certificate of eligibility. I entered their claims in a register, stamped their discharge papers, and issued the certificate which was typed up by one of the girls in our office. My efficiency rating in this job was "excellent."

After more than a year, I was transferred to the Vocational and Rehabilitation Division where I handled contracts made between employers and veterans getting on-the-job training. I recorded information about the amount and frequency of wage increases due the veterans, checking to make sure the wage progressions were correct. My rating in this job was "very good." Toward the end of my second year Congress passed a bill granting pay increases of about \$6 a week to all civil service employees. . . .

For the first time in my life, I had a sense of security. For the first time I had a real job. I was filling it satisfactorily, and although I did not magnify its importance I was making a slight contribution to the welfare of other veterans. But above all was the realization that I was not socially useless after all, that despite my disability I could hold a job like other people, that in certain ways I was even better off than before I was drafted!

All in all, this was the happiest time of my life since my schooldays. . . . I remained a member of the party, interested as before in social and political developments, but not as active; I still took minutes at meetings, but had no time now to help in the clerical work. . . .

And then on August 16, 1948, came a bombshell more stunning than any I ever experienced in the war: The manager of the Veterans Administration in Newark . . . handed me a letter telling me I was scheduled to be

fired within 30 days on the ground that I was "disloyal" to the government of the United States.

THUS was James Kutcher launched on a career as a national figure. For from that day on, he has been engaged in a continuing fight to defend himself (and his parents as well) against the attacks of various government agencies.

The charges against Kutcher, brought under President Truman's loyalty program, Executive Order 9835 of March 21, 1947, all arose out of his membership and activity in the Socialist Workers party. This ineffectual splinter group was certainly no instrument of any foreign power. It was devoted to the doctrines of Leon Trotsky, and was anathema to the Communists.

Nonetheless, it had long been an object of special concern to the government. Its leaders were the first persons prosecuted under the Smith Act. In 1941, years before the first prosecution directed against the leaders of the Communist party, eighteen major and minor leaders of the Socialist Workers party were convicted and sentenced to prison in a trial initiated by the then Attorney General, Francis Biddle. About the same time, Biddle drew up a more or less informal list of subversive organizations for the guidance of government agencies. This list included a number of Communist and Fascist groups, as well as the Socialist Workers party, the dissident Trotskyists of the Workers party (later called the Independent Socialist League), and the Industrial Workers of the World. Executive Order 9835 gave official status to a revised and expanded version of this list, drawn up by Attorney General Tom Clark. Membership in any organization on the list was to be considered as showing a need for further investigation of an employee's loyalty. In drawing up the list, neither Biddle nor Clark gave any hearing to the organizations concerned. Later, the courts held (in the case of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee) that the failure to grant a hearing was a violation of due process. Nevertheless, the Socialist Workers party has to this day been unable

to secure such a hearing. (Its application for one was rejected by Attorney General Brownell on the ground that it was signed only by the party's secretary, Farrell Dobbs, and not by its chairman, James Cannon.)

The lack of due process in establishing the Attorney General's list does not, of course, mean that membership in organizations on the list is irrelevant to fitness for a sensitive position in the government. It merely means that the list itself is not valid proof of such relevance. Certainly there are a great many positions of such a nature that membership in the Socialist Workers party and adherence to its doctrines would be ample ground for disqualification. This is true even without going into the question of security—it is obvious, for instance, that a member of the SWP would not be a much better choice than Judith Coplon was for the position she held in the Department of Justice.

But the case of James Kutcher has never, in any of its aspects, even remotely involved security, or even suitability. The action taken against Kutcher seems to have been intended to punish him for his beliefs and affiliations, and it seems neither to have had nor pretended to have any other purpose.

KUTCHER replied to the charges by affirming his membership in the SWP and challenging the validity of the loyalty program in general and the Attorney General's list in particular. In accordance with the procedure established under the executive order, he was given a hearing before the Veterans Administration Branch Loyalty Board on September 10, 1948. The government representative opened the hearing by declaring: "The charges are based upon investigation, reports of which are in the possession of the Board, and no witnesses will be presented on behalf of the government. I wish to call the Board's attention to the reply of the employee by letter dated August 25, 1948, wherein it was stated in paragraph 2, 'I have never denied my membership in the Socialist Workers Party; I do not deny it now; on the contrary, I proudly affirm it.'

I have nothing further to present at this time."

In accordance with the regulations under which it operated, the Board refused to permit any evidence designed to challenge the validity of the Attorney General's designation of the SWP as subversive; it held that his decision on this point was binding on it. It did, however, permit Kutcher to testify as to his own beliefs, his relation to the party, and his interpretation of its doctrines. And the government stipulated that his job was not a sensitive one. On October 12, Kutcher received notice that, after considering all the evidence, the Board had decided that there were reasonable grounds for believing him disloyal, and that he was suspended from his job. Despite the formal reference to "all the evidence," it was clear that his dismissal was based solely on his membership in the SWP.

Had there been any doubt on this point, it was dispelled by the decision of the Assistant Administrator of the Veterans Administration in response to Kutcher's appeal. On December 29, 1948, he wrote: ". . . there is no choice but to affirm the action of the Deputy Administrator in suspending you from duty and pay. You have admitted and therefore it must be concluded to be a fact that you are a member of the Socialist Workers Party. . . . The Attorney-General has determined that the Socialist Workers Party is an organization that seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. The Veterans Administration is bound by that determination of the Attorney General. The Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, in a memorandum dated December 17, 1948, copy of which is enclosed, states that section 9A of the Hatch Act makes it mandatory to remove from the service any employee found to be a member of that organization."

Kutcher then appealed to the national Loyalty Review Board. Here his case was heard by a panel of three distinguished and liberal-minded men: John Harlan Amen, John Kirkland Clark, and Henry Parkman.

The Loyalty Review Board agreed to hear testimony on the doctrines of the SWP from the party's secretary, Farrell Dobbs—and then decided that the determination of the Attorney General was binding on it as a matter of law, and that it therefore had no choice but to affirm Kutcher's dismissal. Kutcher was notified of this on April 25, 1949.

THERE remained the courts. Here, after the Federal District Court had upheld his dismissal, he secured a reversal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. The court held on October 16, 1952, that, despite the hearing board's statement that it had considered all the evidence, the Administrator had based his action solely on Kutcher's membership in the SWP. And this, it held, was insufficient basis for dismissal under the Executive Order. It therefore directed the Administrator to reconsider the case, taking all the evidence into account.

The Administrator, holding that the court had found fault with his determination, but not with the original loyalty hearing, did not convene a new loyalty board to hear the case *de novo*. He did, however, give Kutcher a new hearing before the VA's Loyalty Board of Appeals. This took place on March 9, 1953. The Board questioned Kutcher rather extensively on his views; it was clearly seeking to develop further evidence, beyond Kutcher's membership in the SWP, to prove him subversive. In response to specific and repeated questions, he reiterated his own opposition to the use of force, violence, or other unconstitutional means to alter the form of government of the United States. (In the original hearing, some very confused questions on these points had produced answers which were not models of clarity—although they were not inconsistent with the position Kutcher now stated unequivocally.)

Three points in the questioning deserve specific mention, because they were cited by the Board as part of the basis for its ruling, handed down on February 7, 1955, reaffirm-

ing Kutcher's dismissal. In the questioning on his beliefs, the following colloquy took place:

MR. LYNCH (board member): Have you read the Communist Manifesto?

MR. KUTCHER: Yes, sir.

MR. LYNCH: Do we find therein representative views of Karl Marx?

MR. KUTCHER: Yes, sir.

MR. LYNCH: And you say that we would not find therein advocacy of force and violence?

MR. KUTCHER: That's right.

MR. LYNCH: Do you advocate the course of action as advocated by Karl Marx?

MR. KUTCHER: Yes, sir.

MR. LYNCH: Does that include world revolution?

MR. KUTCHER: That includes bringing about socialism all over the world.

MR. LYNCH: Is that action based upon destruction by force and violence, if necessary, of our present capitalistic system, the system under which we live under the Constitution of the United States?

MR. KUTCHER: It doesn't say that at all.

In its decision, the Board used this as a basis for impeaching the integrity of Kutcher's testimony, asserting: "He denied that the Communist Manifesto . . . contemplated revolution and destruction by force and violence, if necessary, of our present constitutional Government and way of life. Such denials were made in the face of his assertion of having read the Manifesto and, what appears to be, in fact, his fair understanding of the teachings of Marx set out, among other places, in the Communist Manifesto. . . ." The Board then quoted the concluding paragraph of the Manifesto, calling for "the forcible overthrow of the whole extant social order."

The Board also asked Kutcher a number of questions as to whether he remembered certain activities of various individuals in the SWP. He answered that he did not; then, after a recess in which he conferred with his counsel Joseph Rauh, he changed his testimony and admitted that he did remember them and had denied it in order to avoid involving others. This also seemed to the Board to cast "serious question" on the integrity of Kutcher's testimony.

And as a clincher, the Board cited Kutcher's testimony, in answer to a hypothetical question, that if he knew "a very close friend" to be a member of the Communist party, he did not think he would voluntarily go and report him to the FBI if the individual in question had not committed any overt act against the government. On the basis of this, the Board declared: "In other words, his pretended loyalty to this Government is overcome by his admitted loyalty to those who seek to destroy it." This writer suspects that if Kutcher's answer on this point is proof of disloyalty, many, many other people would have to be branded as disloyal—though perhaps not all of them would be as truthful about it as Kutcher if their jobs were at stake.

Aside from these points the Board based its decision on the subversive character of the Socialist Workers party—buttressing its case by citing the evidence in the 1941 Smith Act trial.

Kutcher again appealed to the courts for relief. His petition, turned down by the United States District Court, is now before the United States Court of Appeals. It is based partly on procedural grounds, one of which is the use by the Board of evidence (including the material on the SWP's subversive character) which had not been presented at the hearing so that Kutcher could refute it. It again challenges the listing of the SWP. And it maintains that dismissal from a non-sensitive post on the grounds given violates Kutcher's rights under the First Amendment.

MEANWHILE, new troubles were brewing for Kutcher. In July 1952 Congress passed the Gwinn Amendment to the Independent Offices Bill, barring from federally aided public housing all members of organizations on the Attorney General's list. Hence the Newark Public Housing Authority demanded in December 1952 that all tenants of the Seth Boyden Housing Project, where Kutcher lives with his parents, certify that neither they nor any members of their families belonged to any

such organization. Kutcher's old and ailing father was not himself a member; neither was Kutcher's mother. But as long as their son lived with them, they could not make the required certification. The Kutchers therefore went to court to seek an injunction against the enforcement of the requirement. This was granted by the lower court, appealed through various stages by the Newark Housing Authority, and affirmed on December 19, 1955, by the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a decision which avoids the constitutional issues involved. The Newark Housing Authority is seeking to appeal this decision to the Federal courts, which also have before them a number of other decisions in Gwinn Amendment cases by state and lower Federal courts—almost all of them favorable to the tenants. The United States Supreme Court will probably have to decide on the validity of the Gwinn Amendment. In view of the near unanimity of lower court decisions, the Court seems unlikely to uphold the provision; the question seems to be whether it will base its decision on the narrow grounds of lack of due process in the promulgation of the Attorney General's list, or will deal with the broader constitutional issues.

The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court came at a time when Kutcher was faced with what many regarded as the most outrageous attack of all. This was an attempt to deprive him of his disability pension on the ground of his membership in the SWP. On December 12, 1955, he was presented with a statement of charges and notice of suspension of pension payments, based on a provision of the law providing for the revocation of pensions in case of mutiny, sabotage, treason, or rendering assistance to the enemy. It was charged that by his membership in and activities on behalf of the SWP, Kutcher had assisted the North Koreans and Chinese during the Korean war.

This was the first time this provision had been invoked in a case similar to Kutcher's. In the hearing on Kutcher's case, which took place on December 30 before the VA's

Central Committee on Waivers and Forfeitures, the chairman stated that a number of cases of revocation under the same provision had taken place overseas. Further investigation reveals that most if not all of these were cases of veterans of World War I who had returned to their native countries and then served against the United States in World War II. If they had resumed their original citizenship—or perhaps had never become American citizens—they were obviously not guilty of treason. But they were certainly guilty of assisting the enemy. It appears more than probable that the law's reference to "rendering assistance to the enemy" was intended to cover such cases, not to apply to persons whose political activities in the United States might be held to be indirectly of such assistance.

The actual precedent for the proceedings in the Kutcher case was the revocation of the disability pensions of two Communist leaders, Robert Thompson and Saul Wellman. Even these cases were by no means precisely parallel to Kutcher's case; Thompson and Wellman had been convicted under the Smith Act—though not of the offense on the basis of which their pensions were revoked—and they had not concealed their sympathy for the Chinese and North Korean governments. But they were similar in that they represented a stretching of the law, of no conceivable benefit to the security of the United States, to deprive Americans of their contractual rights to pensions, under circumstances not contemplated by the law, for their political activities. (It is perhaps worth noting that after the Civil War, men who had risen in armed rebellion against the United States were nevertheless permitted to retain pensions based on pre-war service.)

THE threat to Kutcher's pension resulted in an immediate outcry throughout the nation, from conservatives as well as liberals. Indeed, it would be hard to find a voice which defended the proposed revocation. The situation had, indeed, been similar when Kutcher was originally brought up on

the loyalty charge in relation to his job. At that time, he had the support of almost every one of the many newspapers which commented on the case, as well as of organized labor and numerous other groups.

The one significant exception was the Communist party, whose West Coast organ, *People's World*, declared on June 24, 1949: "To talk of 'civil liberties' for a Kutcher is to talk of 'civil liberties' for a Ward Warren or a Louis Budenz. It is to argue for the rights of a stool pigeon or a paid agent of fascism to sink a knife into the back of the people in their search for a better world. The American people are not in favor of awarding a purple heart to Hitler." This position, however, completely isolated the Communists even from most of their closest friends; thus Kutcher received the support of Harry Bridges' International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. Perhaps because of that experience, or because they had come to a belated realization that they could use the attack on Kutcher to serve their own purposes, the Communists now gave Kutcher half-hearted support.

Like the Communists, the Veterans Administration also now apparently realized that the Kutcher case was a very hot potato. Or perhaps it was simply that the law on pension forfeitures, by requiring that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, gave them an out which they lacked under the security program. In any case, the Committee on Waivers and Forfeitures ruled on January 6, 1956, that a reasonable doubt did exist and Kutcher could keep his pension.

The case of James Kutcher is in some ways the most outrageous example of its kind which has so far come to light. No other person seems to have been exposed to the multiple forms of jeopardy which the government has visited on him. But the infliction of a single injustice is bad enough, though a triple injustice is certainly worse. His case has a special pathos because of his personal circumstances; a persecution which would in any case be wrong becomes a supreme example of bureaucratic callous-

ness. But James Kutcher's physical condition is not the source of the wrong done to him; it merely aggravates it. Kutcher is a follower of Trotsky. But the treatment to which he has been subjected would be no more just if he were a Communist. The country is certainly no safer now that Robert Thompson and Saul Wellman have been deprived of their disability pensions and, it is reported, called on to refund the payments they have received since the end of the war. (Even under the Veterans Administration's own highly questionable interpretation of the law, there would seem no basis for this last demand; the United States was not at war with any Communist power prior to 1950. It should also be noted that, even if Thompson's conviction under the Smith Act were considered a substitute for a hearing on the charge of rendering assistance to the enemy, all the acts involved in his trial took place before 1950 and hence have no relevance to the charge; he has been convicted without a hearing of any sort in respect to the only acts relevant to the pension case, those committed during the Korean war.)

If the revocation of veterans' pensions has been based on a strained and questionable interpretation of the law, the denial of Social Security funds to former Communist party officials (e.g. Alexander Bittelman) is based on a fantastic one. The assertion that the Communist party, because it has been designated as an agent of a foreign government by the Subversive Activities Control Board, comes under the exclusion of foreign government agencies from the provisions of the Social Security Act, represents a deliberate confusion of two very different things. The type of foreign government agency excluded from the Social Security Act has diplomatic or consular status; its exclusion follows from the legal inability of our government to tax it. It does not appear likely that the government

plans to confer diplomatic immunity on the officials of the Communist party. The status of that party, under the determination—with which this writer agrees—that it is a foreign agent, is analogous to that of the various public relations firms which are paid propagandists for foreign governments. And it has not been suggested that *they* be excluded from the Social Security Act. (Of course, if the Communist party had *not* paid Social Security taxes, it would have been prosecuted for failing to do so.)

SOME of these things have been done without warrant in law, or under laws of doubtful constitutionality. Others may be legally sound. But all of them have in common an absence of relation to any genuine considerations of security, a lack of moral justification, a departure from the basic principle that punishment shall be inflicted only in the form of prescribed penalties for definite offenses after a fair trial.

Any limitation of liberty without a clear need is tyranny; any injury to the individual without a clear benefit to society is pointless cruelty; any punishment without adequate grounds or due process of law is injustice. No matter what guilt men may bear, we still retain a basic responsibility toward them as human beings as long as we permit them to live at all—yes, even though they may be Communists or Fascists.

When the Russian army entered Germany near the end of the war, a Russian soldier whose whole family had been slaughtered by the Nazis vowed to an American correspondent to kill every German who fell into his hands. A few days later the correspondent observed him giving a cigarette to a German prisoner, and asked him how he explained his change of heart.

"Well," said the soldier, "one kills, or one lets live. And if one lets live, a man must smoke."

FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

THE POLITICIANS

Ai, America!

S. L. BLUMENSON

THE Seamen's Barber Shop & Hotel, in the last decade of the 19th century, was located on Pike Slip in New York's Lower East Side, one block from the East River water front. Pike Slip is a continuation of Pike Street, which runs south from Division to Cherry Street, where it broadens out and becomes Pike Slip.

In 1894 a double floating dry dock was moored at the foot of Pike Slip. This dry dock and kindred industries catering to it—chandler shops, forge shops, loft rigging, and the like—gave employment to hundreds of workers, mostly Irish immigrants. It was the last of the many shipbuilding and ship-repairing enterprises which had operated along the East River water front since Colonial days, when the "slips" were natural inlets where ships found haven. The shipyards, which built wooden vessels, went out of existence when iron steamships began to displace schooners, clippers, and frigates on the seven seas.

The owner of the Seamen's Barber Shop & Hotel was one Alter Schmulevitz. On his way to New York from his native Kalaverie in Russia, he had spent a year in Berlin. There he learned the barbering

WHEN in 1894 New York's reformers, led by the Reverend Charles Henry Parkhurst, took out after Tammany Hall following the Lexow Committee's revelations, things looked bad for the Lodge. But down at the grass roots of the Lower East Side its loyal wardheelers were holding the people firm against the "uptown" assault. S. L. BLUMENSON, whose memoirs of the East Side have appeared before in COMMENTARY, forsook the world of Rutgers Square and Pike's Slip in 1935 for quieter California.

trade. His short sojourn in Berlin de-Russianized him completely, and for the rest of his life he behaved toward the despised "Polacks" with the pomp and condescending airs of the *Yahudi*. He considered himself worldly and well informed, though he read no newspapers, not even the *Tageblatt*, for the simple reason that he could neither read nor write. The only periodical he perused from time to time was the *Police Gazette*, a fixture in all barber shops—not for its reading matter, but for the pictures of prizefighters and the "naughty" photos of burlesque queens in tights and bloomers.

Alter considered himself far superior to the more recently arrived "greenhorns" who were invading the last bastion of the Irish slums in the Fourth Ward—Cherry Street. In fact, the invasion had now reached all the way to Pike Slip, the frontier beyond which the Jewish immigrants had never yet ventured. The Jews called Pike Slip the *grenitz*, the "border." West of the Slip, Cherry Street became part of the Second Ward in the Second Assembly District. The Fourth Ward was part of the Fourth Assembly District. Aldermen to the city aldermanic chambers were elected by wards; assemblymen to the state legislature at Albany by assembly districts. There were not many Jews in the Second, except on upper Henry Street where a newly built synagogue stood. In the same latitude, south of Henry Street and as far as the river, it was solidly Irish, except for the presence of a few Greek peanut and chestnut venders on upper Madison Street.

The Second boasted the notorious Cherry Hill and Whyo gangs, the most vicious in

New York history. These gangs, along with the remnants of the Bowery Boys and White Rabbit gangs, dated back to the Civil War draft riots. It was no place for a timid and peaceful immigrant just off the boat to live. Any Jew with a beard who strayed into the Second Ward left it without a beard and without breaking tradition—it was plucked out.

Alter was known all over the East Side as “Alter der Deitch.” He considered it beneath his dignity to speak *mamma-loshen*—Yiddish, his native tongue. Instead he used a strange lingual concoction which the East Siders termed *deitchmerish*. Others, because of Alter’s provenance, called it *Kalaverier deitch*. It consisted of a conglomeration of mispronounced German superimposed on mispronounced Yiddish.

Alter came to New York in 1886, and after working in several East Side barber shops, opened his own establishment on Pike Slip. There were many Kalaverier *landsleute* in the vicinity of Pike Street—on Monroe, Madison, and Henry Streets, and also on East Broadway. When the uppish *Yahudim* moved away from the Lower East Side in the early 80’s, the newly founded Kalaverier *Chevra* took over their spacious synagogue on upper Pike Street and renovated the building, façade and all. There they installed the famous Cantor Cooper, and the synagogue became one of the leading orthodox *shuls* in New York, second only to the Beth ha-Medrash ha-Godol on Norfolk Street. It is still there. Cantor Cooper’s sons, who also had fine voices, did not follow in their father’s footsteps; they became famous in vaudeville and on the legitimate stage.

ALTER’S barber shop was located on the first floor of the “hotel,” a three-story building. A high stoop with ornate iron grill railings led up to the shop. Below the shop itself were two basement stores. The larger of the two was occupied by the Fourth Ward Tammany Club; a big crowing rooster flapping his wings was emblazoned in red on its painted windows—the symbol of the Democratic party and of Tammany Hall. The smaller store—much smaller—bore a sign in tiny letters, “Fourth Ward Republican Club.” The bald eagle, symbol of the Republican party, was absent.

The president of the Tammany Club was

a man named Hughey Mahoney; the president of the Republican Club was Tommy Mahoney, Hughey’s younger brother. Hughey was one of the stalwarts of the Honorable John F. Ahern, leader of the Fourth Assembly District, a Sachem and a power in Tammany Hall. The Republican Club under Tommy gave no support to the Jefferson Club on East Broadway, though it was the recognized Republican organization in the district and loyal to the state leader Thomas Collier Platt. But after all, it was said of “Boss” Platt that he played “footsie” with Tammany Hall.

Never in the history of Hughey’s district had a non-Democratic vote appeared on a ballot—but that was before the Russian Jewish invasion. With the coming of Russian Jewish voters into Cherry Street, this record was broken by one Yussel Tunick, who opened a candy and tobacco store right next door to the barber shop. A wooden Iroquois Indian, in war paint and full regalia, holding a bunch of tobacco leaves in one hand and an upraised tomahawk in the other, guarded the store entrance. Yussel paid open allegiance to the Socialist Labor party, and when a Socialist ballot turned up in an election everyone in the district knew that the heretical vote had been cast by Yussel. But Yussel was a man of character, afraid of no one, not even Hughey. He dared to flaunt the brooding and bearded countenance of Daniel de Leon in his store window.

As a matter of principle he carried Kropotkin, Karl Marx, Lassalle, Engels and other such “revolutionary” brands of cigarettes. Since he had little call for them, he had to smoke most of them himself. What could these *baytzimer*, these Irish, know about world revolution! Give them “Svitt Koppel” (Sweet Caporal) and chewing tobacco, plug-cut for the poor, Piper Heidsieck for the elite! Of course, the “enlightened” among the new East Siders, the *genossen*, did buy the “revolutionary” cigarettes. And as they puffed they could envisage the capitalist system going up in smoke. A small tobacconist on Division Street became a wealthy man by putting out brands with names that catered to the nationalistic and radical trade: Zola, Dreyfus, Lassalle, Bebel, Bakunin, Herzl.

Yussel Tunick became something of a legend to the East Siders of that day for

his exploits in taming the Irish. It was said that he was the only Jew ever to have served in the Czar's Life Guard regiment. He was over six feet tall, built like a giant, and, because of his flaming red hair and beard, was called Samson. The Irish, especially those of the Second Assembly District, across the *grenitz*, also had a lot of respect for Yussel, and for a very good reason. He had knocked three of their best fighters unconscious, one after the other, when they came to harass him after he first opened the store. This created quite a sensation. It was something new for a Jew to fight back. But the Irish were good sports. Yussel's victims conceded that they were knocked out in fair fight. Thomas McMahon, a well-known promoter, offered to put Yussel in the ring, promising to make a second John L. Sullivan out of him—a champion. But Yussel would not hear of it. Despite his flair for radicalism, he was an Orthodox Jew who closed shop Friday at sundown and kept it closed until after sundown on Saturday. To fight for money, without provocation! What was he, a *bondit*, a hoodlum? Ai, America! The sporting fraternity of the Fourth and the Second made it a practice to drop in on him for their "chaws" and "Svitt Koppel." They loved listening to the bearded Yussel, in broken English, tell of his exploits in the Russian army, where he had served eight years, and retell how he knocked out the three mischief-makers.

THE barber shop had three chairs, the first tended by Alter himself. He barbered only the most important patrons: men of distinction—the aldermen, the assemblymen, and the politicians who owned the fourteen saloons which lined Pike Slip, mostly on the west side, in the Second. The Tammany leader of the Second was Paddy (Patrick) Dever, an old man whose reign went back to pre-Tweed days and who was now fighting the younger Tim Foley for leadership. Tim's ablest adherent was a tobacco-chewing young blade who sported loud haberdashery topped by a brown derby and worked in the nearby Fulton Fish Market. He was Alfred Emanuel Smith—an Irish lad with a silver tongue who was called the Chauncey Depew of the East Side, Chauncey being the greatest Tammany orator of the day and a Tammany Sachem. It was the

victorious Tim Foley who, along with John F. Ahern and the powerful Sullivan clan, kept Tammany going when the Lexow Committee's disclosures of graft and corruption forced "Boss" Richard Croker into short-lived exile.

The second chair was tended by "Frenchy" Gaston, brother of the "Frenchy" Louis who was a steward on a liner plying between New York and Le Havre, France. They were the native-born sons of Alsatian Jews. Gaston barbered the foremen and executives who worked on the dry dock and, because he knew German and French, also took the officers of the foreign vessels docked at nearby piers.

The third chair was presided over by Viktor Prager, a Vienna-born Jew quite advanced in years who had fallen on evil days. Viktor wore Napoleon the Third chin whiskers and a longhorn mustache, once blond but now gray, which was well waxed and curled up at the ends. He had the manners of a nobleman, and was a specialist on mustachios and whiskers, an important skill in those days. It was on Viktor that Alter the Deitch improved his "German."

When younger, Viktor had worked in a "fancy" barber shop on Grand Street where the prosperous German, Austrian, and Hungarian Jewish merchants and professional men—the *Yahudim*—had their hair, mustaches, and beards trimmed. The Austro-Hungarian favored the bi-sectional long beard with shaved chin made famous by Kaiser Franz Joseph. The Germans preferred the Bismarck walrus, or the Kaiser Wilhelm upswing crescent with its feather-edged waxed points—depending upon their politics. This was just after the Civil War when Viktor, a few years past his teens and a veteran of the Grand Army of the Republic, came home and began practicing his art. But the *Yahudim* moved uptown, the "fancy" barber shop folded, and Viktor was reduced to practicing his art among the Irish. But what did these Irish know about art? Could they appreciate an artist like Viktor? He was wasted on them.

The shelves lining the side wall of the shop were full of expensive shaving brushes and gaudy shaving cups with gold-encrusted initials. Among the gaudiest were those belonging to the Jewish ward politicians of the Fourth. It was a mark of distinction to

walk into the shop, flop down nonchalantly into Alter's chair, and without saying a word have him take down the right cup and go to work. Despite the fact that the "woiks"—haircut, shave, shampoo, massage, and Viktor's art—only cost thirty-five cents, the shop was run with all the pomp and ritual of a modern "sporting" barber shop. After the massage many aromatic lotions were poured on face and head, creams rubbed in, hot steaming towels applied, until the customer began to look like a boiled lobster and smell like a combination of stale rose and withered lilac.

For the elect there was one special—imported—lotion of which Alter was justly proud. For a long time, as long as Gaston worked for him, Alter held a monopoly of this lotion. It was brought over in gallons by Frenchy Louis, then put into smaller containers for shop use. Frenchy Louis had labels specially printed in color, featuring sprigs of lilies with the brand name "*Eau de Latrine*" superimposed. Frenchy Louis had a fine sense of humor, and so had Gaston and Viktor. No one ever gave the secret away.

Eventually Frenchy Louis took his brother out of the barber shop and set him up in the barber supply business on Grand Street. *Eau de Latrine* became popular and available in all East Side barber shops. Some years later Louis abandoned the sea, became a landlubber, and moved Gaston, Inc. to upper Fifth Avenue. There *Eau de Latrine* became "*Eau de Paris*," in fancy crystal bottles at fancy Fifth Avenue prices. In time *Eau de Paris*—néé *Eau de Latrine*—was splashed over full pages of slick magazines under yet another exotic name. The label still boasted sprigs of lilies, and the expensive lotion was still concocted from Frenchy Louis's "secret" formula.

ALTHOUGH the Seamen's Hotel contained only ten small cubicles, with iron bedsteads, on the upper floors, it had more registered guests than the Astor House or the Waldorf-Astoria further uptown. Over sixteen hundred people claimed the hotel as their legal residence. They were, presumably, all seamen scattered over the seven seas. The hotel register was kept, for "security" reasons, in a small safe at the Tammany Club under the barber shop. In the same safe there lay a similar register of

the Sailor's Haven, situated on the west side of the Slip, in the Second, almost directly opposite the barber shop. The Sailor's Haven had six cubicles and bedsteads and some sixteen hundred registered guests, all of them, by a curious coincidence, likewise working seamen.

Twice a year both hotels received postcards addressed to each registered guest. This legally established their right to vote on Election Day. Hughey gathered together all these postcards and put them in the safe. A stickler for making sure that the election laws were not infringed, it was his proud boast that no unregistered vote had ever been cast in his district.

The summer preceding the municipal elections of 1894 was a very sad and troublesome time for the Democratic party in general and for Tammany Hall in particular. The inauguration of Grover Cleveland (*der Grober Cleveland* to the East Siders) as President in March 1893 had ushered in an economic "crisis," as depressions were called in those days. But Tammany's troubles started before the depression.

One Sunday morning in the spring of 1891, a lanky and bewhiskered crusading minister, the Reverend Charles Henry Parkhurst, preached a sermon on a text from the Sermon on the Mount, "Ye are the salt of the earth." He told of vice and political corruption, the iniquities of the modern Sodom called the City of New York under the "proprietaryship" of Tammany chieftain Richard Croker, his lackey mayor, the highly respectable Hugh Grant, and the easygoing and tolerant district attorney of New York County, the socialite De Lancy Nicoll. (Having profited by the Tweed revelations in the 70's, Richard Croker always surrounded himself with highly respectable front-men.) Reverend Parkhurst's denunciations were based mainly on newspaper reports.

When the Tammany rulers, against the astute advice of Big Tim Sullivan ("Suppose he proves it?"), challenged these accusations, the Reverend Doctor set out to prove them. He suddenly brought the long dormant Society for the Prevention of Crime, of which he was president, to life. He hired investigators, accompanied them to the sinks of iniquity, received tips from disgusted and disgruntled Tammanyites, and

came up with sheaves of affidavits testifying to corruption, graft, boodle, bribery, and police protection.

The disclosures were sickening. Public resentment rose to so high a pitch that Thomas Collier Platt, the Republican boss, had to take note. This led to the Lexow Committee investigation early in 1894. Dr. Parkhurst refused to cooperate with the Committee on the ground that it was formed as a political move. To placate the Reverend, the committee appointed a staff of investigators who were absolutely beyond suspicion. The group was headed by John W. Goff and assisted by William Travers Jerome and Frank Moss, who was counsel for Dr. Parkhurst's anti-crime society.

The Lexow Committee report uprooted the police department, and early in the spring of 1894 sent Richard Croker and other important Tammanyites into exile. Before leaving for England, Croker appointed his deputy leader, Thomas F. Gilroy, to pilot Tammany until the storm of reform blew over. The Hall had not been in such dire straits since the Tweed scandals. An aroused citizenry organized an independent political party—the Fusion party—and put a slate into the field for the November municipal elections with William L. Strong as candidate for mayor. Mr. Strong was a banker, an independent Republican, and well known for his philanthropic activities.

Tammany was in trouble. The cry went out to all loyal members to come to the aid of the party. Only the solid downtown districts under Ahern, Dever, Finn, and the Sullivan clan could hold Tammany together and salvage something from the imminent catastrophe. The Tammany politicians, ever realists, knew that the moment public indignation flared up, they were licked. But even if they lost the mayoralty, it was important that their aldermen be returned to office.

(They also knew from past experience that the reform wave would soon spend itself. It had been so after the Tweed scandals, and it came to pass this time too. Three years later the five boroughs became Greater New York, and after Tammany's victory in the 1897 elections, Richard Croker returned from exile to be hailed as a conquering hero. With the slogan, "To hell with Reform"—

first uttered by a Sullivan henchman, Max Hochstim, in the Fourth Ward Tammany Club under Alter Schmulevitz's barber shop—the reformers were thrown out, and Tammany Hall, aided by Brooklyn's Democratic Boss McCooey, returned to power.)

But just now, on a hot night in June 1894, Tammany's Jewish politicians were holding a special session in the rooms of the Fourth Ward Tammany Club. Max Hochstim, the drive-wheel of the Sullivan clan in the Jewish wards of the Sixth, Eighth, Second, Fourth, and Twelfth Assembly districts—the whole Lower East Side south of Houston Street and east of Broadway—was to give them a pep talk. They had to deliver more than the usual vote in the coming election "or your names will be mud."

The Fourth had received a fairly clean bill of health, except for one or two "cribs" on lower Front Street where it was alleged, though never proved, that sailors had been shanghaied. The Sixth, with its Bowery "institutions," and the "Ate" (Eighth), home of the Essex Market Magistrates Court, a real sink of iniquity featuring shyster lawyers, fixers, and professional ready-made witnesses, did not come off so well. In the "Ate" could be found the openly immoral "institutions" of Christy and Allen streets—a stink in the nostrils of the decent—as well as the Eldridge Street Police precinct, presided over by notorious Captain "Big Bill" Devery, who had to leave the force after the Lexow revelations. But worse than anything in the Eighth was the Second's upper Cherry Street—in the opinion of all a veritable Sodom and Gomorrah.

Only two blocks away from Old Cherry Hill (now Franklin Square), which in post-Revolutionary days had been New York's finest residential district where Washington, Hancock, Madison, Monroe, Hamilton, and other national heroes lived, were located the most nauseating dives in the city. On Cherry Street, only a block away from the barber shop, stood the saloon of the notorious Tom Summers, a meeting place for all the thieves, pickpockets, second-story and confidence men in town. The Lexow Committee had proved that Summers was the most active "fence" in New York, and that he had paid thousands of dollars to the po-

lice for this "privilege." Things did not look too well for Tammany even in these "safe" districts. It was up to Max Hochstim to keep the Tammany voters in line. He depended on the election district captains, all city employees, to deliver the vote—by hook or by crook. Their livelihoods were at stake.

There was Sigmund Oppenheim, a left-over *Yahudi*, who worked in the Tax Department and, not being under civil service, was afraid to move away. There was Sam Krakauer, a postal clerk who officially belonged to the Republican Club but was really part of the Tammany organization. There was "Limey" Joe Jacobs, a product of London's East End, who spoke high cockney and ended all his sentences with "dunch-er-knaow." Joe was a checker on a nearby pier. And there was Julius Melkin.

Julius was a process-server and "key-hole peeper" for the ill-famed law firm of Howe and Hummel. He looked a bit like the junior partner of the firm, Abe Hummel—short and thin, with a rather elongated hooked nose. Aping his boss, Julius sported narrow trousers, a sack coat, a fancy vest, a pearl-gray derby, and high heels. He was addressed as "counsellor" and overawed his fellows with *ipse dixit*s, *caveats*, and *subpoenas duces tecum*. His was the shrewd brain behind Hughey Mahoney—or so Julius thought. It was rumored that his brother Aaron acted as East Side representative for Al Adams, the infamous policy king. On several counts, then, Julius was a very valuable member of the district, particularly since his connection with Howe and Hummel gave him an open sesame to the Essex Market and Jefferson Market Magistrates courts, where fixing was an extremely important art.

AMONG the lesser lights was Abraham Holtzman, president of the Downtown Pushcart Peddlers Association. Abe's duties were to obtain annual license renewals and to "square" police summonses for his poverty-stricken members. Each and every morning that court was in session Abe appeared with a bunch of summonses and had them cleared—"fixed" was the word, and still is. In return for this service Abe had to deliver the vote "right." Every pushcart peddler, along with his relatives and friends, was expected to vote a straight ticket—an "X"

marked under the flapping wings of the Tammany rooster. If not, as Abe used to warn them, "*vet zein az och un vay tsu eich!*"—("You're in for it").

The clubroom under Alter's barber shop was packed that June evening. After all, it was not every night that so important a figure as Max Hochstim, accompanied by the alderman of the different wards—"the Essex Street crowd"—paid a visit to these humble Tammany workers.

Hochstim spoke the language of the district, not the high-falutin English of the Fusion agitators who came downtown to address outdoor meetings. "Boys," said he, "we're in trouble. If we lose the election we lose our jobs. And jobs, you know, are hard to get right now." This was language the assembled could understand. "Them reformers have given us a bad name." Max had no use for reformers, nor was he afraid of them. (He had stepped down from the witness stand at the Lexow Committee hearings and tried to punch interrogator Frank Moss in the nose.) "We have to elect our aldermen to hold our jobs, or we don't eat."

Max stopped to drink a glass of water, letting his comments sink in. Then he resumed: "We need an issue and we need a slogan that will give us the aldermen. The Second Assembly has come up with the slogan, 'A glass of beer on Sunday for the workingman.' This is all right for the Irish. It is not a slogan for Jews. We need a good issue, a good slogan to get out the Jewish vote. Anyone got ideas?"

The "counsellor," Julius Melkin, arose in all his diminutive dignity. He pushed his pearl-gray derby to the back of his head (it wasn't safe to leave your hat lying about), and addressing the visiting statesmen as "your honors," he cleared his voice and said: "I have a slogan. Jews have not been getting political jobs. Everything goes to the Irish. Where do you see a Jewish copper, a Jewish fireman, a Jewish street-cleaner, a horse-car driver or conductor? To get out the vote we must demand our rights. What kind of blokes are we to keep taking it on the chin? I have the slogan which will get out the vote for Tammany: 'Jobs for Jews.'"

Everyone applauded. Julius was encouraged to proceed. "Why," he shouted in the best manner of his boss Mr. Howe declaim-

ing to a jury, "we could even get Yussel Tunick next door to go along with us and get the radical vote. I have already discussed this with Mr. Chaim Rabinovitz and he agreed to help. You all know what the name of Chaim Rabinovitz means among the Orthodox voters. He is a good friend of Kathriel Sarahssohn, the owner of the *Tageblatt*, and you all know what influence the *Tageblatt* has among conservative voters. With the slogan 'Jobs for Jews—A Glass of Beer on Sunday,' the voters will flock to Tammany. *Subpoena duces tecum*—it can't fail."

Prolonged applause. Mr. Hochstim shook hands with Julius and congratulated him. Said Max: "Counsellor, you are an asset to the party. We won't forget you." And then Max delivered the famous line which won the municipal elections for Tammany three years later and brought Richard Croker back from exile. "Boys," said Max, "we will beat them uptown bums yet. Get busy, go out and scratch. *To hell with Reform!*"

The hectic campaign began. The *Tageblatt* came out with two separate editorials. One posed the question why workingmen should be denied a glass of beer on Sunday. The other relayed a promise from the Tammany leaders that if their local candidates were re-elected, Jews would receive the same preference for jobs as the Irish.

True to his word, Julius Melkin, a most energetic person, convinced Yussel Tunick that he would not delay the world revolution by enlisting in the holy cause of equal rights for Jews. Tunick got busy among his radical friends, every one of whom had a relative or dependent eager for a political job. The leader of the Fourth personally promised to make sure that Yussel's father-in-law would be among the first to find a job. This would take a heavy load off Yussel's shoulders, for his father-in-law, Tevel Turetzky, had a hard time making a living. Tevel was a member of the Minsker synagogue on Henry Street. In a short time he and Yussel had visited the meetings of all *chevras*, synagogues, lodges, and *landsmanshaften* in the vicinity, exhorting their members to enlist in the holy cause.

Alter Schmulevitz, the "Deitch," belonged to the Kalaverier *chevra*, and he also campaigned among the Kalaverier *landsleute*.

And, of course, Abraham Holtzman saw to it that every pushcart peddler did his part.

THE professional politicians put great hopes in the influence of Reb Chaim Rabinovitz. Reb Chaim, reputedly a great scholar, devoted all his time to communal affairs and yet had no political axe to grind. He had been instrumental in persuading the *Rav Ha-Kolel*, Rabbi Jacob Joseph, to come to the East Side. Reb Chaim was head of the *kashruth* committee (the *Rav Ha-Kolel's* faction), which controlled the *plumbes*, those leaden seals clamped on the legs of slaughtered fowl certifying to the chickens being kosher. Reb Chaim also placed the *shochtim* in the slaughterhouses and appointed the *mashgichim* who saw to it that all proceeded in accordance with the *Shulchan Aruch*. His name appeared on the *hechsher* placards displayed in every kosher food store, butcher shop, and restaurant. He was, moreover, one of the founders of the Yeshiva Rabbi Yitzchak Elchanan on Henry Street, and himself taught Mishnah there. To top it all off, Reb Chaim enjoyed the close friendship of Kathriel Sarahssohn, owner of the *Tageblatt*, and cooperated in the paper's drive for *teheresha-mishpochah* (the sanctity of the family), which, according to editor Johan Paley, was being subverted by the *laidakes* (infidel-scamps) who wrote for the then rather weak radical press. For the *Tageblatt* this campaign was a circulation stunt; for Reb Chaim it was a sacred movement.

There was only one drawback. Reb Chaim—who was tall and slender with a long reddish beard—when decked out in his formal Prince Albert, his *tsillender* (high silk hat), and his gold-handled *steck* (cane), resembled the Reverend Parkhurst a bit too closely (*l'havdil*). Despite this resemblance, however, the Jewish politicians made it a point to have him seated on the speakers' platform at every major meeting, in Valhalla and Turn Halls on Broome Street, in the two large halls on East Broadway, and at important outdoor rallies. He made no speeches, but his very presence lent respectability to the meetings. If a reputable scholar and *khal-tuer* (communal worker) like Reb Chaim Rabinovitz associated himself with the Tammany candidates, who could believe what the reformers, those "uptowners," said about Tammany Hall? Did they ever show up except

around election time? (As a matter of fact, Reb Chaim was unaware of the Lexow revelations, as he read only the *Tageblatt*, which sided with Tammany, and was busy with his many activities.)

The Tammany orators shouted: "Do the uptowners get licenses for the poor pushcart peddlers? They are against peddling altogether. Elect them and they will take the bread out of the mouths of hundreds of East Side families.

"When there's trouble does a man go to the uptowners? Who gives out free coal in the cold winter? Tammany. Who gives out baskets of food at Thanksgiving and Christmas? Tammany. Who arranges the free river excursions for children in the hot summer? Tammany. Why, the uptowners, the reformers, even advocate tearing down the tenements—slums they call them, an insult to all East Siders—so they can put up playgrounds and parks instead! And where will the East Siders move to when that happens? In with Vanderbilt, with Gould, with Morgan, or maybe in with the reform candidate, the millionaire, Mr. Strong?" So argued the East Side politicians. "Vote for a glass of beer for the poor workingman on Sunday. Vote for jobs for Jews. Vote under the crowing rooster. To hell with Reform."

ON THE eve of Election Day the campaign flamed to a white heat. In the usual torchlight parade, there were, besides the perennial Tammany stalwarts, hundreds of marchers from the various *chevras* with their flags and banners. A *kleinikeit*: equal rights for Jews! The paraders converged on the rather narrow Rutgers Square (narrow because Seward Park was in the future and the old tenements still stood), where a huge meeting, with torches and flares and a brass band blaring out Sousa marches, was in progress. All the important Jewish Tammany politicians were collected on the platform. In their midst sat Reb Chaim wearing his *tsillender*, and at his side Yussel Tunick, his red beard gleaming in the torchlight. The speeches were all in Yiddish. Tammany did not have to worry about the Irish voters: Hughey would tend to them.

As far as the Fourth and Second Assembly districts were concerned, the two issues of a glass of beer on Sunday and jobs for Jews completely overshadowed the revelations of

the Lexow Committee, which the speakers did not so much as mention. Nor did they mention the Democratic candidates for mayor and district attorney, who Tammany knew were licked. The important thing was to return the aldermen.

The Fusion party also held open-air meetings, but their speakers knew only English. Most of them were hooted down by organized hoodlums and their meetings disrupted. On the night before election there was veritable hysteria among the Tammany supporters. Give the workingman a glass of beer on Sunday! Jobs for Jews! To hell with Reform! Victory is in the bag if we only get out the vote tomorrow!

Harvesting of the local vote was in the hands of the election-district captains, while the "absentee" vote fell to Hughey Mahoney and his brother Tommy, the nominal Republican. Before midnight of election eve, a number of barges tied up along the wharfage between Pike Slip and Rutgers Slip. Below decks waited the more than sixteen hundred registered guests of the Seamen's Barber Shop & Hotel, all eager to exercise the right of franchise like the good citizens they were. By coincidence they always arrived in port on Election Day—and always by barge.

At the same time that Hughey was welcoming these citizens with food and drink—mostly drink—his brother Tommy and the election inspectors and clerks, aided by volunteers, began to put up tables and voting booths in the Tammany Club. By two in the morning all was ready including the registration lists. The officials who were to conduct the election did not go home.

While they were having an early morning snack, Tommy took it upon himself to correct the clocks in the barber shop and the polling place by moving their hands two hours forward. The officials synchronized their watches accordingly. (The jokers called this "P.S.T."—Pike Slip Time.) When the clocks showed 6 A.M. ("P.S.T."), the inspectors, clerks, and watchers took their posts. One of the Tammany watchers—no other watchers were present—had the hotel register before him. On the dot of six ("P.S.T."), the polling place was declared open. Lined up outside was a long string of voters reaching two blocks back to the barges. The voting proceeded according to law.

"Your name is Thomas Jones? You live at

the Seamen's Barber Shop & Hotel? You are a merchant seaman? You cannot write? Here is your ballot. Make a mark next to your name on the register." As soon as Thomas Jones came out of the booth and deposited his ballot in the box, he was hustled across the street to the Sailor's Haven, and the same process was repeated. In the Fourth, Thomas Jones and his more than sixteen hundred fellow seamen were "floaters." In the Second they became "repeaters." No one was allowed to vote twice in the same polling place. That was against the law.

Two hours later the Fusion and Socialist watchers arrived. When they protested the vote, the Tammany and the Republican officials sympathized with them. It was too bad. Apparently the clocks were fast. What did they expect them to do now? Break open the ballot box and desecrate the sanctity of the secret ballot? But they did correct the clocks.

Throughout the day the polling place was surrounded by groups of ward-healers, at fifty feet of distance, with lists of voters. In the Republican Club next door, Hughey and Tommy checked off the lists of registered voters from corrected rosters which the Tammany watchers sent down to them. Tardy voters were rounded up, and for those who did not appear by mid-afternoon, substitutes were produced. Fusion and Socialist watchers shouted fraud and challenged votes, but to no avail.

"Your name is Simon Cohen? You live at 138 Cherry Street? You are a pushcart peddler? You are a naturalized citizen of the United States? Ballot 17,987.

"See, he answered the questions correctly; would you deprive a citizen of his vote? You say Simon Cohen looked Italian? So what? There are lots of Jews who look like Italians. Look at me. I look as Irish as Paddy's pig and my name is Moishe Yekelchick. What? He spoke with an Italian accent? Don't you know that Simon Cohen stands with his pushcart on Mulberry Street? Where do you suppose he learned to speak English, in Columbia College maybe? You blokes pipe down, twenty-three skidoo! Stop scaring the voters."

It was dark in the streets when the voting ended at seven o'clock. A great bonfire fed by fuel which the young people had been assembling for weeks—they had raided all the storage cellars for laid-away furniture—was

now blazing outside the polling place. By eleven the count was in: 100 per cent for the Tammany candidates. There had been twenty-five Republican, three Socialist, and one Prohibition vote, but they were invalidated when Tommy Mahoney, the "Republican" guard, accidentally turned an inkwell over on them. Accidents will happen.

AT MIDNIGHT the lights on the dome of the World Building, then the second tallest edifice in the city (the St. Paul Building, twenty-two stories high, at Park Row and Ann Street, right opposite Saint Paul's Church, was the tallest) proclaimed a sweeping victory for Fusion. The newspaper headlines announced the end of Tammany Hall. The morning *American* and the *Evening Journal* owned by that radical, that near-Socialist, William Randolph Hearst, ran cartoons picturing the Tammany leaders in prison stripes. Tammany was defeated, crushed, ousted, on the run. Corruption had received its death blow. Crokerism was finished. But in all the traditionally Tammany wards the Tammany aldermen had been re-elected.

Since it was up to the Republican state legislature to grant the workingman a glass of beer on Sunday, the workingman, sad to relate, never got it. He still had to sneak into a saloon through the side door—"family entrance"—and drink his Sunday glass of beer with the blinds down. But on the promise "Jobs for Jews," Tammany came through handsomely.

Tevye (Tevel) Turetzky, Yussel Tunick's father-in-law, had been a *tregger* (porter) in his native Turetz, in the province of Minsk. All his life he had known nothing but heavy loads and hardship. The loads he carried would have strained the back of his competitor, the horse. When Tevel first came to the East Side with his family, he found himself in desperate straits. In America, horses took the bread out of the mouths of willing workers. Through Alter Schmulevitz's acquaintance with the waterfront bosses he might have obtained work as a longshoreman, the nearest thing to a *tregger's* job, but being a *Shomer Shabbos* made that impossible. To labor on the Sabbath? That's what he came to America for? It was bad enough that the *tsitsilisten*, the *anarchistlach* on East Broadway, and other *laidakes* openly smoked on the Sabbath; some even worked, may they be

rooted out. *Ai Tateh zieser* ("dear God"). *Ai, America.*

He tried working in a laundry, as a presser in a sweatshop, and as a rag-sorter, but he did not excel in any of these callings. Most of the time he was unemployed. Having worked outdoors all his life, he could not stand indoor confinement. Just before the Passover following the election, rumors began to float on Monroe Street—in Lekowsky's grocery, in Mishkin's drug store, in Horowitz's saloon, in Bushelovits's butcher shop—that Tevel was slated for a political job. When the Tammany leader of the Fourth promises, he delivers.

That Passover, Reb Tevye, an insignificant man hardly ever noticed in *shul*, received honors. For the first time, he was called up to the Torah. True, the *aliya* was a humble one, only *revii*, nothing to rave about, but still an *aliya*. On the day after Passover Tevel was duly inducted into the service of the City of New York. He became a member of the reorganized Department of Sanitation, formerly the Street Cleaning Department.

In a brand new, spotlessly white uniform and a white helmet, carrying a broom and short-handled spade in one hand and pushing a portable garbage-can with the other, Tevel began "following the horses" on the cobblestones of Monroe Street—to the great admiration of his neighbors and *landsleute* who lined the sidewalks to watch him. At last the Jewish politicians had done something for their people. Not much, but a start. At last there was a Jewish streetcleaner in New York, and he wouldn't have to work on the Sabbath. *Leben zol Columbus!* Where else could this happen but in Columbus's

medinah? In time, when Tammany was back in power, Jewish policemen, firemen, conductors would follow. Just be patient until we get rid of the reformers.

FOR Yussel Tunick the victory was a tragedy. His old comrades, the *genossen*, the radicals, ostracised him. They called him a *farkafte neshoma*, a bartered soul. He had sold out to the capitalists, to Wall Street, for a measly job. But out of spite Yussel joined the Fourth Ward Tammany Club. De Leon's picture disappeared from his shop window. As soon as he ran out of the "radical" cigarettes, he replaced them with stogies. Before long he began to patronize Alter's barber shop, but only for haircuts. He did not shave—God forbid—but he did allow the artist, Viktor, to trim his beard—no more than the edges—and his mustache. A new shaving cup with Yussel's initials emblazoned on it in gold letters appeared on Alter's shelves. Just for importance and not for use.

But Viktor Prager smiled knowingly behind his Napoleon Third mustache. In his prime he had seen similar transformations on Grand Street. If the Lord would only grant him a few more years, what he could do with Yussel's full red beard! An artist's dream!

Yussel became an East Side legend; there was talk of running him for alderman. But in his secret heart he was not happy. Every time he went into his store he walked through the door with downcast eyes. It seemed to him that the Iroquois Indian, in his war paint and regalia, tobacco leaves in one hand and upraised tomahawk in the other, looked down upon him with ill-concealed contempt.

CEDARS OF LEBANON

WHY A JEW STUDIES

Selections from the Midrash and Talmud

THOUGH the Torah had always been read and expounded in public, it was only in the last generations before the fall of the Second Commonwealth (70 C.E.) that the study of Torah became a decisive force in Judaism. The immense prestige of the scholar in Jewish tradition is based philosophically on the assumption made by the Rabbis that learning had a two-fold significance. Outwardly it consisted of the reading and interpretation of a book. But in essence it was the attempt to comprehend divine thought. Through delving into the

written word, the student tried to recapture the word spoken on Mount Sinai. The very process of immersion in the word lifted study to a plane above the mere gleaning of information or the mere mastery of a given issue. Like worship, study aims ultimately at communication with the Divine and the translation of the teaching into life. The following selections, culled from Talmudic and Midrashic sources, illustrate the central position occupied in classical Judaism by the study of the Torah.

—NAHUM N. GLATZER

SCRIPTURE says: "To love the Lord thy God, to hearken to His voice. . . ."

Thus, a man must not say: I shall read so that they will call me sage, I shall study so that they will call me rabbi, I shall learn so that I may become an elder and hold a seat in the assembly. No, you shall learn out of love of God, and glory may come to you after that.

He who studies the Torah holds it as dear each day as on the first day when it was given on Mount Sinai.

He who gives his heart to the study of the Torah frees himself from the fear of the sword and of starvation, of evil and of the yoke imposed by man. Nor is he obliged to offer sacrifice—his study is sacrifice. And if the student is from among the Gentiles, he is still equal to the High Priest: Scripture, when it refers to the Torah, does not speak of Priests, or Levites, or Israelites, but only of man. Study is prayer, and, it may be, higher than prayer; a man prays also for his needs in this world, but his study is wholly rooted in the eternal life.

Study of the Torah is a man's constant companion. If he goes on his way and is lonely, the Torah will go with him. If his

body feels pain, study of the Torah will allay it.

He who studies must be worthy to study, and then the Torah will be an elixir of life for him. Where two students sit together and exchange words of Torah, the Divine Presence abides between them. When three have sat at a table and eaten and spoken words of Torah—"this is the table that is before the Lord." And if one alone occupies himself with Torah the Lord will come to him and bless him.

He who timely reads a sentence of Torah has caused goodness to be brought into the world. The word of Torah that enters the heart drives out a word of scoffing.

When God came to give the Torah to Israel on Sinai, he asked for guarantors to vouch for it, that it would be guarded. The children became the guarantors of the Torah.

The revelation of the Torah on Mount Sinai is the prototype for every study session wherein a father teaches his son, or a grandfather his grandson. Just as the event on Sinai took place in awe and fear and trembling, so every session of learning should take place in awe and in fear and in trembling.

The world endures only for the sake of the breath of school children; this is the breath in which there is no sin. School children may not be made to neglect their studies even for the building of the sanctuary in Jerusalem. Jerusalem was destroyed because children had ceased to study and scholars were no longer honored.

The teacher is considered the father, the student is considered a son. He who teaches Torah to the son of his neighbor is held by Scripture to be as the father who begot him. He who, by study of Torah, leads another human being under the wings of heaven is considered as if he had created him and brought him into the world.

Do not neglect the children of the ignorant, for from them comes Torah. Be heedful of the honor due to the children of the poor, for from them comes Torah.

Why is it not usual for scholars to have learned sons? Lest they, the sons, become arrogant, and so that it may not be said that the Torah is their inheritance.

Whoever is engaged in the study of the Torah by night, to him the Holy One extends a thread of grace by day. To him who is engaged in the study of the Torah in this world, which is as the night, the Holy One extends the thread of grace in the future world, which is as the day.

Scripture compares the Torah to water: as water flows away from the high places and seeks the low, so the words of the Torah remain only with the one who is meek. Scripture compares the Torah to

water, to wine, and to milk: as these three liquids can be kept only in the simplest of vessels, so the words of the Torah are contained only in him who is meek.

This is the way of Torah: you will eat a morsel of bread with salt, and drink a measure of water, you will sleep upon the ground and live a life of hardship—and you shall toil in the Torah. Then will you be happy in this world, and well in the world to come.

The Torah may not be made a crown to magnify oneself with, nor a spade to dig with. He who draws material profit from the Torah cuts himself off from the life of the world to come.

Scripture says: "The book of the Torah shall not depart out of thy mouth but thou shalt meditate therein day and night." This is not an obligation and not a commandment, but a blessing.

Whoever dedicates himself to the study of Torah for its own sake will become worthy of many things. He will be called friend and beloved, one who loves God and mankind, one who makes glad both God and mankind. The Torah clothes him in modesty and reverence, makes him ready to be just, pious, upright, and faithful; it draws him away from sin and brings him near to virtue. People enjoy his counsel and his understanding. He lives in humility and forgives those who insult him. This is his greatness.

The words of the Torah will remain only with him who is ready to die for them. Adhere to study even until the hour of death.

THE DESTRUCTIVE WILL

HARVEY SHAPIRO

THIS, then, is the child's wish:
To see the earth a dancing flood
And the new home floating free,
And all irrational, outside, inside.
The packed beasts padding through
The comforts of the living room.
And the old man, his hand forced
By the impossible command,
Compass-less and out of touch.
And all the navigational aids
Part of the swiftly moving flood.
But mainly it's the murderous beasts,

Wonderfully close and now accepted
As part of home and family:
The dumb, the fierce, the tooth and claw.
I read it in the earliest book,
Where all our childhoods signify
Themselves in open imagery.
And this is the image of the will:
To see the globe a watery blot,
History killed, pain stopped.
And this must win us to the dark,
And close our eyes, and rock our sleep,
And pray the coffin be an ark.

ON THE HORIZON

GIBBSVILLE AND NEW LEEDS

The America of John O'Hara and Mary McCarthy

NORMAN PODHORETZ

MARY MCCARTHY and John O'Hara are two of the most consistently interesting and provocative novelists in America. They are so different that it takes the accident of a publication date to bring them together for discussion. Yet once having placed them side by side, it is difficult not to see a certain significance in their very opposition. Each navigates his own course, but both discover the same America.

O'HARA is a realist; that is, he considers his principal duty to be the creation of a plausible likeness of the world. His care and skill in achieving accuracy of detail are truly astonishing, so much so that if a vivid surface were all that mattered O'Hara would be a very great novelist. But his details are more than merely accurate. He is endowed with the kind of shrewdness that can derive the world from a brand label, and the whole universe from a fraternity pin. Sharing O'Hara's angle of vision, one begins to believe that to learn where a man was born, educated, and buys his clothes is to know virtually all there is to know about him.

The brilliant surface makes O'Hara's world immediately recognizable. The mo-

ment you step into it, you feel at home and at the same time excited by all the bustle around you. O'Hara's prose style, casual and tweedy in texture, contributes to the relaxed, informal atmosphere of the visit. Only after you have been there for a while, when you pause and reflect, do you realize what a strange place you have come to.

The name of the place is often Gibbsville, Pennsylvania, though at times it has been New York or Hollywood or another Pennsylvania town. It is a place in which the social has superseded all other considerations. The nature of Gibbsville was most purely bodied forth in O'Hara's first novel, *Appointment in Samarra*, a book which seems to me a minor classic of our time. Julian English, the hero, in a fit of drunken petulance throws a highball into the face of an influential Gibbsvillian, and the insult sets off a chain of events that leads within three days to the break-up of Julian's marriage and his suicide. It speaks for O'Hara's integrity of conception that he makes this fantastically disproportionate sequence credible, convincing, and even inevitable. And fantastic the story is: no other word will do. A breach of the peace at a country club followed by a few tactless moves (most crucial of which is Julian's flirtation with another woman)—and an apparently happy life is cut off.

Of course there is a history behind Julian's disaster. Though he is of good family, a perfectly respectable businessman, and a member of the best circles in town, he has always been a "bad boy." But all this seems to mean is that he committed a few harmless pranks as a child, and as a young man proved unable to behave himself quite properly when

NORMAN PODHORETZ, who here discusses in a single context two very dissimilar representations of contemporary America—John O'Hara's *Ten North Frederick* (Random House, 408 pp., \$3.95) and Mary McCarthy's *A Charmed Life* (Harcourt Brace, 313 pp., \$3.95)—recently joined our staff as an assistant editor. His review of *Marjorie Morningstar* appeared last month.

drinking. The fact remains that in Gibbsville tactlessness is deemed a mortal offense: the real horror of Julian's death is that no one complains at its madness. In Gibbsville, people would no more question the supremacy of the social values than most of us would question the laws of gravity. The social values are all they have. With no inner resources to sustain them against the decrees of the country club, an infringement of the rules leaves them helpless and submissive, meekly awaiting punishment, and convinced that they deserve whatever they get.

To put all this another way, O'Hara appears to conceive that a man is exhaustively defined by his observable behavior—by what is usually called his manners—and beyond that, by his sexual habits. There is nothing else, either implied or specified. But it must be understood that O'Hara is not a “novelist of manners” in the sense in which literary critics have used that term. Manners in O'Hara refer to nothing outside themselves or deeper than themselves. They are neither an index of sensibility nor the expression of moral impulses: O'Hara is no disciple of Henry James. Nor does he share in the same tradition as Fitzgerald. Like most 19th-century novelists of high life, Fitzgerald attributed a spiritual value to money and social position. “The really rich,” he said, “are different from us”—and he meant that they were more beautiful, more interesting, *better* (though he would have been hard pressed to define how they were better). Other novelists who have dealt with the rich have presented them sometimes as better, sometimes as worse than the rest of us—but always as different, and always the difference had a meaning. What is curious about O'Hara's preoccupation with the rich is that despite his meticulous care in describing the way they live and think, he draws no conclusions from class. Which is to say that he is not a snob. The rich appear to him most representative of the human condition, because their lives are frankly, clearly, and fully implicated in the life of society.

O'Hara's concern with sex, and with erratic sexual tastes in particular, sometimes seems gratuitous, as, for example, when he devotes several pages to a description of the bedding down of two peripheral characters. Love-making of all varieties goes on in his books; an O'Hara character is bound to have

a very positive sexual personality, especially the women. But mere prurience does not account for these erotic passages—or at least not all of them. In the world of O'Hara, sex is the one area of a man's life in which he can achieve a certain individuality of expression. Everything else belonging to him, defining him, identifying him, comes from environment and returns to it, bit by bit throughout the years. The epigraph to the collected works of John O'Hara might be, “Of Gibbsville we are and to Gibbsville return.” We have no privacy, no inner life, no unique irreducible qualities—no mystery. Except, that is, in the bedroom, the domain of the unpredictable, the individual.

But O'Hara has grown older—he is over fifty now—and he no longer feels satisfied with his original account of life. *Ten North Frederick*, his latest novel, is the most comprehensive picture he has yet given us of Gibbsville. It covers three generations and various social strata of the town, concentrating on the life span of Joe Chapin, Gibbsville's leading citizen, and his wife Edith. The book ends with the following passage:

There is here, in the biography of Joe Chapin, nothing that could not have been seen or heard by the people whose lives were touched by Joe Chapin's life. . . . Ten years after Joe Chapin's death, the people who remember him slightly or well have to go by what he said and did and looked like, and only rarely by what he did not say or do. Somewhere, finally, after his death, he was placed in the great past, where only what he is known to have said and done can contradict all that he did not say, did not do. And then, when that time was reached when he was placed in the great past, he went out of the lives of all the rest of us, who are awaiting our turn.

The mystery of life has finally caught up with O'Hara in the fact of death, and *Ten North Frederick* is his attempt to reinterpret the universe in the light of that fact. The tone is less jaunty, less smart-alecky than his previous work; it conveys an impression of a man in quest of answers rather than of a shrewd bird in the know. But it is in the nature of O'Hara's special genius that it should be helpless before questions of meaning, that it should penetrate only so far and no further. The world as he sees it, as he cannot help seeing it, contains no mysteries; at most, it accommodates a paradox or two. His angle of vision is not a matter of choice,

but the way he responds to experience, and consequently not to be modified by additions but only by a radical revision.

Ten North Frederick is still written from the same vantage point as *Appointment in Samarra*, except that O'Hara tries to introduce another dimension by acknowledging that a man's life is more than his observable behavior. But on this subject O'Hara has little to say, and the mere presence of the acknowledgment is enough to make the old O'Hara who survives in *Ten North Frederick* less convincing. The drama below the surface in the history of Joe and Edith Chapin is crudely imagined. Joe is animated by the secret ambition to become President of the United States, and when this ambition falls flat his apparently enviable life turns into an insipid affair, ending in alcoholism and moral collapse. Edith is driven by the desire to "own" another human being, and O'Hara gives us to understand that this evil wish poisons her husband's soul. O'Hara never shows the inner struggle between Joe and Edith; it is mentioned many times but remains an unrealized idea. Actually, what comes through as the cause of Joe Chapin's failure is precisely the same error that destroyed Julian English—a tactless move. Joe attempts to further his political career without consulting Mike Slattery, the local boss, and O'Hara is very good when he portrays the disastrous consequences of this offense against the system. For the rest, all the talk about the Joe Chapin-nobody-knew and the "real" Edith Chapin strikes us as a propitiatory gesture toward the gods O'Hara once slighted and whose sovereignty he is now ready to proclaim.

A CHARMED LIFE is Mary McCarthy's third novel (or fourth, depending on whether you consider *The Company She Keeps* a novel—I do not). Like *The Oasis* and *The Groves of Academe*, it is a satiric portrait of a community of intellectuals, this time bohemian rather than political or academic. Martha Sinnott, the heroine, returns with her second husband to New Leeds, a town whose "essence was a kind of exaggeration. . . . In wife-beating, child neglect, divorce, automobile accidents, falls, suicides, the town was on a sort of statistical rampage, like the highways on a holiday week-end." She has come back after a long absence to

finish a play, though the infectious disorder of New Leeds life frightens her, and in spite of the fact that her first husband, Miles Murphy, from whom she had fled in the night several years earlier to marry John Sinnott, is still in town and still a problem to her. Martha's marriage to Sinnott is a good one, but has lost the aura of excitement that once surrounded it. Under the circumstances, the inevitable happens, and after a drunken party Miles seduces Martha. When she finds that she has become pregnant, the very slight possibility that Miles may have been responsible forces her to seek an abortion. Her desire for a child, reason, arithmetic, and prudence all tell her to have the baby. But intelligence is powerless against Martha's more obscure emotions. (" . . . the moral part of Martha knew that she would have to have an abortion because all her inclinations were the other way").

On her way to the abortionist, Martha discovers that she is no longer afraid of herself. At that moment her car swerves and crashes, killing her instantly. It is as though, fearless, she were no longer eligible for life.

The story of Martha is standard Mary McCarthy, not as sharply executed as some of the Margaret Sargent stories in *The Company She Keeps*, perhaps, but nevertheless very much worth reading. However, at least half of *A Charmed Life* has to do with other characters and other matters—principally the career of Warren Coe, a little abstract painter of small mind, silly aesthetic theories, and large heart; and the timid sexual ventures of Dolly Lamb, a fading virgin in her thirties whose goodness is equaled only by her fragility. These sections of the novel are thin and rather flabby. They are Miss McCarthy's experiments in charity, and they seem to register her perception of the helplessness of Good People, but one has the impression that their main purpose is to expand what might have been only a longish story into a full-length novel.

The fact is that good people, helpless or otherwise, are not in Mary McCarthy's line. Neither, for that matter, are bad ones; she seems to me quite indifferent to the ordinary moral categories. Like any good satirist—and she is surely the best in America—she creates her own heaven and hell. In the world of Mary McCarthy all activities are equally absurd, all people equally ridiculous.

Even Warren Coe, whom she tries very hard to strike off as a figure of dignity, remains pathetic, and so does Dolly Lamb. At first glance, nothing distinguishes the saint from the sinner. There is, however, one traditional virtue which never stimulates Miss McCarthy to suspicion and ridicule—and that is honesty, the will to face the truth about oneself, the desire and ability to be critical of one's own motives. This kind of honesty is, of course, an "intellectual" virtue, presupposing as it does an unusual degree of analytic power. Which is precisely the point: the major distinction Miss McCarthy makes with regard to people, the only distinction that has force and reality to her, is between the intelligent and the stupid. But the intelligent are not those who have read many books or who are always concerned with ideas. They are the people who refuse to harbor illusions about themselves, who are vigilant and severe in flaying the self-deception out of their souls.

Of this virtue Miss McCarthy's heroines are always possessed. A Mary McCarthy heroine examines her soul with the scrupulous, unashamed persistence of a professional model looking herself over in the vanity-table mirror. She knows exactly what she looks like from every angle, and she is not afraid to acknowledge that her nose may be a trifle too long. Indeed, it is of the greatest importance to her that she recognize her own weaknesses, the better to carry them off. But here the comparison ends. For the more a Mary McCarthy heroine knows about herself, the less she is able to control her actions ("The more one knew, the less one could predict, it seemed to Martha Sinnott"). She is driven by impulses that seem to have no relation to what she feels herself to be. To take the most salient example—and the most frequently recurring situation in Miss McCarthy's work—the heroine never goes willingly to bed with a man; she always "finds herself" in bed with someone she dislikes and often hates. What we have in Margaret Sargent (and all the others who follow her, including Martha Sinnott) is a spectator of her own life, yet somehow not a participant, essentially unaffected by her experience and hence not really responsible.

But Miss McCarthy's heroines represent a good deal more than that. In general, it might be said that they dramatize the dis-

junction—or rather, the hostility—between Reason and Impulse. This is Miss McCarthy's true subject, a theme which underlies her satirical castigations, which calls forth all her famous brilliance, which gives point to her acerbity, and depth to her apparently gratuitous bitterness. She has seen the special relevance of the idea for the contemporary world. The impotence of reason and good intentions against instinct and impulse is, of course, a very old theme of literature. Indeed, it is one of the cornerstones of Christian thought, used by theologians from Augustine to Tillich to prove that man without Grace is helpless against the Devil. It was, too, Freud's great preoccupation; when accused of giving too much license to sex, he retorted that the aim of his new science was to establish for the first time in human history the dominion of reason over the unconscious. But this ambition was never fulfilled. Freud ultimately claimed that his most enduring achievement was to have dealt the third great blow to human pride, the first two being the Copernican revolution and Darwinism, which proved that man was neither cosmologically nor biologically unique.

A "new philosophy calls all in doubt"—and we have Donne's *Anniversaries* and many Victorian testimonies to give us some sense of the uneasy skepticism caused by the first two revolutions. What Freud called into doubt was our power to control our own characters, much less our own destinies. He taught that no human motive can be "pure," that motivation itself was an incredibly complex phenomenon made up in great part of elements which the actor did not even know were present. He taught that we never quite "outgrow" anything, that the child we once were lives on within us, clamoring to be heard, filing his demands against the adult mind and spirit—and with astonishing success. And here we have the Mary McCarthy heroine: a high-minded adult under the tyranny of a five-year-old brat.

Miss McCarthy, it would seem, has assimilated the lessons of Freud very thoroughly; she has felt them with an intensity no other writer has even approached. Having been raised as a Roman Catholic, and then become an avant-garde intellectual, she was perhaps in an especially good position to

understand the implications of Freud's skeptical pessimism, and certainly she responded to it with something like religious fervor. (The analogy between the psychoanalyst's couch and the confessional is always on her mind.) The failure of Reason as a substitute for Grace, and the illusion of free will—she went through, as it were phylogenetically, these adventures of Western culture in her own life:

She feared that hope might be an illusion, which she had in common with every wreck and derelict who had floated up on the beach. It might be nothing more than the old "free will" of the philosophers, which was a part of the apparatus of consciousness and told nothing one way or the other about reality.

In this scheme of things, hypocrisy—traditionally the main butt of satirists—takes on a new flavor. No one can help being a hypocrite; we are all hypocrites by definition, though some of us are "honest" hypocrites. This, according to Miss McCarthy, is a great joke—on other people:

The conceit of the "noble" action, he said to himself, chuckling, *l'acte gratuit*, the selfless, improvident, senseless, luxurious, spendthrift action, this had touched the soft spot of the little iron maiden, so resolved to distinguish herself from the others . . . whose ancestors had had to work for a living, by the implacable purity of her motives.

But note how the tone changes when one of her heroines is under scrutiny:

They still "loved" each other, but this love today was less a promise than a fact of life. If they could have chosen over again, neither would have chosen differently. . . . They could not even imagine an ideal companion they would put in the other's place. From their point of view, for their purposes, they had the best there was. There lay the bleakness; for them, as they were constituted, through all eternity, this had been the optimum—there was no beyond. There was nothing.

The use of "through all eternity" in that passage is, of course, serious, lending grandeur to Martha's difficulties. The relish at having found someone out is transformed into the solemnity befitting the confrontation of a Great Truth. Freud may have deprived Miss McCarthy of her faith in the power of intelligence, he may have con-

vinced her that it is impossible even to be honest, but she will not surrender her feeling of sublimity at the steady contemplation of one's own ruin.

What we respond to in Miss McCarthy, I think, is this show of fearless honesty, this last-ditch stand against cynicism. How courageous, we say, to admit such things, how admirable! But it is, after all, only a show. The "bleakness" inspires no horror. Instead, it seems to generate satisfaction, even complacency. For other people are worse because they are not perceptive or honest enough to admit to their own nothingness. Intelligence may be unable to realize itself in action, it may be morally neutral, but how comely a sight all the same!

It is, then, to intellectual vanity—the only form of pride snatched from the flames of three cultural revolutions—that Miss McCarthy's satire appeals. How well she seems to understand our predicament, we who have lost our innocence by knowing too much, the over-conscious, over-critical. How much more attractive she makes us appear than the rest of those people. How well she understands our spiritual fastidiousness, our despair at discovering unworthiness in ourselves. How perfectly she appreciates that the real, the enduring me is the thinking, analyzing me, not the doing, the pragmatic me. How cunningly she salvages my essential purity from the wreck of my life.

IN GIBBSVILLE every gesture a man makes is noticed and judged; in New Leeds every movement of his spirit is taken account of and used in evidence against him. In both places the standards are as severely and confidently applied as they are vaguely conceived. A man must always be on guard, for, at any moment, and for a reason he may never even understand, someone is likely to take away his membership in the club, or in a bout of despondency he may even tear it up himself. The resident of these places is denied the luxury of taking himself for granted, either socially or morally. No matter what his position, no matter how securely lodged he may seem to be, he must always make a supreme effort, he must continue to justify the space he occupies on the earth. Gibbsville and New Leeds, different though they look, are nevertheless neighboring communities, and both are in America.

THE STUDY OF MAN

AUTOMATION AND THE FUTURE SOCIETY

Our Fourth Industrial Revolution

ARNOLD M. ROSE

A NUMBER of technologists and economists have predicted that we are on the verge of a series of radical changes in industrial technology which will revolutionize productive processes. The consequences, in terms of human relations and social institutions, of such a revolution are certain to be enormous. But it is not so easy to foresee these consequences. Predictions in this area have to be tentative and subject to constant modification, since they are not based on careful measurement of experimentally controlled observations, but (1) on analysis of social changes following *previous* technological innovations, and (2) on our general knowledge of the structure and dynamics of contemporary society.

SPECULATION abounds on the consequences to be expected from the spread of automation in industry, and ARNOLD M. ROSE here reviews what seems to him the most authoritative thinking on the subject as gleaned from books and articles. He was stimulated to this effort by his participation in an "American Studies" seminar sponsored at the University of Minnesota (where he is professor of sociology) by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Mr. Rose, who formerly taught at Washington University (St. Louis) and Bennington College, was born in Chicago in 1918 and educated at the University of Chicago. He is president of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, a contributor to many periodicals, among which are all the professional sociological journals, and the author of several books the latest of which, *Sociology: The Study of Human Relations*, is being published by Knopf this year. Mr. Rose's first appearance in these pages was in October 1948 with "Anti-Semitism's Root in City-Hatred."

An "industrial revolution" may be said to consist in a relatively sudden and major increase in productivity. No less than three industrial revolutions can be distinguished since the end of the 18th century in England. Until then the technological equipment of Western society had remained substantially unchanged—with a few exceptions, such as the introduction of gunpowder—since Hellenistic times. While social organization had been drastically altered during this time, the only marked increase in material productivity had come as a result of that great expansion of the European economic market in the 16th and 17th centuries which later historians called the "Commercial Revolution." The *first* industrial, or technological, revolution came only after the 1770's, with the introduction of a few simple machines like the spinning jenny and the cotton gin, and the expanded use of water and steam power. The major economic consequence of this first industrial revolution was the growth of the factory system, as opposed to commercial production in the small, family-run shop. About a century later the *second* industrial revolution began in England with the use of electric power, which made for increasingly complex machines and the relocation of factories. The *third* industrial revolution emerged in the United States shortly after the beginning of the present century, and has not yet spread to all Western countries. This revolution does not involve technological improvement so much as changes in the use of manpower, its goals being specialization and mass production, and its chief industrial manifestation the assembly line.

Each of these industrial revolutions was followed by radical social changes, largely un-

anticipated; all were attended by a great deal of dislocation and hardship, but all eventually raised standards of living and made possible a great increase of population. If the knowledge gained from this experience can be applied effectively now to help predict the direction of social changes, it may be possible to take steps to avoid some of their ill effects in the future.

THE mere fact that our society has been experiencing steady technological and other social change for almost two hundred years suggests that a new industrial revolution, such as is now being predicted by technologists, engineers, and professors, will not have the disruptive impact of an industrial revolution that occurs in a static or backward society. There is nothing in sight, as I see it, to justify the fears of a few physical scientists—who happen to be ignorant of social science—that our society will have great difficulty in adjusting to the coming changes, or that there will be widespread disorganization.

Change is a normal condition in any society; rapid change happens to be characteristic of our own; neither the coming engineering changes* nor the attendant social changes are likely to be extraordinary in extent or speed, even though in some cases they will certainly be different from what we experienced previously.

The technological elements of the new revolution look to be, first, energy derived from fissionable materials that are easily transportable; and second, the introduction of those processes of machine production known as "automation." A new source of energy involves no basic change in the manner of production, but will profoundly affect cost, location, speed, and other factors.

Automation will have at least three generalized types of effect on the manner of production, according to George B. Baldwin and George P. Schultz, industrial economists of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in *Monthly Labor Review* (February 1955):

1. The linking together of conventionally separate manufacturing operations into lines of continuous production, along which the product will move "untouched by human hands." This development, which depends primarily

on mechanical engineering for its adoption, we shall refer to simply as "integration," a term already in wide use in the metal-working industries.

2. The use of "feed-back" control devices, or servo-mechanisms, which will allow individual operations to be performed without human control. "Feed-back" refers to a built-in automatic device that will compare the way in which work is actually being done with the way in which it is supposed to be done, and then automatically make any adjustments necessary. "Feed-back" technology is primarily dependent not on mechanical but on electrical engineering and techniques.

3. The development of general- and special-purpose computing machines capable of recording and storing data (usually in the form of numbers) and of performing both simple and complex mathematical operations with such data. This, too, depends primarily on new developments in electrical engineering.

Automation will not affect all industries; and even those in which it can be used are not likely to rely upon it completely. Some industries are more amenable to automation than others—notably those engaged in the production and assembling of parts, those engaged in processing (e.g. of chemicals, flour, oil), and those relying heavily on bookkeeping (e.g. insurance, banking, public utilities). Industries already largely automatic (e.g. canning, oil processing), those in which production requires constant judgment or irregular variation (e.g. slaughtering, construction), and those producing goods the demands for which are continually subject to changes in taste and fashion (e.g. the garment industry) will be least affected by the trends toward geographic decentralization and the concentration of ownership. Agriculture, mining, transportation, service industries, and retailing will be little affected directly by automation.

Most factories that automatize will not do so, as I have said, completely. The engineers think it is often feasible to automatize 80 per cent, say, of a plant's equipment, but the remaining 20 per cent tends to be too expensive to automatize. Hence automation will not come immediately or completely in the near future. As to the use of nuclear power, the experts differ widely. Some say that it will be possible to produce nuclear power at competitive costs by 1965, while others say that "it will be 1975 or later before as much as one-tenth of Amer-

*See John Diebold, *Automation: The Advent of the Automatic Factory* (D. Van Nostrand & Co., 1948).

ica's electricity will come from atomic plants" (E. V. Murphree, "The Revolutions of Power," *Saturday Review*, January 22, 1955). Probably the best estimate is by Sir John Cockcroft, an outstanding authority, in a speech at the UN conference on atomic energy at Geneva in September 1955: "... the whole history of engineering development shows how rapidly capital costs fall in the early stages of new developments, and there is good reason to believe that in the second decade the cost of nuclear power will fall below that of power from coal and oil."

On the assumption that automation and nuclear power will be introduced to a significant extent during the next twenty or thirty years, what effects are they likely to have on the structure of industry, the labor market, the lives of workers, education, government, international relations, and even on what might be called the "mental life" of society?

INDUSTRY should become less dependent on heavy fuels that are expensive to transport, like coal, oil, and water power, and on unskilled manpower in large supply; hence it should become more mobile and easier to decentralize. The present need to be close to markets and sources of raw materials will remain, however, so that decentralization will probably not be radical. Existing investments in real estate and plain inertia will probably serve further to slow down the rate of decentralization. But gradual decentralization there will be—to avoid high land costs, high taxes, congestion, and other undesirable aspects of our present large urban industrial concentrations. Another effect of automation will be to diminish the benefits to industry of moving into areas that offer a large supply of cheap, unskilled labor—the South, for instance. The skilled workers required for automation, and the schools for training skilled workers, are more readily available in the North and Midwest, and the wages for skilled workers show little regional differential. Given the advantage of the proximity of the large Northern markets, it is likely that industries that automatize will tend to locate in the North.

An economist, Wassily Leontief, has made a careful study of the costs of automation and finds it relatively inexpensive, hence capable of being introduced rapidly. He writes (in the *Scientific American* for September 1952):

"The average [cost of automatization] for all industries would be almost six per cent . . .

[and] six per cent is far from a formidable figure. Furthermore, the investment in instruments would not necessarily mean a net increase in the total plant investment per unit of output. On the contrary, the smoother and better balanced operation of self-regulating plants has already shown that they can function with less capitalization than a non-automatic plant of identical capacity. And much existing equipment can readily be converted from manual to automatic control. . . . The mechanization of the 19th century required heavy capital investment and proceeded slowly; the new technology, unhampered by such vast capital requirements, can be introduced at a much faster pace."

But larger firms will be readier to spare both the time, however short, and the capital for the change-over; they will also be in a better position to take advantage of the possibilities of decentralization. Thus automation may encourage concentration of ownership unless the government steps in to assist small firms with loans, information, etc., etc.

There will be a need for new kinds of skills, and a sharp drop in the demand for unskilled labor. To keep employed, many unskilled or semi-skilled workers will require schooling, and some categories of skilled workers will have to be retrained. It seems nonsense to expect widespread permanent unemployment as a consequence of machines taking the place of workers. Workers released from one job or industry will be required in another. But they will be needed with different skills and perhaps in different places, so that temporary unemployment and dislocation are likely.

Older workers will suffer greater hardship. Since the expense of their retraining will net a smaller total return to employers, they are less likely to be given the opportunity for re-education. Untrained older workers will either be downgraded, or—if pensions become available at a lower age—retired earlier. On the other hand, the retirement age for the worker retrained to operate automatic machinery may be raised because of the ensuing shortage of skilled labor—one that will last for many decades—and because work itself will become easier physically than it is now.

Some categories of female labor will find it harder to obtain the kind of unskilled employment now available to them because unskilled and incidental clerical and factory jobs will be

greatly reduced in number. (Waitresses and saleswomen, however, will be unaffected by automation.) Women are also less likely to be offered training as machinists and maintenance workers, which are the jobs that will be most plentiful in automatized factories.

The general upgrading of the average skill levels of workers may be expected to have some effect on unions. Skilled workers have traditionally favored strong unions and, given the need of labor in general for security amid the dislocations brought on by automation, they will probably become unionized in increasing number. Unions will probably also be strengthened by an increase in their functions. At the same time, some of their traditional *bêtes noires* will be eliminated: piecework pay, incentive systems, the speedup, and other features associated with individual production. Also, as part of the long-term trend associated with increasing productivity, the service industries will (as Colin Clark foresees) preempt a steadily increasing proportion of the labor force; service workers have been the hardest to unionize, but may become less so as more and more of them are recruited from previously unionized labor.

THE great rise in productivity may be expected to raise real incomes and the general standard of living sharply, while further reducing hours of work.* Such a change will, of course, have innumerable secondary effects which can only be guessed at. Two are particularly worth speculating about.

The continuing rise in the standard of living will reduce still further the consumption differentials between classes, especially as automatically produced goods are expected to be of higher quality. The lower-income groups will be able to afford more of the things now

*It is difficult to predict the extent of the rise of wages and reduction in working hours, as these will be a function not only of the increase in productivity, but also of (1) the extent to which the proceeds of increased productivity are spread throughout the economy; (2) the probable increase in economic demand; (3) the change in the age structure of the population (it is estimated that the population will increase by 20 per cent by 1965, but that the number of those of working age will rise by only 10 per cent). Still, a responsible economist has predicted a four-day work week with a 20 per cent increase in average income by the 1970's (George L. Ridgeway, Director of Economic Research for International Business Machines Corporation, in the *New York Times*, March 27, 1955).

available only to the wealthy. And there will be a greater flowering of leisure-time activities. Present trends suggest a considerable variation in this development: not only will there be more recreation and social participation of the kinds already familiar to us, but small "side-line" businesses will multiply, along with "do-it-yourself" work around the home, gardening, "creative art," etc., etc. Since many people are not yet prepared to cope with an abundance of leisure, its sudden increase will probably provoke a great deal of boredom and dissatisfaction at first. New small industries and occupations purely exploitative in purpose may arise.

Education, too, will of necessity be greatly affected by automation. Industries that automatize will in most cases be compelled to train employees themselves, probably under the joint supervision of management and unions, while the training of young people for their future careers will probably remain in the hands of the kinds of schools now in existence. Pressure is already being exerted to change these schools to meet the needs of the new industrialization. At the secondary school level, the need for technical training will be greater than ever before. Since teachers adequately trained in technological disciplines are in increasingly short supply because of the relatively low salaries in their field, not only will teachers' salaries be raised (by Federal or industry-aid plans), but differential salaries by subjects may be expected to appear.

At the university level, the rise of engineering, natural science, and social science may be expected to continue at the expense of the humanities and "education." The humanities will be able to retain their importance in general education by subordinating themselves to science as *the* major subject. But managers and engineers will more than ever need the breadth that only the humanities can provide. Higher education will continue to be increasingly important for social mobility. Leadership in industry, government, and civic life generally will depend more than ever on the ability at least to understand, if not guide or manage, the newer technology and the social readjustments it will entail.

THE effects on government of the changes in technology will be secondary insofar as they will derive from the effects on industry and labor. If industry and population are decentralized, the many material and cultural services

now provided by municipalities will have to be assumed by state and Federal government, or by new metropolitan and/or regional authorities not yet in existence. The exodus to the suburbs is already straining the cities' capacity to collect taxes to provide the services which suburbanites still use. If industrial ownership becomes concentrated among a decreasing number of firms, government controls in industry may be expected to multiply. Since the new "monopolies" will, presumably, not be inefficient or try to restrict production—in fact, they can be expected to do the contrary—the new government controls will move in the direction set by the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, rather than in that of the old-fashioned "trust-busting" of the Sherman and Clayton acts.

A broadened social security program—as safeguard against unemployment, interruptions of income during retraining periods, and in old age—is already being recognized as essential to personal and social stability. Social security will become even more necessary with increasing technological unemployment and the loss of incidental privileges such as pension rights, vacation rights, seniority, etc., etc. Probably not all of the different kinds of security benefits will be provided by the government—some unions have already moved to require industry to provide severance pay and a "guaranteed annual wage."

Government will play a new role in education, under the pressure of industry and labor alike. Federal aid to education is about to become a reality, and in the coming years it may have to provide a major part of school revenue. It is even likely that the Federal government will grant increasing funds to private colleges; it has already begun to do so in the form of research subsidies and agricultural extension work.

Internal migration policies, and agencies to implement them, will probably become necessary in all industrialized countries. Information about job opportunities, job requirements, and wage levels can parallel the crop-reporting service the Federal government has long provided. Small loans to pay for transportation of families and household goods cannot be provided by the usual lending agencies, limited as they are by their collection facilities and by state law; a Federal agency will probably have to be set up for this purpose. Social services to

provide aid in finding housing and in helping migrants adjust to new communities will be greatly in demand. These and other related innovations can be handled by a "Division of Migration Service" in one of the existing departments of the Federal government.

A MAJOR factor in world politics today is the difference in productive capacity between the industrialized and the so-called "underdeveloped" countries. The new technology will only increase the difference. The first effect of the newer technology will be to make it even more difficult for the underdeveloped countries to "catch up" with the West. The abundance of capital and of workers with specialized skills required for automation are lacking in backward countries. But if capital and training are provided for them by more advanced countries like our own, they may be able to modernize, and even ultra-modernize, their economies with relative swiftness.

The underdeveloped countries have, however, one advantage: they are not saddled with large capital investments in technological plants inherited from the first, second, and third industrial revolutions. Such investments may retard the advanced countries unless they are willing to scrap much of their present "wealth"; England is the notable example of a country that was held back because her capital commitments to the first and second industrial revolutions prevented her from taking advantage of the third. Some engineers (according to A. H. Raskin in the *New York Times* on April 8, 1955) estimate that 70 per cent of all machine tools now in use in the United States have become outmoded. That is quite a large investment to scrap.

Automation will also be helped in underdeveloped countries by the fact that most of their towns and cities are small and scattered. Automatic production does not need the large urban agglomerations developed in the West under industrialism over the past one hundred and fifty years. Introduced into hitherto unindustrialized countries, automation can avoid the dislocations caused by extreme and rapid urbanization.

Atomic energy will also be a special advantage for backward countries once it becomes available at competitive prices. Fissionable materials (and materials that are likely to become fissionable under the attack of science in the coming decades) are much more widely scat-

tered over the earth's surface than coal and oil, and in any case much cheaper to transport. Thus the coming industrial revolution should be more easily exportable to Asia, Africa, and South America than were the earlier industrial revolutions (though the training of labor will still remain a major problem in these areas). Technologically advanced countries like Italy and Japan that lack coal and oil will likewise be helped by the shift to atomic energy, and the prospects are for a further lessening of the great differential in productivity between the West and the rest of the world that has been characteristic since 1775.

WE HAVE heard much of the ruinous effects of over-specialization and the meaninglessness of work on the assembly line. The fourth industrial revolution may be expected to check and even reverse this tendency. The typical new worker will be skilled and technically educated, not the unskilled or semi-skilled hand that the earlier industrial revolutions called for. In an automatized factory he will be able to "see" a given productive process from beginning to end. His main job will be to control, tend, and repair machines, and this active role will not permit the machines to set the rhythm of his work.

There is a dangerous tendency current to treat automation and the technological changes it will entail as things mysterious and superhuman. Scientists, engineers, and some businessmen are among those who most frequently conjure up such spectres. Labor leaders have tended on the whole to avoid Sunday-supplement language in dealing with the subject. Economists and other social scientists seem the most restrained.

The mathematician Norbert Wiener (of "cybernetics" fame) has perhaps been the one most guilty of using scare language in speaking of automatic machinery and its effects. A typical and widely quoted statement from his book *The Human Use of Human Beings* (Houghton Mifflin, 1950) is: "It is perfectly clear that this [automation] will produce an unemployment situation in comparison with which . . . the depression of the 30's will seem a pleasant joke." Another mathematician, John von Neumann, has "proved mathematically" that a machine can be constructed which will "reproduce itself" and that its offspring will likewise be capable of "reproduction," but by this he only means that a machine could be

constructed and programmed so that, when the proper parts are inserted in it, the machine would assemble them into another machine just like itself.

A tendency to personify automatic machines by lending them the attributes of human beings likewise serves to make them seem more frightening. Edmund Callis Berkeley has entitled his book on the new computing machines *Giant Brains*. The machines themselves—which, after all, do nothing but add and subtract at a tremendous speed—have been given such names as "Mark" and "Edna," which are not frightening in themselves but do imply that such machines have human powers. At least two electronic processes have been described by their inventors as "learning." Out of the Bell Telephone Laboratories has come a mechanical "mouse" that can "learn" to find a piece of cheese in a maze with increasing speed. (The first time this little mobile electronic gadget bumps into the walls of the maze almost at random, but because it records these "errors" it is able the second time around to thread the maze without a false move.) At the Cambridge Mathematical Laboratory in England, Dr. Maurice V. Wilks has invented an electronic device that can be "conditioned" gradually to respond to only one out of all the digits; this is also described as "learning."* Without disparaging such devices, an eminent neurologist, Professor Warren McCulloch of the University of Illinois, has estimated (New York Times, August 8, 1954) that to build a gadget with as much "intelligence" as an earthworm, it would take all the electronic power that could be generated by Niagara Falls, and would require all that cataract's water to cool the electronic tubes.

One of the sanest public statements about the new electronic devices has come from Robert Bendiner, a political writer (and contributor to COMMENTARY), in the New York Times for January 23, 1955:

"To appreciate the accomplishments of talented gadgets . . . is one thing; to endow them with human attributes . . . is quite another matter. The human brain is not out—

*It seems that the psychologists are as much to blame for this distortion as the physicists and mathematicians, since they have for years been referring to "conditioning" and "trial and error learning" as equivalent to all of human learning, rather than merely as one type.

moded. In any discussion of these so-called Giant Brains . . . it is strangely necessary to make this point at the outset—because if there is one thing more remarkable than the machines themselves, it is the readiness of people to imagine that these assemblies of metal, vacuum tubes, and wire literally think, remember, learn from experience, use judgment and occupy some new and shadowy ground between the inanimate and the human. In sober truth they do none of these things, but even a cursory review of their behavior and achievements shows how tempting it is to engage in just this fantasy.”

Mr. Bendiner goes on to point out that the machines do only what they are “programmed” to do, and are incapable of meeting an unforeseen situation; that they do not truly *recognize* but merely compare; and that they are incapable of generating an idea or anything else new. . . .

THERE will probably be fewer heavy, dirty, and boring jobs in automatized factories than in the equivalent contemporary plants, and factory work generally will be cleaner and safer. Many workers will be able to wear white collars instead of overalls. John Diebold goes so far as to say:

“In an odd and entirely unexpected way, automation may bring us back to the human and psychological values of the self-respecting craftsman. Electrical and mechanical repair work, instrument adjustment, and general mechanical tinkering can provide challenges, pleasures, and satisfactions very much like those enjoyed by the swordsmith or cabinet-maker of old.”

The engineers, Gordon S. Brown and Donald P. Campbell, writing in *Scientific American* (September 1955), make this more specific:

“Even in the most robotized of the automatic functions there will be many men, and they will have interesting and responsible jobs. They will be freed from the timing, nerve-racking or even boring jobs of today’s mass manufacturing. To win this freedom, however, they

will have to upgrade themselves in skill and sophistication. The new controllers and instruments will call for a higher level of precision of repair and maintenance. A \$50,000 controller cannot be hit with a hammer if the shaft doesn’t fit into the hole on the first try. Men who have heretofore thought of electronic equipment as simply a metal chassis with tubes will become conversant with switching, flip-flop, peaking, and other circuits. They will have to judge when to repair and when to throw away rather than stop production. We have here a paradox; today we cannot afford not to have lots of control, because a half-day shutdown of a plant may mean a \$100,000 loss in potential sales.

These robots are not hurting the workman—they merely coax him none too gently into taking more responsible jobs, making bigger decisions, studying and using his mind as well as his hands.”

On the other hand, such downright unpleasant jobs as those in the mining and slaughtering industries will probably not be susceptible to automatization in the next few decades. But hours of work will go down in all industries, and this will make even the most unpleasant of occupations more bearable. The mental life of the worker of the future will be much more determined by what he does during his leisure time than what he does during his working hours. As his job ceases to dominate his life, political, family, religious, and “cultural” activities may take on greater significance. It is difficult to see how a democratic state can channel leisure-time activities, except by making the facilities for them, whatever their nature, more freely available. But it is likely that the things that fill the leisure time of the average citizen will shape the future to a greater extent than any other set of factors.

All in all, the net prognosis for the coming industrial revolution under automation seems to be for a happier, more vital people, not a Huxleyan “brave new world” of mechanical monstrosity. Planning, foresight, and a modicum of intelligent action on the part of the public and private organizations should see to that.

LETTERS FROM READERS

Senator Humphrey's Amendment

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have read with considerable interest the article entitled "Cost of the Security Programs" by Maurice J. Goldbloom in the December 1955 issue. His documentation is excellent and I concur in most of his conclusions.

I regret that Mr. Goldbloom has failed to recognize the work of the Subcommittee on Government Reorganization, of which it was my privilege to serve as chairman. . . . This subcommittee that conducted extensive hearings into the government loyalty and security program . . . obtained passage of a bill to establish a special Commission on Government Security. That Commission . . . will review the entire structure and administration of the loyalty and security apparatus. . . .

I must . . . disagree with Mr. Goldbloom's observation concerning the Communist Control Act of 1954. This is not the Dies-Humphrey Act, since Congressman Dies was not an author or co-sponsor of the Act. It is officially known as the Butler bill. However, the section relating to the Communist party was an amendment which I introduced during the debate on this particular measure. My amendment, in the nature of a substitute for the Butler bill, declared the Communist party to be an integral part of the international Communist movement and a conspiratorial force, rather than a normal political party. . . . This is no secret, nor is it a theory. It is a known fact to any fair-minded, objective person; it is a recognized fact in the decisions of our courts; and it is an accepted fact by every member of Congress. What the Humphrey amendment did, therefore, was to make a legislative finding and declaration as to the nature of the Communist party.

The second point of the Humphrey amendment was to assure anyone accused of membership in the Communist party of the protection of due process of law. In other words, the intent and purpose of my amendment or bill was to take this issue of Communism out of the Congressional committees and place it in the courts where the burden of proof rested upon the government and the presumption of

innocence was with the accused. In short, the Humphrey proposal was an amendment to the Smith Act of 1940. . . .

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

U.S. Senate

MR. GOLDBLOOM writes:

In view of the limited scope of my article, it was impossible to discuss all the things I might have liked to, including the work of Senator Humphrey's committee and those headed by Senators Johnston and Hennings. As to the Communist Control Act, I must still disagree with Senator Humphrey. The original bill of Senator Butler dealt only with Communist-infiltrated unions. The substitute introduced by Senator Humphrey—who later accepted the Butler bill as an amendment—provided criminal penalties for membership in the Communist party, as did a Dies-sponsored amendment passed by the House. One may call this assuring due process of law, since a criminal trial fits that description; the late Senator McCarran said that it "violates the conception of innocence until guilt is proven." The criminal penalties were eliminated in conference under pressure from the administration, supported by McCarran.

Even in its final form, which Senator Humphrey called "not as strong a blow as Hubert Humphrey would like to have struck," the act seemed to the American Civil Liberties Union to be an "unconstitutional and unwise contradiction of the guarantees of free speech and free association." With this I agree—the more regretfully as I am in agreement with Senator Humphrey on most aspects of the security problem.

In Praise of Brodbeck

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

May I say how very much impressed I was by the article "In Dreams Begin Responsibilities," by Dr. Arthur J. Brodbeck, in the February COMMENTARY. I know of no place in the psychiatric literature in which the interesting and provocative contributions of Hadfield are described with such clarity and economy.

I have made the reading of this article man-

datory for my residents. You are to be congratulated on your foresight in securing Dr. Brodbeck as a contributor. I hope that you will publish further contributions by this stimulating psychologist.

C. W. WAHL (M.D.)

Department of Psychiatry
School of Medicine
University of California Medical Center
Los Angeles, California

Cave Scroll Dating

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Professor H. L. Ginsberg in his article "More Light from Judean Caves" (November 1955) said that among the finds which were discovered were "several fragmentary Hebrew documents dated by 'deliverance of Israel through Simeon ben Kosbah, Prince of Israel.'" I assume that Professor Ginsberg has seen a photograph of these Hebrew fragments. Will he inform us whether the words "deliverance of Israel through Simeon ben Kosbah" appear in a letter or a document and whether they occur in the beginning or at the end, and what is the context of the entire fragment? It is of paramount importance that he answer these questions.

SOLOMON ZEITLIN

Philadelphia, Pa.

PROF. GINSBERG writes:

The papyri in question were reported on briefly by de Vaux in *Revue Biblique* 60 (1953): 264. Upon my request Father de Vaux communicated the Hebrew formula to me in an air letter of February 14, 1955. It goes like this:

שנת א לנאות ישראל על יר
שמעון בן כוסבה נשיא ישראל

About the character of the documents and the number of occurrences, de Vaux's letter adds to what he said in the above passage in *Revue Biblique* only this: *C'est un formule de date, qui se rencontre plusieurs fois dans des documents de contenu analogue* ["A similar formula in dating shows up a number of times, in documents of analogous character"].

First Names Revised

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

May I add some annotations to Rabbi Ben-zion Kaganoff's essay "Jewish First Names Through the Ages" in the November 1955 issue of COMMENTARY? An essay by me on the same subject will appear in the forthcoming issue of

Tarbiz, Quarterly for Jewish Studies (The Hebrew University, Jerusalem).

1. In opposition to Hellenistic Jewry, the medieval Jews were very scrupulous in avoiding the use of names of pagan deities or Christian saints. Feibush is not Phoebus, but the French name Vives—Hayim; the Tosafist Peter was not named after the apostle (who by then had been "Pierre" in France for centuries) but was called by the Hebrew name Peter, which is identical with the Sephardic Hebrew name Bekhor; and Treindel is not the diminutive of Katharina, but the French Térine, reduction of Estérine.

2. Chanukah is a common name even today among Grusinian, Persian, and Bokharan Jews for persons born at the time of the feast, just as people born on Purim or Chanukah are called Nissim—miracles (they happened in those days).

3. The custom of naming a son Yehudah Aryeh Leb (Leone), Naphtali Zevi Hirz (Hirsh), Yissochor Dov Ber, Binyamin Zeev Wolf, is a comparatively recent one, not to be found before the 15th century, and then only in Germany and Italy. In this period animal names were not usual among Germans. The origin of this custom is Cabbalistic.

4. Not few, as Rabbi Kaganoff assumes, but comparatively many names of French origin have come down to our days, particularly feminine ones: Minkche, Sprinze, Kele, Bele, Treindel, Yente—Mince (tiny), Espérance, Célie, Belle, Estérine, Gentille. Names of flowers derive from medieval France; they survive in Blume, Rosel (Rayzel), Feile, Yachent (Yachne)—Fleur, Rose, Violette, Hyacinthe. Masculine names of French origin or French pronunciation are Zanwil, Zalman, Isac, Feivish, Benoit, Isserlin—Samuel, Salmin, Ishaque, Vives, Bénédict, Israelin. Bunem is a corruption of Bonhomme and of Bonami. Both names were specifically Jewish, not Gentile.

5. Curious name metamorphoses came about when parts of Hebrew words were taken for German diminutives in the Middle Ages; the *-chem* of Menachem was taken for the German *-chen*, so a grown-up Menachem became Mann, or in Austria-Bavaria, where the diminutive *-el* or *-dl* prevailed, Maennel (Emaniel!), Mendl. The same thing happened to Rachel, which became Rechä; to Rivkah-Rivke, which became Rive or Rivlin in the *-lin* diminutive provinces; to Mordechai-Mottche-Mottke, which by the same process changed to Mottel in Austria-Bavaria.

(Dr.) F. GUMPERTZ

Jerusalem, Israel

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Adam Fallen and Unfallen

THE RUNGLSS LADDER. By CHARLES H. FOSTER. Duke University Press. 278 pp. \$4.50.

THE AMERICAN ADAM. By R. W. B. LEWIS. University of Chicago Press. 205 pp. \$5.50.

Reviewed by RICHARD CHASE

MOST writers on American literature these days take a "dialectical" view of our literary history. They tell us that the American imagination from the beginning has embraced such contraries as Calvinism and secular optimism, romanticism and realism, and that it continues to do so. This view contrasts with the older account of our literature (as expressed, for instance, in Alfred Kazin's *On Native Grounds*) which pictured our literary history as a more or less monolithic drive away from Puritan superstition, provincialism, and romanticism, and towards realism in literature and a free, secular, and radically democratic culture.

The new dialecticians are more subtle than the old realists, and in the details of literary analysis they are often better critics. They are right, also, when they speak of the American imagination as characteristically embracing contradictions. At the same time their general view of things tends to be tamely conservative and conventional. Their vaunted dialectic is anything but intrepid. And the cultural atmosphere they live in is more than a little stifling.

Charles H. Foster's *The Rungless Ladder* and R. W. B. Lewis's *The American Adam*, both interesting and valuable studies in their way, illustrate some of the above generalizations. Mr. Foster's book is a competent intellectual biography of Harriet Beecher Stowe, particularly in her relation to New England Puritanism. The old-fashioned way of treating this author was to trace her gradual achievement of realism in fiction as she abandoned the Calvinism of her family heritage and passed

from the early fable, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, to her later genre fictions, like *The Pearl of Orr's Island* and *Oldtown Folks*. But Mr. Foster doubts if she ever really did abandon her Calvinism, at least her Calvinist imagination, and he disagrees with those who speak of *The Minister's Wooing* as her "attack" on the family religion. This novel is, rather, an expression of her contradictory ideas and feelings. And beginning with his first chapter, called "New England Doubleness," Mr. Foster painstakingly traces in Mrs. Stowe's work the contraries and tensions of the Puritan, or post-Puritan, mind, which her intelligence if not her somewhat inadequate art so fully comprehended.

As Mr. Foster says, Mrs. Stowe's idea of Calvinism is symbolized by the rungless ladder, a metaphor she uses in *The Minister's Wooing*. Calvinism sets up a ladder of which the top rung is at the threshold of God and the bottom rung in the human affections and instincts. But then, by its cruel doctrinal opposition of the few elect and the many damned, it in effect knocks out all the intermediary rungs, making it impossible to climb up.

In her personal and emotional life Mrs. Stowe found Calvinism too austere and callous, and she turned finally to Episcopalianism. But the rungless ladder remained a central symbol of her imagination. Mr. Foster calls attention several times to the persistence of the Puritan sensibility in American literature, but he does not offer on this basis, or any other, a general view of our literature beyond suggesting that many of the most interesting and original American writers have contained within themselves the dialectic of their time.

R. W. B. LEWIS's *The American Adam* is more ambitious. Mr. Lewis thinks the American mind has been "clearest and most rewarding when it has been most dialectical." And like Mr. Foster, he speaks often of "inner contradictions" and (quoting Emerson) "this old double" that characterizes American thought. But Mr. Lewis rests uneasily among contradic-

tions and yearns for resolutions, apotheoses, and transfigurations, and this leads him to generalize on a large scale.

He believes that the "dialogue" within the American imagination has split itself into three "parties." The first is the party of Hope (the optimists and progressives, like Whitman, Emerson, and Thoreau). The second is the party of Memory (not quite clear who belongs to this—perhaps Jonathan Edwards, the historian Parkman, and others who are "orthodox" either because they believe with the Calvinists in inherited sin, or because they look back nostalgically to the European past). The third party embraces the first two and is called the party of Irony (Hawthorne, Melville, Henry James, senior and junior). The subject of the dialogue is what Mr. Lewis calls "the American myth"—the myth, that is, of the "new Adam." There are of course many interesting allusions to Adam in American literature, as there were bound to be, given a new country with a new ideal of innocence and hope. We are not surprised that the optimist Whitman, in his "Children of Adam" poems, should have depicted an unfallen Adam, or that Hawthorne, a more complex moralist, should in *The Marble Faun* have made the young hero into a sort of fallen Adam. It is appropriate, in other words, that Mr. Lewis's party of Hope should believe in a sinless Adam, the party of Memory in a lost and eternally damned Adam, and the party of Irony in the "fortunate fall" of Adam. Mr. Lewis identifies himself with this last party and says that the idea of a fallen Adam is necessary and that the fall was "fortunate" because it was a step away from innocence and superficiality towards a culture capable of taking a tragic view of its experience.

Mr. Lewis's thesis is obviously too narrow to accommodate the large meanings he attributes to it. It does allow him, however, to organize a good deal of interesting material—on Parkman and Bancroft, on Henry James, Sr., and on the theologian, Horace Bushnell.

But one is struck by how often Mr. Lewis's preoccupation with the "new Adam" leads him to exalt eccentric and second-best works over better and more typical works by the same authors—for example, Charles Brockden Brown's *Arthur Mervyn*, Hawthorne's *Marble Faun*, Melville's *Billy Budd*, Henry James's last three novels, *The Ambassadors*, *The Wings of the Dove*, and *The Golden Bowl*, and Faulkner's *The Bear*. The Adam myth is a

theme of American literature but it is by no means *the* theme. And Mr. Lewis's attempts to generalize the theme involve him in considerable vagueness and some confusion. In the stories of initiation in our literature, is the "American Adam" initiated "away from" society (page 115), or, taking "his start outside the world," is it his fate to learn and master or be mastered by "its power, its fashions, and its history" (page 128)? It depends on whether you are talking, say, about Cooper's Natty Bumppo or F. Scott Fitzgerald's *Gatsby*. These two are at best second cousins; they can't both be Adam.

STILL, it is only in the chapter on Melville that things get entirely out of hand. Without any of the irony he says he is party to, Mr. Lewis reads Melville as Scripture. And we begin to suspect that any piece of writing, whether novel, fable, poem, or essay, becomes for him a form of revelation or "dramatic comment" moving dialectically towards divine truth. In *Billy Budd*, that is, the fallen Adam is reborn in the Christ-like hero; and the new Adam has "entered, once and for all, into the dimension of myth," becoming, one gathers, the new, new Adam.

But what about *Moby Dick*? Isn't that book, as everyone feels, closer to the grand archetypes of the American imagination than is *Billy Budd*? One's reason for thinking that it is is Mr. Lewis's reason for thinking that it isn't. For as he correctly writes: "*Moby Dick* is an elaborate pattern of countercommentaries, the supreme instance of the dialectical novel—a novel of tension without resolution." As a general truth this is undeniable. And the imagination that created *Moby Dick*, and other great books, from *The Scarlet Letter* to *Light in August*, is, then, not tragic and Christian, but, to use two terms that suggest unresolved contradictions, melodramatic and Manichean.

In any case *Billy Budd* seems more political than theological or mythic. It is closer, in other words, to the spirit of Edmund Burke than to that of Kenneth Burke, a critic who, along with F. O. Matthiessen, has influenced Mr. Lewis. It presents the idea that society must follow a middle way of expediency and compromise. Society cannot be based on the contrary absolutes of good and evil represented by Billy Budd and his traducer Claggart. If these absolute extremes enter the arena of society they assume a revolutionary form, and so,

Melville seems to say, from the point of view of political realism, it is proper that they should destroy each other. But this is hardly a "resolution" of any sort, except perhaps as showing that contradictions are absorbed in history. The Biblical metaphors Melville uses suggest a quasi-Augustinian idea of grace revealed in history. But still the final impression we get from Melville's story is less the mystery of incarnation than the mystery entailed in the eternal contradiction of good and evil, of the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness. The structure of society cannot countenance this extreme polarity, but it may, nevertheless, be the very substance of the aesthetic imagination, as indeed, in *Billy Budd*, it is.

ASSUMING for the moment that Mr. Lewis's book is roughly typical of the new approach to American literature, one concludes not that this approach is too dialectical but that it is not dialectical enough. The newer critics who take any sort of position at all are dialectical only up to the point they want to get to—namely, some sort of middle ground of taste and opinion where contradictions are resolved, tensions relaxed, and the imagination is made safe for morality. This has been the goal of most literary people for some time now, and there has been a general drive to remove from art and from the psyche of the artist all conflict, recalcitrancy, suffering, and neurosis, all color, native impulse, and adventure.

The search for a middle ground of taste and opinion has taken many forms. It is apparent in the generally middlebrow tone of the time. It is apparent in the extraordinary emphasis—often among writers one ordinarily thinks of as highbrow—on the tragic view and the religious view, since both tragedy and religion, as conceived by writers like Mr. Lewis, offer a resolution of contradictions, a catharsis or incarnation. The many symbolistic studies of literature, following Cassirer and Mrs. Langer, tend to break down the old dualistic verities of Western thought and to absorb all orders of meaning into language; the poetic symbol being, as we are told, "the incarnation of meaning" wherein all contradictions are reconciled. "Myth," about which we have heard so much, has meant to most literary people only one kind of myth—that which is derived, as tragedy is now said to derive, from the religious ritual of the death and rebirth of the divine hero.

And thus, so far as all this affects American

studies, an anomalous situation has developed. For the most general truth about the reigning fashions of criticism is that they aim at a middle ground where contradictions are resolved, whereas the most general truth about American literature is that at its best it has been remarkable for its unique capacity to express the extreme and irreconcilable aspects of life and for its habit of leaving ultimate questions open.

Bitter Autobiography

EPSTEIN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By SIR JACOB EPSTEIN. E. P. Dutton. 294 pp., 95 illustrations. \$6.00.

Reviewed by ALFRED WERNER

TO BEGIN with, this is no real autobiography but an overly generous selection—especially of articles *pro* or *contra* Epstein (mostly the latter) published in the British press between 1908 and 1939—from the sculptor's scrapbook. The volume would have gained considerably if Epstein had drawn upon the talent so happily evident in his sculpture—his gift for sloughing off non-essential details.

The author's own contributions to this work are, in the main, angry comments on angry comments. In the opening pages of the volume, an honest effort is indeed made by the sculptor to write the story of his life, but at the end of twenty pages he has already raced through his first twenty-seven years. Still, this is the only place in the book we can get a more or less unobscured sense of Epstein's striking personality. Then commence the outbursts of indignation and moods of frustration that link the clippings of the 1908-1939 period. The artist's description of his early life on the "teeming East Side" of New York during the 1880's and 1890's is thin and unsatisfying. He says little more than that "Rembrandt would have delighted in the East Side." Looking back in 1939, when most of this book was written and the emergence of Nicholson, Moore, Giacometti, and others had begun to make him look old-fashioned, Epstein maintained that the wholesome influence on him of the Jewish East Side during his formative years helped him to keep a "human point of view" in his sculpture, to inform his work with "human rather than abstract implications." But sculptors like Gabo, Pevsner, and other products of the *Judengasse* developed in the direction

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of radical abstractionism for all the influences in youth of a Jewish milieu.

We learn something about Epstein's early readings, his studies at the Art Students League in New York, then at the Académie Julian in Paris (where old Bouguereau fumed at "*ce sauvage Américain*"), his visits to the British Museum where he saw the Elgin Marbles, Greek sculpture, the Egyptian rooms, and the Polynesian and African collections. Very few words, however, are spent on Epstein's family, Orthodox immigrants from Poland who grew rich in the New World and with whom he had little in common. It is only from other sources that we know about Epstein's early struggles in London, where he and his young wife (a Scottish girl nowhere mentioned in the book) lived in two bare rooms, with most of his income coming from what he made at night as a model in an art school. Curiously, their daughter might have gone entirely unmentioned too, if the portrait bust the father made of her had not provoked an outburst from a critic: "Even the soul of a child is not safe in his hands."

A brief "Post-script: 1954" sketchily covers the decade and a half since the first publication of the autobiography (then entitled *Let There Be Sculpture*). These were no longer years of struggle, though one of his sculptures was rejected by several museums and another received a good deal of hostile comment. Several of his statues were installed in public places, among them a *Madonna and Child* in a London convent, and a group, *Social Consciousness*, in Philadelphia's Fairmount Park. Famous men, Churchill, Nehru, and Bertrand Russell among them, now sat for the squire of Hyde Park Gate, but the hand that can so successfully reveal a sitter's traits in a portrait bust fumbles at describing them in words. (Missing from this new edition is the catalogue of his works that appeared in the 1940 edition; brought up to date, it would have been a useful aid to collectors and art historians.)

READING the attacks made on him in an England dominated until recently by unimaginative, timidly naturalistic sculpture, one can easily understand how Epstein developed what bordered on a persecution mania. To make things worse, some of the attacks were prompted by xenophobic and anti-Semitic motives. The most scurrilous kind of Jew-baiting was stooped to in the *New Age* article of 1924 in which Epstein was accused of having projected "cer-

tain bestial characteristics" into the faces of decent people, of having expressed the "sub-conscious racial Hebraic life," where "power is the motive force of man, and woman is but an instrument of sensuality."

Such Stuermer-like assaults, though rare, were painful and bewildering, especially since Epstein—his early infatuation with the Lower East Side notwithstanding—had no conscious connection with Judaism or Jewish life. "I have never joined in all-Jewish exhibitions of art," he explains, almost apologetically. "Artists are of all races and climes, and to band together in racial groups is ridiculous." Just as Captain Dreyfus never understood why millions of Frenchmen were arrayed against him, so Epstein is baffled by the resentment he inspired in England's Edwardian upper middle class.

In some ways it was unfortunate that Epstein forsook post-Dreyfus, post-Impressionist France for Edwardian England, where foreigners were suspect and so respectable a movement as Impressionism was regarded with raised eyebrows. In France he would have had more allies: he might have been spared that bitterness, that pathological sense of isolation, which makes him absurd and unfair in his judgment of critics and alien artistic movements. Art critics, he writes, "are recruited either from the ranks of journalists or are disappointed failures as artists." He dismisses abstract and surrealist artists as amateurs with private incomes and plenty of time "for that social intercourse so necessary for the propagation of advanced ideas." One cannot help comparing his self-pity with the undaunted, uncomplaining spirit of such a stepchild of modern culture as Van Gogh. For all his laments, it is a fact that from 1907 on Epstein had many commissions, including some very remunerative ones.

One sorely misses humor, charm, and style in this book. Here and there, however, it is relieved by flashes of irony, especially when he is writing about people he did not care for. On the Futurist Marinetti, for example, whose "impudence was as great as his energy," he writes that after a tempestuous stay in London he "went back to give birth to Mussolini," while his British associates "made frantic efforts to enter the Royal Academy."

No more appropriate observation could be made about this book than the one implied in Epstein's own statement: "Surely the best communication of the sculptor or the painter is through his work and in no other manner."

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Dangerous Friend

AMERICA AT MID-CENTURY. By ANDRE SIEGFRIED. Harcourt, Brace. 357 pp. \$5.75.

Reviewed by OSCAR HANDLIN

PROFESSOR at the Collège de France and member of the French Academy, André Siegfried has been awarded all the academic distinctions his own country has to offer. As an editor of the Paris daily *Figaro*, he also expresses himself frequently on public questions. His views on America have a wide influence in France, where he is regarded as an interpreter and friend of the United States.

But in this connection I am reminded of the old phrase, "With such a friend, who needs an enemy?" The volume before us shows clearly the pernicious character of Siegfried's influence, especially as it concerns the image of the United States held by many Europeans.

An analysis of Siegfried's views can begin with the following sentence, which concerns the immigration of refugees to America since 1933: "It is, however, true that crypto-Communists and spies also appear to have crept in, and that the Jewish problem, which has never been solved, has become more acute." There is not a shred of evidence to support this. Siegfried surely must know it is false, for the truth was pointed out to him before the publication of the French edition of this work, and reviews of the book in France reiterated the facts. Yet our historian clings to the falsehood. Why?

The errors that besmirch every chapter of this book result from the effort to square an archaic conception of nationality with the actual circumstances of American life, which in crucial respects run counter to it. For a half-century Siegfried has been repeating the argument that a nation must be culturally and socially homogeneous, share a common racial descent, traditions, religion, literature, and even such traits as intellectuality, common sense, and critical spirit. *Nations Have Souls* is the title of another of his recent books.

This conception, if applied with any sort of rigor, will not even fit France. It is certainly ludicrously incongruous with the realities of American nationality. And since 1911 Siegfried has been frantically trying to justify his notion of nationality by explaining away the case of the United States.

In Siegfried's view, two elements account for the American peculiarities. First, the genuine (Anglo-Saxon) Americans permitted the invasion of a mélange of other races which have since formed into indigestible minorities. "There can scarcely be any racial unity in a nation that has been formed in this way." In some respects the situation is hopeless. For the Negro question, "no solution appears satisfactory or even possible." "The Jewish community remains a group apart in the United States probably more than anywhere else. . . . When the old-established, traditional elements of the nation come into contact with this Biblical flame, with this bitter, insatiable intelligence, ever restless and dissatisfied, so unlike the Anglo-Saxon in its sharp outbursts, they take fright . . . and it is from them that the deepest American anti-Semitic feeling springs."

Furthermore, America as a civilization is different from the nations of Western Europe "not only in dimensions but in quality." The United States has stifled the spirit of critical individualism. A "fanatical respect for method" (inherited from Germany, although modified by "Anglo-Saxon common sense") has made efficiency the central cultural value of American society, so that the individual is "required to classify himself" in a "planned framework." Public opinion demands conformity and creates a nation of mass men, working and living at the command of automatons.

These outmoded clichés would, standing alone, hardly command the respect even of Europeans totally unacquainted with the United States. But knotted in with the generalizations are statements of presumed fact that conform to the prejudices of our worst enemies across the Atlantic. Thus, the Marshall Plan and UNRRA were simply expedients to stimulate falling American exports—that disposes of the altruism in the American effort to rehabilitate Europe and develop the economies of Asia and Africa. Or again, the United States entered the war of 1941, as of 1917, only out of a concern for its own security, and at that only after it had been attacked—that takes care of the slogans about democracy, liberation from totalitarianism, and the four freedoms. And Americans would rather have a new world war than face another depression—that indicates where the real danger to Europe lies!

What is a Frenchman to think who reads these statements from the pen of one who is publicly identified as a friend of America?

There is no notice in this book of subjects touched on by earlier French travelers: democratic institutions, voluntary associations, philanthropy, and the dignity of the common man. Apparently these features of American life have either disappeared or ceased to be important. How then does the United States differ from the Soviet Union? Well, Professor Siegfried informs us, "The conditions of efficient production are on the whole the same in the United States as in Russia, in a society based on free enterprise as under a Communist regime." Confronting these two powers, the civilizations of which are different from his own, can the European be other than neutral?

The tragic misapprehension of the nature of American democracy deprives us of our most valuable potential allies in Europe. Fear of Communism, for the moment, has made such "moderates" as Siegfried our friends, not from any love of our way of life but rather from a sterile resistance to change of any kind. As long as they remain our only interpreters, we shall have difficulty in drawing to our side more vigorous forces, discontented with the civilization Siegfried defends and anxious for changes for which our experience—did they but understand it—offers a model.

Grand Old Man

ON JEWISH LAW AND LORE. By LOUIS GINZBERG. The Jewish Publication Society. 262 pp. \$3.50.

Reviewed by NAHUM N. GLATZER

THE late Louis Ginzberg, a collateral descendant of the Gaon of Vilna, was one of the few Jewish savants of our time who combined first-rate scholarship with success in enlightening the much courted intelligent layman. The author of the learned *Hebrew Commentary on the Palestinian Talmud* also wrote elegant monographs like those gathered in his *Students, Scholars and Saints*. The first four volumes of his *Legends of the Jews*, which present the non-legal traditions of the Talmud and the Midrash, make pleasurable reading, which does not prevent the two volumes of "Notes" that follow them from being documents of meticulous research into the original texts and their variants, as well as into general and Jewish folklore, into comparative religion and ancient Near Eastern thought.

The bibliography of Ginzberg's writings—which comprises several hundred books, studies, encyclopedia articles, and reviews—does not begin with the usual doctoral dissertation expected from a scholar trained at a German university; the first item on the list reads simply: *Gedichte* (Poems), Basle, 1894. The world of living things and people retained the interest from first to last of this man who became in his time the most distinguished representative of Talmudic learning in the Western world.

ON JEWISH LAW AND LORE, originally planned as an anniversary volume to mark Ginzberg's eightieth birthday, is a collection of essays and studies which demonstrates his interest in both scholarship and its popularization.

Easily the most significant piece is the translation of a paper read in Hebrew at the Jerusalem University and entitled, "The Significance of the Halachah for Jewish History." This gracefully styled lecture, well documented but not overloaded with evidence and completely devoid of the customary bickering with fellow scholars, has been the springboard for extensive work and research by other scholars.

Of the two rival schools in the Jerusalem of the first pre-Christian century, that of Hillel is known to be lenient and forbearing, that of Shammai strict and uncompromising, in the interpretation of the Law. These differences were usually explained as expressing the personal dispositions of the founders of these schools. Ginzberg re-examined the sources and came up with the sociological theory that Shammai's adherents were from the upper and middle classes and represented their interests, whereas Hillel's came mostly from the lower classes and tended to champion their rights.

According to the school of Shammai the so-called "New Year for Fruit Trees" is observed on the first day of the Hebrew month of Shevat; according to the school of Hillel, on the fifteenth. In Ginzberg's opinion, the reason for this difference in dating was economic: the rich had better fields and gardens, whose fruit matured earlier than that in the gardens of the poor. The school of Shammai forbade the baking of twists, or thick loaves of bread, on holidays, while the Hillelites permitted it. The difference was again socio-economic: the rich had no need for such bread on holidays, since they enjoyed various other savories; the poorer classes used bread in any form on weekdays

and even on holidays. Also, in determining the minimal amount to be spent on festivals and pilgrims' sacrifices, the school of Shammai had the well-to-do in mind, the school of Hillel, those of limited means. In discussing the policy of admission to their schools, Shammai required that the student be not only wise and modest but rich and of good family, while Hillel said "one ought to teach every man."

This sociological insight—simple enough once arrived at—is important for more than Talmudic research. Hillel fought for the common man (in the field of legislation as well as by ethical pronouncements) at a time when official Jerusalem, under Herod and his successors, went out of its way to please Rome. Political power was on the side of a Hellenist bureaucracy when Hillel resumed the ancient prophetic protest against the rich and the mighty "who oppress the poor and crush the needy"—this time, however, by patient social action rather than by passionate criticism. To designate Hillel's social attitude, the Talmudic sources use the term *hesed*, meaning loving-kindness, grace, mercy, loving loyalty. This term had been employed by the prophets before Hillel to denote that which God wanted of man, and throughout Jewish history it has inspired the *hasidim*, or "pious ones."

ALTHOUGH Louis Ginzberg's research spreads over many fields of Jewish and related studies—the volume before us is a true mirror of his many-sidedness—his major interest remained the clarification of the vast Talmudic material. This, as a pre-condition for correcting generally distorted notions about Pharisaism. What was needed was a better understanding of the process of separation from the mainstream of Western history that Judaism underwent in late antiquity. This separation was not effected in order to preserve "outward" as against "inward" religiousness; only the preciousness of the inner life under Judaism and the dedication to the *hesed* idea became less and less visible to the outside world. The verdict of post-Classical Europe is understandable only under the historic conditions that accompanied it. The Christian notion of Pharisaism cannot be dogmatically perpetuated, for it is no longer valid. But while practically all the other intellectual and spiritual factors we know of in late antiquity have been revaluated in modern times, Pharisaism still remains misrepresented. Toynbee, who understands very well the ethical

humanism and religious dedication to peace on earth of Hillel and his chief disciple, Johanan ben Zakkai, nevertheless classes them together with the militantly nationalist Zealots, thus confirming—on a new level—the ancient distortion. Here the works of Louis Ginzberg, as well as a few other scholars, could be of great help.

The one great limitation in Ginzberg's work is his inhibited appreciation of the role of mysticism in the growth of Judaism. His essay, "The Cabala," tries hard to do justice to its subject by classifying mystical terms neatly and by attempting an intelligible definition and a historical delineation. Ginzberg admits that the "great importance of the Cabala for rabbinical Judaism lies in the fact that it prevented the latter from becoming fossilized," but this insight remains unrelated to the essay as a whole. Isaac Luria, whose *theologia mystica*, conceived after the expulsion from Spain, was described by Gershom G. Scholem as "a mystical interpretation of Exile and Redemption," a doctrine which "raised every Jew to the rank of a protagonist in the great process of restitution," appears in Ginzberg's article as an initiator of "fanciful religious exercises" in a school which practiced "the writing of amulets, conjuration of devils, mystic jugglery with numbers and letters." Ginzberg maintains that the Hasidic school of Habad alone has "shown that the Lurianic Cabala is something more than a senseless playing with letters," but that other forms of Hasidism "derived from the Cabala, represent the acme of systematized cant and irrational talk." The essay (illustrated as if on purpose with blurry and indistinct mystical diagrams) ends by pointing to the "most pernicious influence on the intellect and soul of the Jew" that certain mystical teachings have had. Here speaks the Lithuanian Jewish rationalist whose broad and intense rabbinic learning and profound piety did not stand in need of correction, improvement, or "defossilization" by mysticism.

That Ginzberg, who in "The Codification of Jewish Law" was patient enough to deal with all those intricacies of Biblical criticism which destroy the unity of Torah—a blasphemy in the eyes of a Halachist—that same Ginzberg almost instinctively opposed the intrusion of non-rational trends into intellectually clear-cut rabbinic Judaism. Once, when talking of the glib latter-day syntheses of rational and irrational interpretations of Judaism, he told this reviewer: "I like my whisky straight."

This *I Believe*

By Harry A. Bullis*

Intellectual maturity can no longer be left to a small element of our society. It must expand to cover large segments of our people, spread out from universities and bring a re-examination of human values and problems in the light of new facts. It is imperative for our survival that we develop an army of intellectually grown-up men and women. Today's undergraduates are candidates for tomorrow's corps of leaders. To justify their membership they must use their academic education as the starting point, not the termination of their intellectual growth. It is the future they must look to, a future inevitably to be far different from the present. Only the penetrating and highly trained mind can appraise the future and prepare to win success in it.

"A highly educated man has been educated at two levels: first, he has a practical understanding of modern technology, is able to foresee its developments and their economic and sociological impact on modern society. Second, he has been tutored in humanistic values. His knowledge of history, economics, religions, sociology, and psychology must be so thorough that he can evaluate change in terms of continuing human progress rather than as a threat to human stability.

"At the same time he must be so mentally flexible that he can avoid at all times the psychic shock that too often comes with changes. He must be able to accept new techniques and precedent-destroying discoveries without discarding the valid experiences of the past. Rather he must be able to re-examine historic contributions to human progress and relate them to current thinking and technological advance. The ability constantly to reappraise the factors of civilization in terms of progress is the mark of the intellectually and emotionally mature man."

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*"The Future Belongs To The Educated Man"

SATURDAY REVIEW

January 21st, 1956, issue.

Holiday Cook

THE JEWISH FESTIVAL COOKBOOK. By
FANNIE ENGLE and GERTRUDE BLAIR.
David McKay Co. 194 pp. \$3.50.

THE JEWISH HOLIDAY COOK BOOK. By
LEAH W. LEONARD. Crown. 184 pp.
\$2.50.

Reviewed by RUTH GLAZER

NOR the least of the places in which the Jewish revival has caused an added bustle is the kitchen. Some of the more enthusiastic popular literature, in fact, would have us believing that the egg beater is today the most effective weapon for propagating the faith; if, at the Seder table, the "Had Gadya" ought to be properly chanted, so ought the *charoses* be properly mixed. And above and beyond that, what *does* go to make up a tasty "Passover brunch"?

Two specialized volumes, *The Jewish Holiday Cook Book* and *The Jewish Festival Cookbook*, have appeared in the past year to enlighten the novice, and refresh the memories of the more experienced. Right off, let me say that apart from the holiday specialties in both volumes, it is gratifying, at last, to find collected between covers the recipes for those obvious, well-known dishes—such as sweet and sour vinegar cucumbers, chicken fricassee with meat balls, Greek salad, cole slaw made with lemon and oil—that can be ordered in any good Jewish restaurant. I had come to believe some mystery was here. For to try to extract one of these sanctified recipes from any of the ladies—otherwise voluble—who have known them a lifetime, was, most often, to be met with the silence of a secret sorority.

Of the two compendiums, the *Jewish Festival Cookbook* turns out to be the more programmatic (irritatingly so) and the better work of reference. One must only steel oneself (when not poring over the actual recipes) against the style, a species of baby talk that babbles this kind of innocent sociology: "The father [on the Sabbath] takes a little nap before going to the synagogue—and this is a custom that might be part of the ritual of the Sabbath, so generally has it always been observed. Then he may go to join a study group or to hear a lecture given by a rabbi. Families, dressed in their best, visit friends and relatives. Children visit

their grandparents and are indulged with *kichlach* (cookies) and nuts. And so the day is spent in study, prayer and social life. It is a day of recreation and refreshment. There is no work to occupy any one." Not omitting the up-to-the-minute, and in the same rhapsodic present tense, the authors speak of Chanukah: "Dreidels," they declare, "have become so much a part of this holiday that they are now made also of candy and sold as holiday confection gifts. . . . In many homes parents plan to give the children a gift every night during this holiday." The rosiness of the plan has only been dimmed, in the observation of this writer, by a certain self-conscious wryness on the part of the parents carrying it out.

When all this is said, whoever buys the *Jewish Festival Cookbook* for what it ought to be bought for, its recipes, will have done well. Its great merit is that it brings together all the highly specialized Jewish dishes and presents them without destructive American "adaptations." If the meat has to be cooked to death for a carrot *tsimmes*, for example, the recipe will so instruct you. Green vegetables go unmentioned and the only salad referred to is the one made of cucumbers, radishes, scallions, tomatoes, pot cheese, and sour cream. Only, to return to the mysteries of Jewish cooking, the index won't do for the uninitiated. When I was a child I finally came to know that *lukshen* meant noodles: except, I wondered, was it really the same? The authors of the *Jewish Festival Cookbook* evidently couldn't make up their minds either: they list *lukshen* as *lukshen*, and by the time we reach the last *zimmel* we'd like to cry *roll!*

THE Leah Leonard volume is divided into nine sections, each introducing sound background material, in straightforward capsule fashion, on the major Jewish holidays. One portion is set aside for the Sabbath, and about fifty pages at the end given to "home celebrations." Each section contains a number of authentic, old-fashioned recipes (with a little too much, however, of the "mogen dovid luncheon salad" school of cooking).

But from the first page one is bound to question the spirit of the *Jewish Holiday Cook Book*: is it in keeping with the spirit of the Jewish holidays? That spirit, as everyone knows, requires a frenzy of activity and a prodigality of effort that does not seem consonant with the author's exhortation, for ex-

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ample, to use bought gefilte fish in jars and save your strength. Our author is altogether a very practical lady. She suggests disguising the over-plentiful holiday boiled chicken with mayonnaise and celery. She also adds peanut butter to chopped liver (variation 2), and in the Chanukah salad makes use of papaya rings (variation 1). But these aren't the secrets I, for one, bought the book to find.

Masonry of History

THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST AUTOCRACY: POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN THE SOVIET STATE, 1917-1922. By LEONARD SCHAPIRO. Harvard University Press. 397 pp. \$7.00.

THE RUSSIAN MARXISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF BOLSHEVISM. By LEOPOLD H. HAIMSON. Harvard University Press. 246 pp. \$5.50.

Reviewed by BERTRAM D. WOLFE

"Few would deny"—wrote Isaiah Berlin in the *American Historical Review* for October 1949—"that the Russian Revolution has transformed the social and political outlook of our time. It is strange, therefore, that more than thirty years after its occurrence . . . the works thus far written have done no more than provide the evidence upon which it is possible to build such great and abiding monuments as those by which the French Revolution has been commemorated."

Since the above was written, whether because of the largeness of the subject, the nature of modern scholarship, the unresolved character of the historical process, or the lack of a man with a 19th-century appetite and courage to embrace so vast a theme in its entirety, all the good books which have appeared continue to "do no more than provide the evidence" out of which a Thierry or Guizot or Mignet may

some day construct the monumental study of the revolution whose presence and consequences overshadow our day. Neither of the books under review aspires to be such a "monument," but both provide important building blocks.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO gives the first significant and systematic picture of the political opposition to the Bolshevik seizure of power and its consolidation into a totalitarian autocracy. The very persuasiveness of power and successfulness of success make many of our historians and political scientists all too vulnerable to the official versions of events put forward by the victors, whereas the truths of the defeated, which are always an essential constituent of the overall historical truth and a key to its meaning, have to be sought in obscure pamphlets, stifled speeches, scattered leaflets, melancholy reminiscences, unheard rejoinders from protagonists whom defeat has discredited in the eyes of the worshippers of the brazen calf, and whom the tempest has scattered far and wide into the night of exile. It is these truths of the defeated which Leonard Schapiro recovers.

Mr. Schapiro is a born "archeologist." His skill in exhuming what has been buried under successive layers of calumny, misrepresentation, and ever changing versions of official truth, enables the documents to speak for themselves, with an eloquence enhanced by his own quiet and dispassionate style. Even when he is by implication criticizing the Deutschers and Carrs, who pretend to have given a fair picture of the aims of the defeated, he does this so unobtrusively that one scarcely notices. Thus, in a footnote referring to something he has found in the *Izvestiya* of the Central Committee, he observes: "It is a melancholy reflection on the standards of research into Soviet history in this country [England], that this publication, essential for the study of the history of the party, was found by the present writer in the British Museum in 1950 with its pages still largely uncut."

MR. SCHAPIRO begins with the democratic Revolution of February 1917. The fatal weaknesses of the Provisional Government arose from its dogmatic adherence to total democracy in time of war and siege, and from its superstitious conviction that the enemies of democracy were to be found only on the right.

Next he surveys, in turn, the fate of each of the opposition parties after the Bolsheviks had overthrown the Provisional Government and set up their own state of siege. We watch the Left Social Revolutionaries prepare their own undoing by accepting Bolshevik minority dictatorship and permitting their little group to be used as a mask for it. Then we watch the downfall of the Social Revolutionary party, for whom "nobility took the place of a program," and who had behind them the overwhelming majority of the Russians but refused to use force against the "Left" when force might have been effective. The Menshevik Social Democrats, handicapped by their dogmatic allegiance to the "Soviet power" and "Soviet legality" which the Communist ruling party no longer respected, "perished without firing a shot"; this did not prevent the Lenin propaganda machine from branding them "counter-revolutionists," "White Guards," and "foreign interventionists." (Only recently, Professor Carr's history has once more circulated the official version that they were outlawed because they were "unwilling to accept Soviet legality.")

Now it became the turn of those equalitarian and libertarian Communists who had accepted the dictatorship as a weapon against outsiders, but fancied they could yet keep democracy alive inside an otherwise dictatorial ruling party. But the police methods which they had sanctioned and even urged against all other groups and parties finally reached into their own midst to exterminate the "heretics" in the Communist party who insisted on taking seriously the original ideals and programs that Communism had proclaimed in its campaign for power. With their silencing, all opposition ceased—except that invented by the police and the dictator in order to justify the perpetually maintained state of siege.


It is a triumph of Mr. Schapiro's method of presentation that his conclusions, following after the account of these developments, almost seem superfluous. The facts and documents he has dug up so painstakingly and organized so beautifully already present with the rigor of a syllogism the conclusion that the Communist

party's outlawing of all other parties and then of its own inner life was in itself the obverse side of the rise of totalitarianism.

LEOPOLD HAIMSON, in his *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*, approaches the history of ideas and organizations from the opposite end of the historical continuum. He begins in the 19th century with that little group of revolutionary intellectuals, thrown together by their common estrangement from Russian society, who embraced Marxism and set out to found in its name a single, united, revolutionary socialist party. He traces their break with populism and with the non-Marxist moderate and liberal intelligentsia, their fight against "revisionism," "economism," and other "heresies," their development of what they took to be a common program, a common ideology, common tactical and organizational views, their founding of *Iskra*, their unification congress in 1903, and their unexpected split at this congress into Bolshevism and Menshevism.

Mr. Haimson's book, too, is no less interesting for its method than for the conclusions it comes to. He gives credit in his preface to two teachers, "Michael Karpovich, who guided my first steps in the study of Russian intellectual history, and Margaret Mead, who did so much to stimulate and sharpen my interest in the field of personality and culture." The result is a successful and at times brilliant fusion of a knowledge of the history of ideas and of historical method, on the one hand, with some of the approaches being experimented with by cultural anthropology in its effort to relate personality to culture. He is saved from the absurdities into which so many of the cultural anthropologists have fallen by the fact that the Russian intelligentsia does really present an unusually high degree of homogeneity, and by his own constant awareness of the real historical process in an evolving society. Not nursing patterns, swaddling clothes, and infancy syndromes, but the real biographies, spiritual and physical, of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, and Lenin lead him to their differing appreciations of the meaning of their verbally similar formulae. And these ideas are analyzed not according to some externally seen unhistorical or fossilized social pattern, but in accord with the real history of changing Czarist society.

The author's principal organizing concept is the polarity between "consciousness" and "spontaneity" which played so large a role, conscious



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and unconscious, in the debates of the Russian revolutionaries, and especially of the Marxists and Lenin. In his view, the main concern of the intelligentsia was to attain "consciousness"—"a reasonable and responsible world view in the face of an alien and indifferent society," and with this a clear view of the destiny of Russia. It was the very intensity of this effort, its pride and its penalties, which alienated the intelligentsia from the rest of 19th-century Russian society. The author finds that they had to repress and deny essential aspects of their natures and their heritage in order to identify themselves fully with their fanatically held world view; this explains much of their intolerance towards hidden aspects of their own personalities, and their intolerance of everything in history and society that seemed to challenge the ideas by which they lived.

For Haimson, "spontaneity," the other pole of this highly charged magnetic field, is formed at times by the repressed aspects of the revolutionaries' personalities, at other times by the "spontaneous masses" with whom they sought to link their ideas in order to implement them in the real world of Russia. It is impossible, within the scope of a review, to follow the subtlety and acuteness of Mr. Haimson's use of these concepts. Suffice it to say that he finds in Lenin the strictest control of the suppressed impulses of his own nature, and the strongest awareness that the "spontaneous" impulses of the masses, though potent and ineradicable, could by proper "organization" and control be harnessed to the powers of "consciousness" and utilized to fulfill the latter's formulae as to what the future had inevitably to be.

Two reservations with regard to Mr. Haim-

son's methodology can be suggested. At times he treats his protagonists as disembodied ideas, rooting them, to be sure, in their personal histories and in the history of ideas, but without taking sufficient account of the *samolubie* (self-love) and jealousy that peer through some of their differences over doctrine and organization (e.g. the first Plekhanov-Lenin "lovers' quarrel"). The Russian intellectuals were human, all too human, and their motives did not always fit with these large conceptual polarities of "consciousness" and "spontaneity."

The second reservation is more important. Mr. Haimson does not seem to be aware of the extent to which Lenin (as well as some of his dictatorial precursors) was feeling his way towards an entirely new, and not exclusively Russian, conception of a dictatorship of an elite which was to rule not merely over such "spontaneous mass formations" as the peasantry and the workers, but no less over all other classes, the intellectuals themselves, the whole of society, even over his own party and its leading organs—and the extent to which Lenin identified himself alone with "consciousness." For that, a different conceptual tool must be used, namely a conception of the nature of nascent totalitarianism.

To this reviewer, Mr. Haimson's book seems to owe considerably more to Michael Karpovich than to Margaret Mead; nevertheless, the combination has been fruitful, for as every historian and political scientist knows, when we are trying to study a movement and a revolution, it remains a matter of first importance to study the personality and biography of the man or men who set their stamp upon the movement that brought about the revolution.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

RICHARD CHASE, well-known critic, is associate professor of English at Columbia.

ALFRED WERNER's art criticism appears in many periodicals.

OSCAR HANDLIN's most recent book is *Chance or Destiny: Turning Points in American History*.

NAHUM N. GLATZER teaches Jewish history at Brandeis.

RUTH GLAZER is one of our commentators on informal Judaism.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE's book *Six Keys to the Soviet System* will be published soon by Beacon.

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